MASSEY v MANDELL
Docket No. 115398
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 11, 2000
462 Mich. 375
Argued April 4, 2000 (Calendar No. 3).
Docket No. 115398. Argued April 4, 2000 (Calendar No. 3). Decided July 11, 2000.
Maureen Massey, for herself and as the personal representative of the estate of Jeremy Massey, deceased, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against the Children‘s Center of Detroit; Camp Niobe and certain of its employees, including Joanne Mandell; and others for the wrongful death of Jeremy while swimming at the camp during an outing sponsored by the center. The camp and Ms. Mandell sought a change of venue to Lapeer County where the camp was locatеd. The court, Amy P. Hathaway, J., denied a change of venue because both the plaintiff and the Children‘s Center were in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals, D. E. HOLBROOK JR. and MICHAEL J. KELLY, JJ. (GAGE, P.J., dissenting), granted immediate consideration and denied leave to appeal and a stay of proceedings for lack of merit in the grounds presented (Docket No. 219751). Ms. Mandell and the camp appeal.
In an opinion by Justice TAYLOR, joined by Chief Justice WEAVER, and Justices YOUNG and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
Venue was not improperly laid in Wayne County. Neither
Justice CORRIGAN, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and KELLY, concurring, stated that
Section 1641 is not a substantive venue provision because, standing alone, it does not instruct a litigant where to file an action. Rather, it demands reference to the various substantive venue statutes. It merely explains that when a case involves joined causes of action, the entire case may be brought in any county in which it would have been proper to bring one of the various joined causes of action, if that cause of action had been sued upon separately. To determine whether a particular county would have been a proper venue for one of the various joined causes of action sued upon separately, one must refer to whichever substantive venue statute is applicable.
Subsection 1641(2) provides an exception to the general rule set forth in subsection 1641(1) that venue for the entire case is proper in any county in which one of the joined causes of action could have been brought separately. In cases involving joined causes of action, where at least one cause of action is based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, venue must be determined аccording to the rules of § 1629. Section 1629 is the substantive venue statute applicable to causes of action sounding in tort and wrongful death. Subsection 1641(2) creates a preference for § 1629 over the other substantive venue statutes.
Applying the rules of §§ 1641 and 1629 to the facts of this case, it becomes evident that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that Wayne County is a proper venue. If the plaintiff had brought suit against only the Children‘s Center, then venue would have been proper in Wayne County under § 1629. Subsection 1629(1)(a) would not apply, becаuse the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and the Children‘s Center is a Wayne County organization. Subsection 1629(1)(b) would not apply because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and the plaintiff is a Wayne County resident. Wayne County would satisfy the criteria of subsection 1629(1)(c), however, because no county satisfied the criteria of subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b), the plaintiff is a Wayne County resident, and the Children‘s Center has its place of business in Wayne County. If the plaintiff had brought suit against only defendant Camp Niobe, venue would have been proper only in Lapeer County under subsection 1629(1)(a), because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and Camp Niobe has its place of business in Lapeer County. Because the plaintiff elected to bring this suit against both the Children‘s Center and Camp Niobe, and cer
Affirmed.
Donald M. Fulkerson for plaintiff-appellee.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by Christine D. Oldani and Gregory Gromek), for defendants-appellants Mandell and Camp Niobe.
Collins, Einhorn, Farrell & Ulanoff, P.C. (by Janice G. Hildenbrand), for defendants Children‘s Center and Dilg.
TAYLOR, J. We granted leave to appeal to consider defendants Camp Niobe‘s and Joanne Mandell‘s claim that the trial court had erred in denying their motion to change venuе from Wayne County to Lapeer County. Because we conclude that venue in Wayne County was proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff‘s decedent, nine-year-old Jeremy Massey, was a foster child in Detroit. On June 28, 1998, Jeremy participated in an outing sponsored by the Children‘s Center of Detroit at Camp Niobe in Lapeer County. Tragically Jeremy drowned while in the swimming area at the camp. Maureen Massey filed a lawsuit in Wayne County as personal representative of Jeremy‘s estate. The lawsuit named as defendants the Childrеn‘s Center and one of its employees, Lisa
The camp and Mandell filed a motion for change of venue, arguing that venue in Wayne County was improper and that, pursuant to
The trial court denied the motion to change venue on the basis that both the plaintiff and the Children‘s Center were in Wayne County. Camp Niobe and Mandell filed an application for leave to appeal, a motion for immediate consideration, and a request for a stay with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted immediate consideration and denied the application and stay “for lack of merit in the grounds presentеd.”3 The camp and Mandell then filed a motion for immediate consideration, an application for leave to appeal, and a motion for stay with this Court. This Court granted immediate consideration and granted a stay and leave to appeal.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court‘s ruling in response to a motion to change improper venue under the clearly erroneous standard. Shock Bros, Inc v Morbark Industries, Inc, 411 Mich 696, 698-699; 311 NW2d 722 (1981). Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993).
III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In examining a statute, it is our obligation to discern the legislative intent that may reasonably be
IV. THE STATUTE
(1) Subject to subsection (2) in an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, all of the following apply:
(a) The county in which the original injury occurred and in which either of the following applies is a county in which to file and try the action:
(i) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The corporate registered office of a defendant is located in that county.
(b) If a county does not satisfy the criteria under subdivision (a), the county in which the original injury occurred and in which either of the following applies is a county in which to file and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The corporate registered office of a plaintiff is located in that county.
(c) If a county does not satisfy the criteria under subdivision (a) or (b), a county in which both of the following apply is a county in which to file and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has а place of business, or conducts business in that county, or has its corporate registered office located in that county.
(ii) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or has its corporate registered office located in that county.
(d) If a county does not satisfy the criteria under subdivision (a), (b), or (c), a county that satisfies the criteria under section 1621 or 1627 is a county in which to file and try an action.
(2) Any party may file a motion to change venue based on hardship or inconvenience.
(3) For the purpose of this section only, in a product liability action, a defendant is considered to conduct business in a county in which the defendant‘s product is sold at retail. [Emphasis added.]
V. ANALYSIS
The parties agree that the original injury for purposes of construing § 1629 was the drowning and that the drowning occurred in Lapeer County. The camp and Mandell argue that they satisfy subd (1)(a) of § 1629 because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and they reside, have a place of business, or conduct business in Lapeer County. The plaintiff argues howevеr that when subd (1)(a) is carefully analyzed the argument for mandatory venue in Lapeer County fails.
Subd (1)(a) provides that, using the place of original injury (Lapeer County) as the referent, the inquiry is then if either of the following apply:
(i) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The corporate registered office of a defendant is located in that county. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, subd (1)(a)(i) requires that “[t]he defendant” reside, have a place of business, or conduct business in the county.5 Here, we have a case with four defendants.6 The camp and Mandell would satisfy subd (1)(a)(i) if either were the only defendant. Moreover, the Children‘s Center and Lisa Dilg would not satisfy subd (1)(a)(i) even if they were the only defendant. These circumstances are fatal to the camp‘s and Mandell‘s reliance on subd (1)(a)(i).7
Having determined that subd (1)(a)(i) does not apply, we next must determine if subd (1)(a)(ii) required venue be established in Lapeer County.
The statute next instructs that, if a county does not satisfy the criteria in subd (1)(a), one must look to subd (1)(b). Under subd (1)(b), Lapeer County would be the proper venue if “[t]he plaintiff” resided there, or had a рlace of business there or conducted business there or if “a plaintiff” had a registered corporate office there. None of these criteria are satisfied.
The statute next instructs that if a county does not satisfy subd (1)(a) or (1)(b) that one must look to subd (1)(c). Under subd (1)(c), the county in which the original injury occurred is no longer a consideration. Rather, if there is a county wherein “[t]he plaintiff” resides, or has a place of business, conducts business or has its registered office, and at the same time “[t]he defendant” resides or has a place of business or conducts business or has its registered corporate office, then such a county is a county in which to try an action. Plaintiff argues that Wayne County comes within subd (1)(c). We cannot agree. There is no question that plaintiff resides in Wayne County. However, subd (1)(c)(ii) also requires that “[t]he defendant” reside, have a place of business, conduct business, or have its registered office in Wayne County before Wayne County would be “a county in
The statute next instructs that if a county does not satisfy subd (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c) one must look to subd (1)(d), which provides:
If a county does not satisfy the criteria under subdivision (a), (b), or (c), a county that satisfies the criteria under section 1621 or 1627 is a county in which to file and try an action.
Thus, we are instructed to consult
Except for actions provided for in sections 1605, 1611, 1615, and 1629, venue is determined as follows:
(a) The county in which a defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business, or in which the rеgistered office of a defendant corporation is located, is a proper county in which to commence and try an action.
Sections 1605,8 1611,9 161510 do not apply here. This means we must look to § 1629, which by its terms refers us to § 1621 or § 1627.
Applying § 1621 leads to the conclusion that Wayne County was a proper county in which plaintiff was free to file her lawsuit because at least one defendant
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary then, because
WEAVER, C.J., and YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with TAYLOR, J.
CORRIGAN, J. I concur in the result reached by the majority, but for a different reason. In my view, the answer to the difficult venue question presented in this case lies in § 1641 of the Revised Judicature Act, which provides in full:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), if causes of action are joined, whether properly or not, venue is proper in any county in which either cause of action, if sued upon separately, could have been commenced and tried, subject to separation and change as provided by court rule.
(2) If more than 1 cause of action is pleaded in the complaint or added by amendment at any time during the action and 1 of the causes of action is based on tort оr another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, venue shall be determined under the rules applicable to actions in tort as provided in section 1629.
When examining a statute, our primary task is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). This task begins by examining the language of the statute itself, as the words of a statute provide “the most reliable evidence of its intent.” See id., quoting United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to have intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the language must be applied as written. “No further judicial construction is required or permitted.” Sun Valley, supra at 236. Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. Id. The interpretation of individual words and phrases within a statute is governed by
All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
“Cause of action” is a legal term of art. Therefore, it must be undеrstood according to its “peculiar and appropriate meaning.”
1. A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person; CLAIM (4) <after the crash, Aronson had a cause of action>.
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2. A legal theory of a lawsuit <a malpractice cause of action. Cf. RIGHT OF ACTION>. — Also termed (in senses 1 & 2) ground of action.
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3. Loosely, a lawsuit <there are four defendants in the pending cause of action>.
Section 1641 describes “causes of action” that are “joined.” For purposes of joinder, this Court has repeatedly defined “cause of action,” as being “the fact or combination of facts giving rise to or entitling a party to sustain an action.” See Multiplex Concrete Machinery Co v Saxer, 310 Mich 243, 253; 17 NW2d 169 (1945); Brewster Loud Lumber Co v General Builders’ Supply Co, 233 Mich 633, 638; 208 NW 28 (1926); Otto v Highland Park, 204 Mich 74, 80; 169 NW 904 (1918). Because § 1641 speaks in terms of the joinder of causes of action, this definition of “cause of action,” which is generally consistent with the word “claim,” best represents the “peculiar and appropriate meaning” of the statutory term in this context.
Understanding “cause of action” to mean “the combination of facts giving rise to or entitling a party to
Section 1641 is not a substantive venue provision. Standing alone, it does not instruct a litigant where to file an action. Rather, it demands reference to the various substantive venue statutes. Section 1641 explains that when a case involves joined “causes of action,” the entire case may be brought in any county in which it would have been proper to bring one of the various joined causes of action, if that cause of action had been sued upon separately. To determine whether a particular county would have been a proper venue for one of the various joined causes of
Subsection 1641(2) provides an exception to the general rule set forth in subsection 1641(1) that venue for the entire case is proper in any county in which one of the joined causes of action could have been brought separately. In cases involving joined causes of action, where at least one cause of action is “based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,” venue must be “determined” according to the rules of § 1629. Section 1629 is the substantive venue statute applicable to causes of action sounding in tort and wrongful death. Subsection 1641(2) creates a preference for § 1629 over the other substantive venue statutes.
Consider, for instance, a complaint that joins a cause of action sounding in tort with a cause of action sounding in contract. The proper venue for the tort cause of action would be determined by reference to § 1629, which is the substantive venue provision applicable to tort actions. The proper venue for the contract cause of action would be determined by reference to § 1621, which is the substantive venue provision applicable to contract actions. Under the general rule set forth in subsection 1641(1), either of these venues would be permissible for the entire case. Under the exception set forth in subsection 1641(2), however, only the venue determined proper by reference to § 1629 would be permissible for the entire case. Thus, the practical effect of subsection
Applying the rules of § 1641 and § 1629 to the facts of this case, it becomes evident that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that Wayne County is a proper venue. If plaintiff had brought suit against only the Children‘s Center, then venue would have been proper in Wayne County under § 1629. Subsection 1629(1)(a) would not apply, because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and the Children‘s Center is a Wayne County organization. Subsection 1629(1)(b) would not apply because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and plaintiff is a Wayne County resident. Wayne County would satisfy the criteria of subsection 1629(1)(c), however, because no county satisfied the criteria of subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b), plaintiff is a Wayne County resident, and the Children‘s Center has its place of business in Wayne County.
On the other hand, if plaintiff had brought suit against only defendant Camp Niobe, venue would have been proper only in Lapeer County under subsection 1629(1)(a), beсause the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and Camp Niobe has its place of business in Lapeer County. Because plaintiff elected to bring this suit against both the Children‘s Center and Camp Niobe (as well as a number of the individual agents of those entities), this case involves the joinder of multiple “causes of action.” Under the general rule set forth in § 1641, venue would be proper in any county in which one of the joined causes of action could have been brought separately.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.
Notes
(1) [I]n an action based on tort . . . seeking damages for . . . wrongful death, all of the following apply:
(a) The county in which the original injury occurred and in which either of the following applies is a county in which to file and try the action:
(i) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The corporate registered office of a defendant is located in that county. [Emphasis added.]
The Court of Appeals, in Schultz v Silver Lake Transport, Inc, 207 Mich App 267, 275; 523 NW2d 895 (1994), reached a different conclusion on this issue. There, the Court of Appeals held that a negligence suit against several defendants residing in different counties did “not involve the joinder of separate claims, but a single claim against multiple defendants.” Schultz did not cite any authority for its conclusion that a tort claim brought against several defendants for damages arising from a single accident does not involve the joinder of separate claims. Nor did the Court of Appeals explain its conclusion. Accordingly, I would reject the conclusion reached in Schultz, supra.(1) [I]n an action based on tort . . . seeking damages for . . . wrongful death, all of the following apply:
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(c) If a county does not satisfy the criteria under subdivision (a) or (b), a county in which both of the following apply is a county in which to file and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or has its corporate registered office located in that county.
(ii) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or has its corporate registered office located in that county. [Emphasis added.]
The substantive venue statutes are §§ 1605, 1615, 1621, 1627, 1629, and 1635.