82 Pa. Super. 579 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1923
Argued December 10, 1923. The facts on which the referee's award in this case was based are not in dispute. On December 4, 1920, the claimant, while working as a miner in the employ of the Armerford Coal Co. was struck on the pupil of his left eye by a flying stone, resulting in a traumatic cataract. The cataract was removed by a surgical operation, which necessitated the removal of the injured lens and its replacement by an artificial lens. Without the aid of glasses the percentage of vision of the injured eye is about five per cent; with glasses and a correcting lens it is about normal, 96 per cent. But with glasses it will not coördinate with the uninjured eye — the vision of which is better than normal — and therefore claimant cannot use the glasses for binocular vision. The result is that he has full vision with his right eye, provided he does not use glasses on his left eye; and using the glasses he has practically normal vision in his left eye, provided his right eye is closed. The referee concluded from this statement of facts that the claimant had permanently lost the use of his left eye within the meaning of section 306 (c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and awarded him 60 per cent of his wages for 125 weeks; and the board and the court below affirmed the award.
We are regretfully constrained to reverse this action. An award under paragraph (c) of section 306 contemplates the absolute loss of one of the members mentioned in the paragraph or such a permanent injury as is the equivalent of its loss. It must be such an injury as "destroys the usefulness of the member": Lente v. Luci,
Now the claimant's left eye is not destroyed. The lens, which focuses the light on the retina, is destroyed, but the retina is not, and with a correcting lens practically normal vision is obtained. Unfortunately the claimant cannot obtain this vision while using his uninjured eye, for the two eyes will not coördinate and do not present the same picture to the brain. But the eye is not destroyed; it is rather in reserve. That it is a serious injury, and that it detracts from the value of the eye, there can be no doubt, but the eye is not lost. For if claimant should lose his right eye, he would be able, using the injured eye, aided by a lens, to fully perform his duties. Under the theory adopted by the referee and the board it would be possible for this claimant to be twice awarded full compensation for the loss of each of his eyes, a condition which cannot have been intended: Fillip v. Wm. Cramp Sons Co.,
The Workmen's Compensation Law of New York is practically the same as ours in that it provides a special schedule of compensation for the loss of certain members, including the eye, and declares that the permanent loss of the use of such member shall be considered the equivalent of its loss. In Frings v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co.,
We believe our ruling to be in accordance with the principles enunciated with much clearness by our Supreme Court in Lente v. Luci, supra. There, it was held that where a workman, who had lost an eye, entered employment in the course of which he lost his remaining eye, his employer was not liable for total disability under section 306 (a), — as interpreted by clause (c) of said section providing that the loss of both eyes shall constitute total disability to be compensated according to clause (a), — but only for the loss of one eye in accordance with the schedule contained in section 306 (c); although the resulting disability was just as total as would be the loss of both eyes to a normal man. The expressions "loss" and "loss of the use" as used in section 306 (c) should be given their unrestricted and ordinary use; and the claimant's eye or the use of it, is not lost unless it is useless in any employment for which claimant is physically and mentally fitted: Chovic v. Pittsburgh C.S. Co.,
As the testimony was somewhat in conflict as to when his total disability ceased and the referee did not, under *584 his view of the case, determine that fact, the case must be returned to the board to find the facts relative to the claimant's disability and enter an order in conformity therewith.
The assignment of error is sustained. The judgment is reversed and the record is remitted with directions to recommit the record to the Workmen's Compensation Board for further hearing and determination in accordance with this opinion.