These cases were earlier considered by us and are reported under the same title in
Following the remand, no new evidence was offered by the petitioners and no further hearing was held by the Commissioner. The Commissioner again disapproved the filing of the increased fees and in his decision cited reasons therefor. In the Superior Court the judge determined that the Commissioner’s decision was not consistent with a reasonable application of the standards indicаted in our opinion, and entered decrees annulling the decision and remanding the proceedings to the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s appeals bring the case again to us.
The sole question is whether there has been compliance with the terms of the order of remand stated in our earlier opinion. The basic reason assigned by the Commissioner for his disapproval was that the scheduled fees were outside the range of reasonableness in two principal respects: (a) it does not appear that, in submitting the schedule, due consideration was given tо the dual factors of assured prompt payments to participating physicians and the increased demand for the services of participating physicians; and (b) there was no showing as to the identity or qualifications of those who prepared the schedule,
We now have examined the record and are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the Commissioner’s disapprоval was without basis. Implicit in our earlier opinion, wherein we said that “the statute permits disapрroval only if the Commissioner finds the fees to be outside ... [a] range [of reasonableness],” is the fundamental requirement that adequate evidence be made available to enable thе Commissioner to establish a range of reasonableness. The burden of furnishing such evidence is, as the Commissioner has stated, upon the petitioners.. In this connection, it is to be noted that G. L. c. 176B, § 4 (as аmended through St. 1960, c. 307, § 1), imposes no investigatory duties upon the Commissioner but simply states that the rates at which participating physicians are to be compensated ‘ ‘ shall at all times be subject to the written approval of the commissioner.” The duty thus imposed stands in contrast to the obligаtion delegated to him under G. L. c. 175, § 113B, relative to compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance whеrein it is provided that the Commissioner ‘ ‘ shall . . . after due hearing and investigation, fix and establish” the premium charges. It is thus apparent that not only is it not the responsibility of the Commissioner under G. L. c. 176B, § 4, to fix the fees, see
We think that the Commissioner acted within his statutory authority in refusing to approve the schedule bеcause of the failure of the petitioners to provide information which, in the particulаrs specified, he deemed necessary to afford an adequate basis for his apprоval and to enable him to pass upon the dependability of the committee’s conclusions. American Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.
So ordered.
Notes
There was evidence that the fee committee included representativеs of the subspecialties in surgery and medicine, and that the schedule had been considered by the Blue Shield board of directors and by the Council of the Medical Society.
