We granted the application of Massachusetts Broken Stone Company and the AMA Funding Corp. (Broken Stone) for further appellate review to decide whether thе zoning freeze pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par., applies to the land or to a particular subdivision plan. The Appeals Court held that a zoning freeze pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth pаr., applied to the particular subdivision plan and reversed the decision of the Land Court. Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston,
1. Facts and procedural history. The facts are essentially undisputed. Broken Stone owns a seventy-four aсre parcel of land on Route 20 near the intersection of Route 128 in the town of Weston. A small part of the land is located in a nonresidential zone, while the rest is in an area zoned for residential usage. On January 7, 1986, Broken Stone filed a preliminary subdivision plan for commercial development. After disputes arose over the dеvelopment plan, Broken Stone and the town entered into an agreement in 1988 whereby the town agreed to reclassify Broken Stone’s property as a business-zonеd district and Broken Stone agreed to limit its development of the site to less than one-half of the density permitted by the zoning bylaw. In addition, in May, 1988, the town amended its zoning bylaw to accommodate the agreement (1988 zoning bylaw).
In April, 1989, Broken Stone filed a preliminary subdivision plan (1989 plan) for an office complex, consistent with the agreement. The filing triggered a zoning freeze pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par. In May, 1989, the town again amended its zoning bylaw requiring a special permit from the zoning board and site plan approval from the planning board on all substantive uses over 1,000 square feet of land zoned as a business district (1989 zoning bylaw).
Broken Stone’s 1989 preliminary plan was disapproved by the planning board оn June 6, 1989. It timely submitted a definitive subdivision plan for the site which also was disapproved. On March 5, 1990, Broken Stone timely appealed from the disapproval of its definitive plаn to the Land Court. Pursuant to
Because of an economic downturn that affected the real estate market, Broken Stone put its plan to develop its land on hold. However, by August, 1994, Broken Stone held informal meetings with the town’s planning board to discuss proposals for development of the site. On June 30, 1995, Broken Stone submitted a new site plan application to the zoning board of appeals (1995 plan). Unlike its 1989 plan which had proposed a subdivision of the land, the 1995 proposal was for a 359,000 square foot office building.
The town told Broken Stone that, because the 1995 plan was not a subdivision plan, the town considered it different from the 1989 plan, that the zoning freeze did not apply, and that its 1995 plan was governed by the 1989 zoning bylaw. Broken Stone maintained that the 1995 plan was governеd by the 1988 zoning bylaw, which was frozen when it filed its 1989 plan. Broken Stone filed suit against the town in the Land Court.
2. Discussion. In reaching our conclusion we rely on the language of G. L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par., the plain purpose оf the statute, and our prior decisions, especially Heritage Park Dev. Corp. v. Southbridge,
General Laws c. 40A, § 6, fifth par., states, in pertinent part:
“If a definitive plan, or a preliminary plan followed within sevеn months by a definitive plan, is submitted to a planning board for approval under the subdivision controllaw, and written notice of such submission has been given to the city or town clerk bеfore the effective date of ordinance or by-law, the land shown on such plan shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-law, if any, in effect at the time of the first such submission while such plan or plans are being processed under the subdivision control law, and, if such definitive plan or an amendment thereof is finally approved, for eight years from the date of the endorsement of such approval . . .” (emphasis added).
We reject the town’s argument that the words “land shown on the plan” meаn the freeze provision covers only the subdivision plan submitted and ultimately approved. Where the language of a statute is clear, courts must give effect to its plаin and ordinary meaning and the courts need not look beyond the words of the statute .itself. See LeClair v. Norwell, ante 328, 335 (1999) (“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous it must be construed as written”), citing Pyle v. School Comm, of S. Hadley, 423 Mass, 283, 286 (1996); Victor V. v. Commonwealth,
It is true, as the town claims, that in previous decisions, we have apрlied the zoning freeze to subdivision plans. See Heritage Park Dev. Corp. v. Southbridge, supra at 75-76; Green v. Board of Appeal of Norwood,
We have opined that the intent of the statute was to protect
Our opinions have consistently sought to implement that legislative intent. In Heritage Park Dev. Corp. v. Southbridge, supra at 75, we concluded that a zoning freeze under G. L. c. 40A, § 6, vested despite the fact that the developer’s original plan was automatically rescinded pursuant to a contrаctual agreement between the developer and the Southbridge planning board.
In Nyquist v. Board of Appeals of Acton, supra at 464-465, which arose under G. L. c. 40A, § 7A (predecessor to the prеsent statute), we concluded that the language of § 7A was clear and unambiguous and that the “use of the land” provision under § 7A protected building permits because the words offer broad protection and cannot be restricted. See Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton,
We, therefore, conclude that G. L. c. 40A, § 6, fifth par., applies to the land.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The case lay dormant until 1996 when the Land Court allowed Broken Stone’s motion for summary judgment on the planning board’s disapproval of the site and the Appeals Court upheld the decision. See Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Planning Bd. of Weston,
Brokеn Stone and the town, in their lawsuits and appeals, have raised other issues that are not before us.
The Appeals Court’s interpretation of cases was similar to thе town’s. See Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston,
We do not agree with the town’s assertion that the sole public purpose of the statute is to allow a landowner the right to develop an аpproved subdivision within a reasonable period of time.
In Heritage Park Dev. Corp. v. Southbridge,