232 Conn. 172 | Conn. | 1995
The dispositive issue in this appeal is the validity of a bank’s exercise of its right of setoff
The underlying facts are undisputed. The plaintiff and her husband opened three joint accounts with the bank over a period of years beginning in 1986. Substantially all of the money in these accounts was deposited by the husband. On May 4, 1990, the bank notified the plaintiff’s husband that, because he was in default on a $15,000,000 loan to Village Gate Partnership for which he had agreed to act as guarantor, the bank had put a hold on his bank accounts. On May 7, 1990, the bank exercised its right of setoff and withdrew the remaining balance in the three joint accounts. Although the bank sent certified notices of the closing of these bank accounts to both the plaintiff and her husband, the plaintiff was not shown to have received any such notification. The funds subsequently were restored by the bank in conjunction with a workout arrangement pursuant to which the husband agreed to pledge the funds as security for a new loan transaction. The plaintiff learned of the new pledge on November 1, 1990.
The judgment is affirmed.
General Statutes § 36-3 provides in relevant part: “JOINT deposits and accounts, (a) When a deposit has been made in this state in any state bank and trust company, national banking association or savings bank or an account has been issued in this state by any savings and loan association or federal savings and loan association or credit union, in the names of two or more persons and in form to be paid to any one or the survivor, or survivors, of them, such deposit or account and any additions thereto made by any of such persons after the making or issuance thereof, together with all dividends or interest or increases credited thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to any of them during the lifetime of all of them or to the survivor or survivors after the death of one or more of them, and such payment and the receipt or acquittance of the person or persons to whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge for all payments so made.”
In Grodzicki v. Grodzicki, 154 Conn. 456, 461-62, 226 A.2d 656 (1967), we rejected the contention that, under this statute, the creation of a joint account conferred on each of the codepositors, inter vivos, an undivided one-half pro rata interest in the account.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff additionally challenges the constitutionality of § 36-3. The plaintiff’s constitutional claim cannot succeed. The plaintiff made no such claim in the trial court. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s claim depends upon a showing that the constitutional requirements of due process apply to bank setoffs, a proposition for which the plaintiff has provided no persuasive authority.