Mason v. StateMason v. State
During the direct examination of a witness, the prosecutor asked the witness what conversation he had with the defendant. Defense counsel objected because the state had not disclosed to the defense any statement that Mason may have made to the witness. Defense counsel sought a Richardson hearing, which the trial court denied.
The state was obligated to disclose to Mason any statement that Mason made.
We note that Mason filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Counsel after his trial but before sentencing. The trial judge denied the motion without conducting any type of inquiry. Although our disposition of this appeal has mooted this issue, we address it because Mason may raise this issue again when he is retried.
A defendant has no constitutional right to different court-appointed counsel; therefore, it is presumed that a defendant who files a motion to dismiss his court-appointed counsel is exercising his right to self-representation. Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988). The court is required in this situation to determine whether the defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel. This inquiry must cover the defendant‘s age, mental status, education, experience, and the nature and complexity of the case. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See also
When a defendant raises the incompetency of counsel, the court must conduct an inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether the counsel has rendered effective assistance. Hardwick, 521 So.2d at 1074. Of course, the trial court‘s inquiry can be only as specific as the defendant‘s complaints; however, the court must attempt to clarify the defendant‘s complaints. Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1994). If Mason again moves the court to discharge his counsel, the trial judge must not deny the motion summarily but must make an adequate inquiry consistent with this opinion.
Case No. 93-11974 is dismissed; Case No. 93-12207 is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
FRANK, C.J., and PARKER and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.