CLINT MASON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN BOOS & COMPANY, WESTAFF, INC., and REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, INC., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 5-10-0399
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District
October 28, 2011
2011 IL App (5th) 100399
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Effingham County, No. 09-L-42; the Hon. Douglas L. Jarman, Judge, presiding. Judgment: Affirmed.
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
In an action arising from the injuries plaintiff suffered while working at defendant wood products manufacturing company as a temporary employee supplied by defendant employment agency, the agreement plaintiff entered into with the employment agency upon receiving compensation pursuant to his workers’ compensation claim released any and all claims arising out of the accident, including his claim against the manufacturing company, and the appellate court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the agency’s failure to register with the Department of Insurance as an “employee leasing company” in violation of the Employee Leasing Company Act barred application of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Thomas Gamache, of Slavin & Slavin, Julie A. Teuscher, Kathleen M. McCabe, Lea Ann Fracasso, and Yaro M. Melynk, all of Cassiday Schade LLP, both of Chicago, for appellees.
Panel: JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Chapman and Justice Donovan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The plaintiff, Clint Mason (Mason), appeals the judgment entered by the circuit court of Effingham County granting the defendants’, John Boos & Company (Boos Company), Westaff, Inc. (Westaff), and Real Time Staffing Services, Inc., dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 Boos Company manufactures wood products. Westaff is a temporary employment agency that assigned temporary employees to Boos Company. Westaff supplied unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and other liability insurance to its employees. Westaff also provided Boos Company with information regarding workers’ compensation and liability coverage.
¶ 3 On October 7, 2007, Westaff assigned Mason to work as a temporary employee at Boos Company. On November 7, 2007, Mason was injured while working on a molding machine at the factory. Mason’s right hand was caught in the machine, which resulted in the amputation of his thumb and most of his four fingers on his right hand. Thereafter, Mason filed a claim for benefits related to his injury pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (
¶ 4 In the interim, on November 4, 2009, Mason filed a negligence action against the defendants alleging that they had allowed him to operate a machine without adequate training, allowed him to operate a machine without a “kill” switch, and allowed him to operate a machine without safety guards. Mason alleged that as a result of his injury, he had endured pain and suffering, had incurred medical bills, and was permanently disabled. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(6) and (a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (
¶ 5 On appeal, Mason first argues that Westaff failed to register with the Department of Insurance as an “employee leasing company” in violation of section 20 of the Employee Leasing Company Act (
¶ 6 In response, the defendants first note that Mason has admitted that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a bar to the instant common law tort remedy against the defendants. Second, the defendants note that Mason has failed to provide case law wherein Illinois courts have upheld his argument that failure to register under the Employee Leasing Company Act results in an inability to claim the protections of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendants, likewise, have found no case law supporting Mason’s theory. In fact, the plaintiff has admitted that this is an issue of first impression. Accordingly, we turn to the statutes at hand. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141 (1983). In determining what the intent is, the court may properly consider not only the language used in a statute but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be achieved. City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners, 105 Ill. 2d 336, 341 (1985). In construing a statute, the court must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985).
¶ 7 The Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy available to injured employees and therefore bars any common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer for injury or death except as provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 8 The stated purpose of the Employee Leasing Company Act is to “ensur[e] that an employer that leases some or all of its workers properly obtains workers’ compensation insurance coverage for all of its employees, including those leased from another entity, and that premium is paid commensurate with exposure and anticipated claim experience.”
¶ 9 When the Employee Leasing Company Act was originally enacted in January 1998, section 20(a) provided that “[a]n employee leasing company may not engage in business in this State without first registering with the Department.”
¶ 10 The defendants note that on the face of the Employee Leasing Company Act, there is no indication of any conditional application of the exclusive remedy protection. According to the defendants, there is no reason to view the Employee Leasing Company Act as being in conflict with the statutory/common law basis of exclusivity protection rendered to a borrowing/loaning employer. Nowhere does the Employee Leasing Company Act provide for penalties other than revocation of registration. There is also no indication that failure to register results in forfeiture of the exclusive remedy protection under the Workers’ Compensation Act. In fact, the Workers’ Compensation Act details penalties for employers who fail to obtain or carry proper liability insurance.
¶ 11 In this case it is undisputed that Mason’s injury occurred during the course of his employment as a temporary worker at Boos Company and that he sought and received recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, Mason chose to proceed with
¶ 12 Next on appeal, Mason argues that the settlement agreement did not act as a release of his common law tort claim. Mason’s argument is twofold. He first argues that because Boos Company was not named in the settlement order, the settlement order did not act as a release as to Boos Company. Second, he argues that the settlement order released only his claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act and did not release his common law tort claim. Mason contends that the Commission has no subject matter jurisdiction beyond the workers’ compensation claims for workers’ compensation benefits and cannot release or affect claims beyond claims for workers’ compensation benefits.
¶ 13 “A release is a contract whereby a party abandons a claim to a person against whom that claim exists.” Whitehead v. Fleet Towing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 759, 762 (1982). To determine the intent of the release, courts look to both the language of the release itself and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. Rathke v. Albekier, 181 Ill. App. 3d 63 (1989); Gladinus v. Laughlin, 51 Ill. App. 3d 694, 696 (1977).
¶ 14 In response, the defendants note that a rider attached to and incorporated into the settlement order states as follows:
“[I]n full, final and complete settlement of any and all claims of any nature whatsoever, including but not limited to past, present, and future time losses, medical, surgical and hospital expenses and for any and all permanent disability of whatever nature, allegedly arising out of an accident on or about 11/07/2007 and all known and unknown injuries and sequelae which allegedly resulted or will result from said accident *** Petitioner agrees that this settlement shall include all other claims of accident or injury, either by a specific accident or repetitive trauma, for all dates of work by Petitioner for Respondent not limited to the above date of loss.”
¶ 15 The defendants note that Mason’s claim arose out of the date of injury subject to the settlement order and is therefore barred. The defendants also note that although the Commission must approve the terms of the settlement agreement, this does not limit the terms of the enforceable contract that the parties entered into. Furthermore, Mason has failed to provide any legal support for his proposition that the Commission did not have the authority to release or satisfy his claims in the settlement agreement. However, the Commission did not release or satisfy the common law tort claims; Mason has done so by drafting and executing the release. The settlement agreement was between Mason and the defendants, the employee and the employers, and the parties agreed to the terms they chose
¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered in the circuit court of Effingham County is hereby affirmed.
¶ 17 Affirmed.