Gаry J. MASON, Appellant v. Ray HOBBS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee
No. CV-14-273
Supreme Court of Arkansas
January 22, 2015
2015 Ark. 20
See also 330 S.W.3d 445.
Where a judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or where the judgment of conviction was not appealed, a petition for writ of error coram nobis is filed directly in the trial court. McJames v. State, 2010 Ark. 74, 2010 WL 569752. The trial court denied the petition on the basis that this court had not granted permission for appellant to proceed in the trial court. A prisonеr who appealed his judgment and who wishes to attack his conviction by means of a petition for writ of error coram nobis must first request that this court reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court becаuse the filing of the transcript in an appellate court deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Maxwell v. State, 2012 Ark. 251, 2012 WL 1950253 (per curiam). Appellant did not appeal the judgment at issue; nevertheless, we affirm the denial of the petition. This court can affirm the circuit court if it reached the right result albeit for the wrong reason. See Nalls v. State, 2014 Ark. 434, 445 S.W.3d 509 (per curiam).
Where a petitioner in a coram-nobis proceeding has served the sentence imposed in the criminal judgment, the petition is moot. Williford v. State, 2014 Ark. 86, 2014 WL 689030 (per curiam). Appellant filed his petition more than six years after the judgment had been entered imposing the thirty-six-month sentence. The public records of the Department of Correction reflect that appellant is currently incarcerated on оther charges. Where it is evident that a petitioner has served his term of incarceration for the conviction challenged, his claim is moot because the remedy that he seeks, a new trial, is not available even if the petition states cause for the writ. Webb v. State, 2009 Ark. 497, 2009 WL 3235635 (per curiam). Appellant could not demonstrate that he was entitled to the writ, and the trial court did not err in denying relief.
Appeal dismissed; motions moot.
Dustin McDaniel, Att‘y Gen., by: Nicana C. Sherman, Ass‘t Att‘y Gen., for appellee.
PER CURIAM
In 2009, an amended judgment was entered reflecting that appellant Gary J. Mason had been found guilty of rape, sexual indecеncy with a child, and possessing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child for which he was sentenced to serve consecutive sentences of 300 months’ imprisonment for rаpe and 72 months’ imprisonment for sexual indecency with a child, with a concurrent sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment for possessing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a сhild. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Mason v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 598, 330 S.W.3d 445.
In 2013, appellant filed in the Jefferson County Circuit Court a pro se petition for declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus against the Director оf the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC“), in whose custody appellant is being held, concerning his eligibility for
Appellant‘s eligibility for parole was determined by the law in effect at the time his offenses were committed between August 2007 and March 2008. See id. Under the provisions of
Appellant argued in the petition that the application of
The purpose of the declaratory-judgment statutory scheme is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, statutes, and other legal relations. McCutchen v. City of Ft. Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, 425 S.W.3d 671. This court has held that there are four requisite conditions before declaratory relief may be granted: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the cоntroversy; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 721 S.W.2d 658 (1986). Here, appellant failed to state a basis for declaratory judgmеnt under
With respect to appellant‘s argument that the appellee has denied him due process of law by applying the statute at issue to his case, thеre is no constitutional right or entitlement to parole that would
As to appellant‘s contention that a trial court order was required before the ADC could apply certain stаtutes to appellant‘s parole-eligibility status, parole eligibility is not within the purview of the trial court. See Mitchem v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 233, 2014 WL 2019278 (per curiam) (citing Thompson v. State, 2009 Ark. 235 (per curiam)) (holding that, because determining parole eligibility is the prerogative of the ADC, the trial court would not have had authority to place conditions as to parole eligibility on the sentence pronounced).
The arguments raised by аppellant in his petition and in this appeal stem primarily from his erroneous characterization of
Here, appellant was found guilty of rape committed between August 2007 and March 2008, and the ADC, in accordance with
Finally, to the extent that appellant contends that
Inasmuch as none of the claims for relief raised in appellant‘s petition demonstrated that he was entitled to any rеlief by means of a declaratory judgment or a writ of mandamus, the circuit court did not err in
Affirmed.