MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL v. MASON COUNTY.
Docket No. 18, Calendar No. 46,423
Supreme Court of Michigan
October 3, 1955
Rehearing denied December 1, 1955
343 Mich. 313
CARR, C. J., and BUTZEL, SMITH, SHARPE, BOYLES, REID, and DETHMERS, JJ., concurred.
Appeal from Mason; Elliott (Philip), J., presiding. Submitted April 5, 1955.
Judgment affirmed.
CARR, C. J., and BUTZEL, SMITH, SHARPE, BOYLES, REID, and DETHMERS, JJ., concurred.
MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL v. MASON COUNTY.
- COUNTIES-BOARD OF SUPERVISORS-POWERS.
A county board of supervisors has no inherent powers when con-sidered as an administrative body, the Constitution declaring that it shall have “such powers as shall be prescribed by law” (
Const 1908, art 8, § 7 ). - SAME-ERECTION OF INFIRMARY-ADMINISTRATIVE POWER.
Declaration in statute conferring upon a county board of super-visors power to erect a county infirmary in a county “in which a county infirmary is not already erected” implied that the legislature intended to grant administrative authority, rather than powers of a local legislative character (
Const 1908, art 8, § 7 ;CL 1948, § 402.6 ). - SAME-BOARD OF SUPERVISORS-CHOICE OF SITES FOR COUNTY BUILDINGS.
A provision in a statute restricting power granted to boards of supervisors “to fix upon and determine the site of any such
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1-3, 10] 14 Am Jur, Counties § 28.
[4, 5] 42 Am Jur, Public Administrative Law § 26.
[7-9] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 225 et seq.
[11] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 303-308.
[12] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 223, 247.
[13] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 358.
[14] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 225.
[15] 28 Am Jur, Injunctions § 61 et seq.
[16] 14 Am Jur, Costs § 35.
- ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-EXPRESS GRANTS OF POWER-CONSTRUC-TION OF STATUTES.
An express grant of power to administrative officers, boards or commissions, is subject to a strict interpretation.
- SAME-DOUBTFUL POWERS.
The power and authority to be exercised by administrative boards or commissions must be conferred by clear and unmistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.
- OFFICERS-MEASURE OF AUTHORITY.
The extent of the authority of the people‘s public agents is meas-ured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.
- STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION.
Whether or not the remodeling of an existing structure may be regarded as within the term “erected” or the equivalent of erecting, building, or constructing, is not determined where unnecessary to decision in case involving the construction of a statute.
- SAME-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-“ERECTED” CONSTRUED AS “ESTABLISHED.”
The term “erected” in statutory provision authorizing a county board of supervisors to erect a county infirmary in a county “in which a county infirmary is not already erected” in the context used, was intended to mean “established,” since there must be facilities supplied to the end that the inmates may receive proper care (
CL 1948, § 402.6 ). - WORDS AND PHRASES-ERECT-ESTABLISH.
The word “erected” may properly mean more than just the term “to build,” if the context requires that it be construed as “to set up” or to “establish.”
- COUNTIES-INFIRMARIES-CHANGE OF SITES-“ERECTED” CON-STRUED AS “ESTABLISHED.”
A board of supervisors may not select a new site for the county
- STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION.
The courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation, but must construe statutes as enacted, in the light of the purpose to be accomplished and giving due and proper meaning to all provisions.
- SAME-INTENT.
It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning which it has plainly expressed, and in such cases there is no room for construction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning.
- SAME-CONSTRUCTION-EFFECT GIVEN TO EVERY WORD.
Effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section when construing a statute to produce a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.
- SAME-CONSTRUCTION-CLEAR LANGUAGE.
A court may not alter or change the clear, distinct and un-equivocal wording of a legislative enactment.
- INJUNCTION-QUESTIONS REVIEWABLE-ACQUIESCENCE.
The legality of the establishment of county infirmary at its present site some 13 years ago may not be questioned in proceedings instituted to enjoin the county from erecting a new infirmary on other land given to it by a municipality within the county, where it appears that all parties involved had acquiesced in the earlier action taken.
- COSTS-INJUNCTION-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
No costs are allowed in suit to enjoin county from changing site of county infirmary in county which had previously established such institution at its present location, a question of statutory construction being involved (
Const 1908, art 8, § 7 ;CL 1948, §§ 46.11 ,402.6 ).
BUTZEL, SMITH, and BOYLES, JJ., dissenting.
Bill by Mason County Civic Research Council, a voluntary taxpayers’ association, against County of Mason and City of Scottville, municipal corpo-rations, to restrain transfer of property by city to county for purposes of infirmary. Bill dismissed. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Vernon Keiser and Hathaway, Latimer, Clink & Robb (H. Winston Hathaway, of counsel), for de-fendant County of Mason.
William W. Stapleton and H. Winston Hathaway, for defendant County of Mason on application for rehearing.
Hathaway, Latimer, Clink & Robb (H. Winston Hathaway, of counsel), for defendant city of Scott-ville.
BOYLES, J. (dissenting). Plaintiff, consisting of certain residents and taxpayers of the city of Luding-ton in Mason county, filed the bill of complaint in this case to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the proposed construction of a county infirmary in the city of Scottville in said county. These tax-payers adopted the designation Mason County Civic Research Council. The defendants are the county of Mason and the city of Scottville. The trial court, after a hearing on stipulated facts, filed a compre-hensive written opinion and entered an order dis-missing the bill of complaint. Plaintiff appeals.
Two principal questions are here for decision: (1) Does the board of supervisors of Mason county have authority to erect a county convalescent home and infirmary building at the proposed location in Scottville; and (2) does the city of Scottville have authority to deed to the county the parcel of land
The facts have been stipulated. In 1942 the coun-ty acquired and has since maintained a place in Ludington as an infirmary, under the name of Mason County Convalescent Home, and under the manage-ment and control of the county social welfare board.1 In 1949, by a vote of the electors in said county, a county sinking fund was created and taxes voted for the purpose of constructing a new county jail and a new county convalescent home.2 No action has been taken by the county sinking fund commis-sion3 to allocate or use the fund. In 1952 the board of supervisors authorized its building committee to procure plans for a new jail and a new convalescent home or infirmary, which was done. Also, in 1952, the electors of the county voted favorably for a bond issue of $165,000 for the purpose of construct-ing and equipping “a new county convalescent home (infirmary).” In 1953 the city of Scottville offered to deed to the county approximately 3 acres of land out of an 18-acre park known as McPhail Field, as the site for the proposed new “county convalescent hospital (infirmary).” The board of supervisors voted to accept the offer, subject to providing a merchantable title.4 In June, 1953, the county prose-cuting attorney gave the board of supervisors a written opinion approving the title to the Scottville site, and the board of supervisors adopted a resolu-tion “accepting the proposed Scottville site and ap-proving the construction of the infirmary in accord-
In July, 1953, the plaintiff Mason County Civic Research Council filed the instant bill of complaint seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain the city of Scottville from conveying the proposed site to the county, and to restrain the coun-ty from further proceeding with the plan for the construction of the proposed county infirmary in Scottville. Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal, by the trial court, of its bill of complaint.
1. Does the county board of supervisors have authority to erect a county infirmary at Scottville, under the facts in the case?
The applicable constitutional and statutory provi-sions are as follows:
“Each county may also maintain an infirmary for the care and support of its indigent poor and un-fortunate, and all county poor houses shall hereafter be designated and maintained as county infirmaries.”
Const (1908), art 8, § 11 .“The board of supervisors of any county in this State in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting there-of, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county.”
CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147).“The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meet-ing thereof lawfully held:
“First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;
“Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk‘s office, or any other county building in such county;
“Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any such building, if not previously located; * * *”
“Fifth, To remove or designate a new site for any county buildings required to be at the county seats, when such removal shall not exceed the limits of the village or city at which the county seat is situated, as previously located;
“Sixth, To cause to be erected the necessary build-ings for poorhouses, jails, clerk‘s offices, and other county buildings, and to prescribe the time and manner of erecting the same.”
CL 1948, § 46.11 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 5.331).
Plaintiff mainly relies on the language in the first sentence of
“The board of supervisors of the county have ex-clusive authority over the subject of the erection of houses for the reception of the poor of their county,
and in the exercise of this authority they may em-ploy such agents as they choose to execute what they have determined upon to do.” Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 Mich 295, 300.*
2. Does the city of Scottville have the right to convey to the county a part of the so-called McPhail park in Scottville?
This 18-acre tract was acquired by the city in 1925 by gift from Curtis W. McPhail, the conveyance stating:
“This deed is made and executed by said first par-ties with the agreement and understanding that the land above conveyed is to be used for a public park and for no other purpose; except that such a portion as is necessary for an athletic field may be enclosed for such purpose.”
The city, anticipating in an excess of caution a possible claim that this entire 18-acre tract would have to be held by the city in perpetuity as a public park, cleared the title from the possibility by other claimants of an interest in the title. It should be noted that the conveyance from McPhail to the city did not contain a reverter clause, and was not expressly made subject to reversionary interests. When McPhail died testate in 1939 he devised the residue of his estate (which would include any pos-sible interest in the park) to 2 churches, both of which have executed deeds to the city releasing any restrictions or right to the park property. Also, all of McPhail‘s heirs have joined in a similar deed to the city, reciting that it was given for the same purpose. The city council of Scottville took formal action vacating the park as to the 3-acre parcel and authorizing the conveyance to the county for an
“Where there was no reverter clause, statement in deed to city for valuable consideration that land was purchased for park purposes is merely declara-tion of purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit grant, and therefore city was under no obliga-tion to maintain park in perpetuity.”
“It seems to be the weight of authority that, where there is no reverter clause, a statement of use is merely a declaration of the purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit the grant.” Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich 143, 151.
Furthermore, the city council took formal action vacating for park purposes the 3-acre parcel to be conveyed to the county. It had statutory authority to do so.
Finally, appellant asks whether the board of super-visors has the right to “ignore” the county board of sinking fund commissioners and order the con-struction of a county infirmary partly out of sinking funds. Nothing here in the record indicates that the board of supervisors will fail to recognize any statu-tory authority of the board of sinking fund commis-sioners. It consists of the county treasurer, county clerk, register of deeds, chairman of the board of supervisors, and chairman of the finance committee of that board.* By statute, the sinking fund is under the control of said board of county sinking fund com-missioners, “subject to the supervision and direction
This opinion is based upon an analysis of the statutory powers conferred upon boards of super-visors by the legislature. The
“The legislature may by general law confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, as it may deem proper.” (Italics supplied.)
It has been argued that boards of supervisors are administrative agencies, lacking authority to change the site of a county infirmary. A board of super-visors is the legislative agency of the county, and if it lacks that authority, obviously it must follow, if existing law is as now argued by appellant, that the location of a county infirmary must remain, per-haps in perpetuity, as originally located, unless further authorized by the legislature.
In some instances the Constitution itself has plain-ly defined the location of certain county agencies. Article 8, § 13, forbids a change in the location of the county seat of government, once it has been established, until the change in location has been approved by a majority vote of the electors. Article 8, § 4, requires that the sheriff, county clerk, county treasurer, judge of probate and register of deeds “shall hold their offices at the county seat.” Sig-
There is neither a constitutional nor statutory re-quirement that a change in the location of the county infirmary shall require a majority vote of the elec-tors. Unless the board of supervisors has that authority, none exists.
Decree should be affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
BUTZEL and SMITH, JJ., concurred with BOYLES, J.
CARR, C. J. The facts in this case appear from a stipulation into which the parties have entered, ex-hibits that have been returned to this Court, and admitted or uncontroverted averments in the plead-ings. In 1942 defendant county purchased, for use as a county infirmary, a parcel of land in the city of Ludington on which was located a residence referred to as the Gray home. The building was remodeled to adapt it for use and has since been devoted to the purposes for which it was acquired. At the same time that the Mason county site for the infirmary was purchased, land comprising the present poor farm was obtained and is now being used for that purpose.
Under date of September 20, 1952, the board of supervisors of Mason county adopted a resolution for submission to the electors of the question as to whether the sum of $165,000 should be raised by a bond issue to construct and equip a new infirmary. Said resolution referred to the building then in use as inadequate, but contained no suggestion that the site was open to objection. The resolution was silent insofar as a change in location of the infirmary was concerned. It appears from the record in the case that the electors authorized the issuance of the bonds
The principal question in the case has reference to the power of the board of supervisors to take the contemplated action in view of the facts involved as disclosed by the record before us. Counsel for defendants in their brief state the question as fol-lows:
“Does the Mason county board of supervisors have the authority to determine to erect a county infirm-ary at a new location under the facts of this case, the county already maintaining an infirmary in the former Gray home?”
The question presented is one of statutory con-struction. As an administrative body the board of supervisors has no inherent powers. The present State
“The board of supervisors of any county in this State in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting there-of, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county; and upon filing such determination with the clerk of the county, they may direct the superintendents of the poor of such coun-ty to purchase 1 or more tracts of land, not exceed-ing 320 acres, and to erect thereon 1 or more suitable buildings for the purpose aforesaid.”
It will be noted that the authority conferred on the board of supervisors by the above provision is limited to counties “in which a county infirmary is not already erected.” It is clearly implied that the legislature had in mind that it was granting admin-istrative authority rather than powers of local legis-lative character. It is consistent with the provisions of
“The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meet-ing thereof lawfully held:
“First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;
“Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk‘s office, or any other county building in such county;
“Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any such building, if not previously located.”
It is urged that the limitation expressed in the third subdivision, above quoted, should be construed as applicable only to the buildings mentioned in the second subdivision to the exclusion of those referred to in the first. However, if the legislature had so intended we think express reference would have been made to indicate such intent, or the second and third subdivisions would have been combined. Applying general principles of statutory construction, it is a fair conclusion that the legislature had in mind the buildings previously mentioned in the section, and, hence, to grant power to the board of supervisors to fix the site of the county infirmary and of the other buildings named if not previously located. Such interpretation is consistent with the statutory provision first above quoted (
The principle has been repeatedly recognized that an express grant of power to administrative officers, boards or commissions, is subject to a strict inter-pretation. Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, § 511. In accord with such principle, it is said in 67 CJS, Officers, § 107, p 378, that:
“The power and authority to be exercised by boards or commissions must be conferred by clear and un-
mistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.”
Of like import is the decision of this Court in Township of Lake v. Millar, 257 Mich 135, in which it was held that the defendant drain commissioner had undertaken to act without jurisdiction. In reach-ing such conclusion, it was said (p 142):
“The extent of the authority of the people‘s public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and as-sumption of authority.”
On behalf of defendants attention is directed to the fact that the provision of the law relative to the care of indigent persons above quoted (
The question before us relates to the intent of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes here involved. The word “erected” may in a proper con-text be construed to mean built or constructed. Hav-ing in mind the purpose of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes above quoted, we think it obvious that such restricted meaning was not in-tended. A fairer construction is that the legislature deemed it proper to withhold from the board of su-
If “erected” means “established” the situation presented here is subject to the restrictive clause of the statute. In determining the legislative intent it must be borne in mind that the mere erection or construction of a building is not sufficient to furnish a county with an infirmary. Such structure must be properly equipped for the purposes for which it is designed. Facilities must be supplied to the end that inmates in such institutions may receive proper care. In 1942 the defendant county did more than to provide a building for the infirmary. It equipped that building and established it as the type of insti-tution authorized by statute.
That the word “erected” may be construed as “es-tablished” is recognized by leading lexicographers. Anderson‘s Dictionary of Law; Webster‘s New In-ternational Dictionary; New Century Dictionary. In Port Huron & Northwestern Railway Company v. Richards, 90 Mich 577, suit was brought on a written instrument executed by defendant whereby he under-took to pay plaintiff the sum of $500 when plaintiff completed the construction of its railway to the village of Port Austin and “have erected” a station for passengers and freight. It appears that the
“The agreement contemplated that facilities should be furnished, not only for the accommodation of passengers, but for the reception and shipment of freight. This involved more than a mere place of shelter. ‘And have erected a regular station’ means more than the erection of a station-house. The word ‘erect’ may mean ‘to build,’ or it may mean ‘to set up’ or ‘found’ or ‘establish’ or ‘institute,’ according to the context. In the connection here used, it means ‘to set up,’ ‘to establish.‘”
While the case involved the interpretation of a contract, we think like principles are applicable in construing a statute. In either situation the ulti-mate question is one of intent to be determined in the light of what is said and the real purpose to be accomplished. The language, above quoted, from the opinion of the Court in the case cited is appli-cable in the instant suit.
The earlier decision in Kiefer v. German Ameri-can Seminary of the City of Detroit, 46 Mich 636, is also in point. In 1861 the legislature of the State granted to defendant seminary 25,000 acres of so-called State swamp lands to aid defendant in “erect-ing” buildings for its use. The act* contained a pro-viso that in the event the seminary “shall fail to erect buildings, in pursuance of the terms of the lease or grant made by the city of Detroit of land to said seminary, and within the time therein mentioned,” the grant should be forfeited. The legislature later
In deciding the case cited, it was recognized that a technical construction of the grant would require the moneys realized from the sale of the lands to be applied to the erection of buildings. The Court, however, did not feel impelled to give such construc-tion. While the defendant had not used the funds derived by it from the sale of the lands granted to construct its buildings, it had accomplished an equiv-alent result. The decision is authority for the propo-sition that the word “erecting” does not necessarily require the building of structures in order to accom-plish the end in view. Whether the result contem-plated has been accomplished is the question at issue. Applying the line of reasoning of the decision to the facts in the case at bar we think the conclusion can-not be avoided that while the county of Mason did not construct a new building in Ludington to be used for the purposes of an infirmary, nonetheless
Counsel for defendants cite Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 Mich 295, as bearing on the question of the author-ity of a board of supervisors with reference to the rebuilding of a county infirmary. In that case the building was located on the “county farm.” It does not appear that any change in site was involved. The precise question at issue was the authority of the board to employ agents to handle details of the work. The decision is not in point in the instant contro-versy.
We think the legislative intent is clearly expressed in the statutory provisions above quoted. In accord-ance therewith the administrative power to change the site of a county infirmary, previously established, is withheld from the board of supervisors. No other conclusion, can be reached without ignoring the ex-press provision limiting the authority of said board. With the wisdom or policy thereof courts are not concerned. Rather, the statutes must be construed as enacted; in the light of the purpose to be accom-plished and giving due and proper meaning to all provisions. As said in MacQueen v. City Commis-sion of City of Port Huron, 194 Mich 328, 342:
“It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning which it has plainly ex-pressed, and in such cases there is no room for con-struction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning.”
The above language was quoted with approval in the recent decision in Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich 460, 465.
“There seems to be no lack of harmony in the rules governing the interpretation of statutes. All are agreed that the primary one is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. All others serve but as guides to assist the courts in determin-ing such intent with a greater degree of certainty. If the language employed in the statute is plain, cer-tain and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices and no interpretation is necessary. The rule is no less ele-mentary that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section. To that end, the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consist-ent enactment as a whole.”
Among decisions of like import are: Gardner-White Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 296 Mich 225; Staiger v. Liquor Control Commission, 336 Mich 630. In the last case cited it was said (p 633):
“It is not the province of this Court to alter or change the clear, distinct and unequivocal wording of a legislative enactment.”
In the case at bar there is no claim that the present site of the county infirmary is not a proper one. As above noted, the resolution of the board of super-visors submitting the question of issuing bonds to raise money for the construction of an infirmary did not aver any lack of suitability as to the existing site, nor did it set forth any intent to procure a site in another municipality. It appears also from the stipulation of facts that the State department of welfare was asked for an opinion as to the com-
No question is here involved as to the legality of the establishment of the infirmary at its present location. The plaintiff recognizes the validity there-of and for obvious reasons the defendants are not in position to raise any question in that regard. Ap-parently said action when taken was acquiesced in by all parties concerned. It is not subject to chal-lenge in this case. The situation presented is that members of the board of supervisors wish to remove the infirmary to Scottville and locate it on the land donated by that city. The question is, as stated at the outset, whether the board of supervisors is by statute granted such authority. For the reasons above set forth we think that the board, under the present statutes pertaining to the matter, does not have the power claimed by it. If it is deemed desir-able that the right to change such site after it has been previously established should be vested in the board, the matter of granting such power rests with the legislature and not with the courts. As the stat-utes now stand they are clearly inconsistent with such authority.
The determination of the primary question in-volved renders it unnecessary to consider other is-sues raised by the parties to the case. The decree from which the appeal has been taken is reversed, and a decree will enter in this Court in accordance
SHARPE, REID, DETHMERS and KELLY, JJ., con-curred with CARR, C. J.