17 A.2d 923 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1940
Argued November 18, 1940. The question involved in this appeal is whether a judgment debtor, whose automobile is the sole article of property levied upon in execution, is entitled, under his claim for exemption, to receive from the sheriff $300 out of the proceeds of sale of the automobile?
The court below held that he was. We agree with the court.
The plaintiff recovered a simple judgment, without waiver, against the defendant for $826.71. A writ of fieri facias was issued on the judgment and by virtue thereof the sheriff levied upon a Ford sedan automobile belonging to defendant. Four days later the defendant filed with the sheriff his claim for exemption under the Act of April 9, 1849, P.L. 533. Pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of the statute, the sheriff *561 summoned three distinterested and competent persons, who appraised the automobile at $500.
Within a few days thereafter, and prior to the advertising of the sale, the defendant, by his attorney, sent an additional notice to the sheriff setting forth that upon a sale the automobile would be converted into cash and claiming such portion of the proceeds of sale as amounted to $300; and explained that his claim was for $300 worth of the car, to enure to his benefit upon the conversion into cash.
The automobile sold for $525. The execution creditor and the defendant each claimed the $300. By agreement this amount was paid into court and an interpleader framed. The court awarded the fund to the defendant. The execution creditor appealed.
The appellant relies upon several cases that followed closely after the enactment of the exemption statute, which stated, by way of dicta1 — for the question here at issue was not involved in any of them —, that a debtor is entitled, under his exemption claim, to receive property only, and not $300 in money. The reason given was that the exemption was chiefly intended for the benefit of the debtor's family and "a family stripped of every comfort might not be much the better of $300 in the pocket of a thriftless father" (Hammer v. Freese,
Even before the Act of 1859 was passed, the Supreme Court, inHanley v. O'Donald,
It must also be remembered that in 1849 and for some *563 years following it, there were few, if any, articles of personal property owned by a judgment debtor of greater value than $300; and that as respects his property which might exceed that amount in value, to wit, his real estate, the statute specifically provided that if real estate not exceeding $300 could not be set aside under the claim for exemption, he was entitled to receive $300 of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. It was thus made apparent that the purpose of the statute was that a judgment debtor should not be left destitute and wholly dependent on the public or charitably inclined persons, but that he should be allowed to retain property or money to the amount of $300 to tide him over his financial extremity and the loss of his property by sale on execution process.
Now, it is not uncommon for a judgment debtor to own an automobile, a truck, or some machine or appliance useful or necessary in his work or business, of a greater value than $300, and the statute should be applied in the liberal and benevolent3 spirit in which it was enacted. Keeping that in view, there is neither rhyme nor reason in holding that if the debtor has such a machine or appliance worth $295, and it is his only leviable property, he can keep it and the creditor get nothing, but if it is worth $305, the creditor will get it all and he have nothing.
We think in the latter case, if claim for the exemption is promptly made, the car, machine or appliance should be sold under the execution and the debtor's exemption paid to him out of the net proceeds, just as was done in the present case; and in the long run, this course will be to the advantage of the execution creditor also, for appraisers will not then be tempted to undervalue the article for the benefit of the debtor.
Our viewpoint was impliedly recognized in Wunderly *564 v. Leopold,
And in McFarland's Est.,
Of course, the claim for exemption, whether out of personalty or realty, must in all cases be made seasonably (Com. ex rel.Collins v. Boyd,
Sutman v. Hogsett,
We see nothing in the language of the applicable statutes that, in circumstances such as are here present, requires us to hold that the judgment debtor lost his right to his exemption — which was claimed seasonably, within a few days after the levy, and before the sale was advertised — because his only piece of personal property seized in execution was an article over $300 in value.
Order affirmed.