149 Ga. 35 | Ga. | 1919
The Court of Appeals desires instruction from the Supreme Court upon the following question involved in this case: “In order to comply with section 910 of the Civil Code of 1910, requiring that a claim in writing be presented to the governing authority of a municipality before suit to enforce a demand for 'money damages’ on account of injuries to person or property, is it essential that any particular amount of money as damages shall be named or specified therein?”
As this question must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative, such answer will necessarily cover the other questions propounded, thus making it unnecessary to specifically set them forth/ as well as the answers thereto..
Section 910 of the Civil Code declares: “No person, firm or corporation, having a claim for money damages against any munici
In 5 Thompson on Negligence, § 6328, the author says: “In general, statutes which require notice to be given, before actions of this kind [cases for injuries on highways] can be prosecuted against the municipality, provide that the notice shall embrace a statement of the time, place, cause, and nature of the injury; that is to say, of the time when it happened, the place where it happened, the defect or deficiency in the highway which caused it to. happen, and the nature and extent of the injury received therefrom. . . In general, it will be sufficient if substantial accuracy is attained in the notice in respect of each of these four particulars; though there are decisions which construe the statute with draconic strictness. It is believed that many of the cases cited in the following sections will show that, in dealing with this subject, the courts have often been too technical, and have converted into a trap and pitfall for the ignorant and unskilful a statute which was merely designed to require a person injured tó furnish the municipal corporation with such information that its proper officers might make such an inspection as would enable them to decide whether the corporation ought fairly to pay the damages or defend an action therefor. The courts ought to have adopted the analogy of the rule of law with reference to the kind of notice which, in other relations, is
The statute of this State as to notice to be given the municipality does not specifically require the amount of the claim for money damages to be stated in the notice, but does expressly require to be set forth, “the time, place, and extent of such injuries, as near as practicable, and the negligence which caused the same/5 The words “extent of such injury55 do not mean the amount of damages claimed in dollars and cents, but mean the nature, character, and particulars of-the injury, and which should be stated “as near as practicable.55 If the statutory requirement of the notice should be substantially complied with as to time, place, and extent of the injury, and the negligence which caused it, why should the amount of the damages in money be stated? The amount, if stated, would not be binding upon the person injured in a subsequent suit for the injury; for it has often been held by many courts of last resort that the plaintiff in ■ such action could sue for a greater or less amount than that stated in the prior notice, and could recover for a larger or lesser amount.
It follows, of course, that the notice in this case which stated the time, place, and extent of the plaintiff’s injury, and the negligence which caused the same, and prayed that upon consideration “just compensation fox'such injury" be awarded, sufficiently met the requirements of the statute.