This suit wаs instituted by appellee against appellant under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Texas (Rev. St. 1925, art. 8306 et seq., as amendеd), to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board, to recover from appellant compensation for the рeriod of ap-pellee’s disability, and for’ the expense of medical treatment. No question is presented as to the рleadings, therefore no statement will be made in reference thereto. On May 26,1930, trial was had without a jury and the court rendered judgmеnt in favor of appellee *914 for $130.60, from which this appeal was duly-prosecuted.
From the uncontradicted evidence we find the following material facts necessary to thе disposition of this appeal: That the motorcycle on which appellee was riding at the time he was injured was owned by him; that under his contract of employment with Cox-Ward Drug Company; he was required to furnish same to be used by him in the performance of his duties, viz., the delivering of packages and parcels for said drug company; that for such services, including the use of said motorcyclе in connection therewith, said drug company contracted to pay appellee the sum of $27.50- per week; that said mоtorcycle was one of the instrumentalities of appellee’s employment; that said employer did not furnish a placе for the storage of said motorcycle when not in use; that appellee at all times had to care for same so as to have it available for the performance of his duties; that appellee sustained his injuries at 5:45 p. m. September 25, 1928, while riding sаid motorcycle on a public street in the city of Dallas on his way to work; that at said time ap-pellee was about twenty blоcks from his employer’s place of business and about one block from his residence; that appellee, under his employment, had definite hours of service, viz., from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m., and from 6 p. m. to 11 p. m., during each twenty-four hours; .that at the time appellant was injurеd he was not engaged in the performance of any duty under his employment, other than he was returning to his work; his next working period beginning аt 6 p. m.
How should the language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act be interpreted that •a liberal construction may be placed thereon? Pronouncement has been made in a number of decisions that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally сonstrued to the end that the purpose for which it was enacted should be accomplished; to this extent our appellаte courts are in accord, but so much cannot be said perhaps in reference to the application of the virtues that lie within that beneficent rule in re the interpretation and application of the provisions of said statute. We arе of the opinion that the term “liberal construction” means to give the language of a statutory provision, freely and consciously, its commonly, generally accepted meaning, to the end that the most comprehensive application thereof may be accorded, without doing violence to any of its terms.
What latitude of construction is available in the use of the wоrds “about,” “furtherance,” and “affairs”? The synonyms of said words are given by Webster’s International Dictionary, Edition 1927, as follows: “Legally, about is nеárly equivalent to more or less, but the variation legally permissible varies 'with what appears as reasonable in the contemplation of the parties under the circumstances. In concern with, engaged in, intent on, concerning, in regard to, on acсount of, touching, appertaining to, in connection with” ; furtherance, “act of furthering, helping forward, promotion, advancement, or progress”; affairs, “that which is done, or about to be done, matter, concern, business of any kind.” Lumbermen’s Recip. Ass’n v. Behnken et al. (Tex. Civ. App.)
That the motorcycle was the property of appellee and not that of his employer created no legal distinction, as the relationship of the parties in regard to the use of the motorcycle would be the same in eithеr case. As favorably bearing upon this phase of the case, see Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.)
Under the faсts of this case we are clearly of opinion that, by giving said provision of article 8309, supra, a liberal construction, as we undеrstand that term should be applied thereto, appellee was at the time he received his injuries “engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer.” Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.