Lead Opinion
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] AppellanMPlaintiff, Mary Price (Price), on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, appeals the trial court’s grant .of Appellees-Defen-dants’, Indiana Department- of Child Services; Director, Indiana Department of Child Services (collectively, DCS), motion for dismissal of Price’s Complaint for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6).
[2] We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand.
ISSUES
[3] Price raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
(1) Whether Price has a private right of action to enforce the maximum caseload standard included in Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5; and
(2) Whether Price’s Complaint states a claim for relief as an action for mandate.
[4] Under Indiana law, the DCS is charged with the responsibility of providing various services to protect children and to strengthen families. The family case managers (FCMs), employed by the DCS, are “the backbone of Indiana’s child welfare system” and the key components in safeguarding the safety of Indiana’s children. (Appellant’s App. p. 4). They are responsible for, among other things, investigating reports of abuse or neglect of children in Indiana, ongoing case management services if the reports indicate that abuse or neglect actually occurred, providing family support services to strengthen families to help assure that abuse or neglect will not recur, and offering adoption or other permanency services if children cannot safely be returned to. their homes. Some FCMs may only provide initial assessments, while others are permanency workers who monitor and supervise active cases after abuse or neglect is substantiated. In smaller counties, one FCM may often perform both functions.
[5] Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 provides, in part, referring to DCS as “the department,” that:
(a) The department shall ensure that the department maintains staffing levels of family case managers so that each region has enough family case managers to allow caseloads to be at not more than:
(1) Twelve (12) active cases relating to initial assessments, including investigations of an allegation of child abuse or neglect; or
(2) Seventeen (17) children monitored and supervised in active cases relating to ongoing services.
(b) The department shall comply with the maximum caseload ratios described in subsection (a).
This statutory requirement is further emphasized by Indiana Code section 31-25-2-10, which clarifies:
(a) This section applies after June 30, 2008.
(b) The department of child services:
(1) must have sufficient qualified and trained staff to;
(A) fulfill the purpose of this article;
(B) comply with the maximum caseload ratios for:
(i) Family case managers; and
(ii) Child welfare caseworkers; as set forth in [I.C. § ] 31-25-2-5.
[6] Price is currently employed by DCS in Marion County as a permanency worker. Therefore, pursuant to the statute, her caseload should be limited to no more than 17 children. However, in the past four years, Price’s caseload has “always greatly exceeded] this number” and at the time of filing the Complaint amounted to “approximately 43 children.” (Appellant’s App. p. 25). In its 2014 Annual Report to the State Budget Committee and Legislative Council, the DCS reported that it would need to employ an additional 216.2 FCMs to comply with the caseload standards mandated by Indiana law. Although additional money was appropriated to hire more FCMs during the 2015 legislative session, insufficient money was made available to allow the mandated statutory caseload standards to be achieved.
[7] Because of the increasing caseload, Price and other FCMs work much longer than a 40-hour week in an effort to keep up with their cases. Due to the excessive caseload, turnover among the FCMs has become a serious problem as they “frequently leave to find employment that is less stressful and demanding.” (Appellant’s App. p. 26).
[8] On July 14, 2015, Price filed her Verified Class Action Complaint for Man
[9] On September 9, 2015, DCS filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) and supporting memorandum, arguing for the dismissal of the cause because Price and the putative class cannot enforce the explicit caseload standards contained in the statute. Price responded on September 30, 2015, claiming that a cause of aetion to enforce the statute existed but that, in any event, she also had a claim for mandate. In its reply of October 13, 2015, DCS rejected the mandate.
[10] On January 6, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on DOS’s motion for dismissal. During the hearing, DCS contended, for the first time, that mandate is not appropriate because Price had an adequate remedy at law in Indiana’s Civil Service Complaint procedure. On February 22, 2016, the trial court granted DOS’s motion and dismissed Price’s complaint. The trial court concluded that no private right of action existed under Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 because the protections included in the statute are for the benefit of the general public. “Any benefit gained by [FCMs] through compliance with I.C. § 31-25-2-5 is ancillary or- secondary to that purpose.” (Appellant’s App. p. 17). Secondly, the trial court held that Price and the putative class of FCMs could not bring an action for mandate because they had an adequate remedy at law through the Civil Service Complaint procedure.
[11] Price now appeals. ' Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[12] The standard of review on appeal of a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim is de novo and requires no deference to the trial court’s decision. Bellows v. Bd. of Comm’rs of County of Elkhart,
II. Private Cause of Action
[13] Price first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 only conferred a public benefit, and did not grant her a private cause of action, Although Price does not dispute the public benefits derived from the statute, she argues that the statute also awarded a private cause ,of action- because
{i]f [Price], and the other FCMs have caseloads , that-are manageable they will .be able to perform their duties. Theywill not have to work overtime to try to keep up with their work. They will not suffer “burnout” and quit. These are all direct, private [ ] benefits to the FCMs. The fact that the FCMs will have better working conditions if DCS complies with the statute will inure directly to the public, but it will also bestow a clear and identifiable private benefit on the FCMs.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 22).
[14] When a civil cause of action is premised upon a violation of a duty imposed by statute, the initial question to be determined by the court is whether the statute confers a private right of action. Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.,
[15] Contending that I.C. § 31-25-2-5 combines a public right of action with a private benefit, Price relies on Whinery v. Roberson,
[16] “[W]hen the legislative purpose is general in nature, the mere fact that statutory language refers to a class of people does not create a private cause of action.” Americanos v. State,
III. Mandate
[17] In an attempt to bring the DCS into compliance with its statutory duty encapsulated in I.C. § 31-25-2-5, Price also claims the right to bring a mandate action to compel the DCS to comply with the duty it is shirking, i.e., to maintain the prescribed staffing levels.
[18] Indiana Code section 34-27-3-1 provides:
An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any inferior tribunal, corporation, public or corporate officer, or person to compel the performance of any: (1) act that the law specifically requires; or
(2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station.
“An action for mandate, an extraordinary remedy of an equitable nature, is generally viewed with disfavor.” Hayes v. Trustees of Ind. Univ.,
A. Standing
[19] It should be mentioned that an action for mandate does not confer automatic standing upon a plaintiff. We have previously determined that a plaintiff seeking mandate must show actual injury by the challenged governmental action. State ex rel. Berkshire v. City of Logansport,
[20] Even though no private cause of action exists to enforce I.C. § 31-25-2-5, in Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp.,
The public standing doctrine, which applies in cases where public rather than private rights áre at issue and in cases which involve the enforcement of a public rather than a private right, continues to be a viable exception to the general standing requirement. - The public standing doctrine permits the asserting of all proper legal challenges, including claims that government action is unconstitutional.
Although the supreme court did not define “public right” in this context, it cited several examples where a public right was found to exist. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Evansville,
[21] Just like the public interest found to exist and confer standing in Citta-dine and other case law referenced, rights created under I.C. § 31-25-2-5 are public and confer public standing on Price. The purpose of -the -statutorily defined maximum caseload ratios is to provide protections to the general public through consistent, efficient, and effective administration of child and family services. According
B. Exhaustion of Remedies ,
[22] Because the issuance of a mandate is an extraordinary remedy, where an adequate remedy at law is available, mandate should not be imposed to compel performance of an act. Whitney v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of DeKalb Co. Eastern Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
[23] Within the arena of administrative agencies, like here, “[t]here exists a strong bias in the case law in favor of the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.” Smith v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind.,
[24] Nevertheless, exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of remedies at the agency level exist. A party is excepted from the exhaustion requirement when the remedy is inadequate or would be futile, or when some equitable consideration precludes application of the rule. Ind. State Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
[25] Focusing on the exhaustion requirement, the trial court noted:
In this case, the [c]ourt finds that an adequate remedy at law exists to enforce caseload requirements under Article 25 for Caseworkers under Indiana’s Civil Service Complaint" procedure established under I.C. § 4-15-2.2-42. I.C. § 4-15-2.2-42 allows state employees, such as Price, to file a complaint concerning a Department’s application of a law, rule, or policy and establishes a procedure for resolution, including a mechanism for reconsideration of the initial findings by the Director of State Personnel' and an appeal of the decision to the State Employee Appeals Commission (“SEAC”). The decisions of SEAC concerning the resolution of the complaint are subject to legal review in accordance with I.C. [Ch] 4-21.5-3. The Legislature established this complaint procedure to provide state employees a fair process to resolve complaints concerning the “application of a law, rule, or policy to the complainant.”
(Appellant’s App. p. 19) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Because the trial court concluded that Price had not exhausted the administrative remedy of the Indiana’s Civil Service Complaint procedure, the trial court dismissed Price’s complaint.
[26] The Indiana Civil Service Complaint procedure, as defined in I.C. § 4-
[27] Accordingly, the administrative procedure is geared towards the resolution of “acts or conditions” which include the “application of a law, rale, or policy” with respect to the complainant. See I.C. § 4-15-2.2-42(a) & (c). As we noted in Abner v. Dep't of Health of State of Ind. ex rel. Ind. Soldiers’ & Sailors’ Children’s Home,
[28] A review of the case law of the State Employees Appeals Commission reveals that its usual issues pertain to individual employment related acts, such as employee termination (see, e.g., Westville Correctional Facility v. Finney,
C. Clear Duty Imposed by Law
[29] However, even though the DCS failed to formulate an explicit response to Price’s systemic deficiencies’ argument, DCS argues that mandate is inappropriate because any order by the court Would entail a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and dictate the performance of discretionary agency acts. Specifically, DCS argues that in order to employ more staff to satisfy the statutory caseload standard established in I.C. § 31-25-2-5, the legislature and Governor will have to be ordered to free up funding and to engage in specific discretionary acts. We disagree.
[30] The statutory caseload máx-imums included in I.C. § 31-25-2-5(a) & (b) are not an aspirational goal but are a clear and definite number to attain. The statute declares, in pertinent part:
(a) The department shall ensure that the department maintains staffing levels of family case managers so that each region has enough family case managers to allow caseloads to be at not more than:
(3) Twelve (12) active cases relating to initial assessments, including investigations of an allegation of child abuse or neglect; or
(4) Seventeen (17) children monitored and supervised in active cases relating to ongoing services.
(b) The department shall comply with the maximum caseload ratios described in subsection (a). ■
I.C. § 31-25-2-5 (emphasis added). By phrasing the statute in mandatory language, it could not be more specific or absolute. “When the word ‘shall’ appears in a statute, it is construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears from the context or the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning.” City of Wabash v. Wabash Co. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
[31] In her Complaint, Price merely requests that the DCS be mandated to comply with its legal duties, ie., the caseload máximums. How DCS accomplishes this is up to the agency.
[32] Accordingly, as Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5 imposes a clear, absolute, and imperative duty on DCS to comply with maximum caseload standards as determined by the legislature and no administrative remedy is available to address this systemic violation of Indiana law, we conclude that Price can proceed with a mandate action. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order to dismiss with respect to the mandate and remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
[33] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that even though Price has no private case of action under I.C. § 31-25-2-5, Price’s Complaint states a claim for relief as an action for mandate.
[34] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[35] ROBB, J., concurs in part and concurs in result in part with separate opinion.
[36] KIRSCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Notes
. We heard oral argument in this cause on July 20, 2016, at the Indiana Supreme Court Courtroom in Indianapolis, Indiana. We commend counsel for their excellent advocacy and well-written appellate briefs.
. Ahles refers to I.C. § 4-15-2-35, which has been repealed. The current version of the statute is I.C, § 4-15-2.2-42.
. DCS argues that it will be impossible to enforce compliance with the statute as
[i]t would be impractical for the trial court to establish a deadline because DCS’s compliance with the statute relies on a key external factor that is out of DCS’s control—the number of people able and willing to work as an FCM. Moreover, other external factors come into play, such as DCS's need to obtain sufficient funding to hire the necessary people and the number of active cases remaining steady or declining.
(Appellee’s Br. p. 43). However, these arguments are directed at a possible future defense DCS might have against claims that it did not comply with a mandate order. An appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss is not the place to consider such possible defenses.'’ The uncertain possibility of such a future eventuality does not militate against
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
[37] I concur fully in Part II of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s decision that Price does not have a private right of action to enforce the statutory maximum caseload standard. As to Part III, I respectfully concur in result.
[38] As Judge Riley notes, mandate is available only where no adequate remedy at law is available. See op. at ¶ 22 (citing Whitney v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of DeKalb Co. Eastern Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
[39] The Indiana Civil Service Complaint procedure may be a remedy, but we are not in a position to say it is an adequate remedy, given DCS’s concession at oral argument that its caseworkers’ caseload numbers continue to climb and the money appropriated by the legislature has thus far not been enough to allow DCS to hire enough caseworkers to meet the statutory caseload limitation. Any remedy Price could obtain through the civil service complaint procedure would be to her benefit only, and therefore would be inadequate at best, if not completely illusory, in addressing the fullness of the problem. Although DCS professes to want to comply and to intend to comply with the statute “to the extent possible,” https://mycourts. in.gov/argumfents/default.aspx?id=1981 & view=detail (beginning at 22:58), the fact is DCS is unable to comply with the letter of the statute, even if through no fault of
[40] As we have determined herein, Price and similarly-situated caseworkers do not have a private right of action to enforce the statute. We have further determined that the Civil Service Complaint procedure does not provide an adequate remedy for allegations of noncompliance with the statute. And I note that although DCS asserted at oral argument the statute is for the primary benefit of children and families, it also acknowledged even a child or a parent harmed by a caseworker’s caseload in excess of the statutory limitation would not have a right to sue for violation of the statute. In other words, as DCS succinctly put it, “there are ho potential plaintiffs” for a violation of this statute. https://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default. aspx?id=1981 & view=detail (beginning at 26:10).
[41] Price does not specifically rely on Article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution to support her claim for mandate, but I believe that provision gives context to our decision in light of the foregoing. Section 12 states, “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” This constitutional provision “does not specify any particular remedy for any particular wrong. Rather, it leaves the definition of wrongs and the specification of remedies to the legislature and the common law.” Cantrell v. Morris,
[42] Here, the legislature has defined a wrong—an on-going services caseload greater than seventeen cases at any one time—but has not specified a remedy. No one, at any time, has a means, practical or
[43] For these reasons, I concur with Judge Riley that the trial court’s dismissal of Price’s action was in error.
. For example, our supreme court recently disciplined an attorney for failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, and failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed decisions for three incidents arising out of his service as a contracted comity public defender. In re Shoaf,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[44] I fully concur with my colleagues’ decision affirming the trial court’s judgment that the appellant does not have a private right of action. I believe, however, that the trial court was also correct in concluding that the appellant had an adequate remedy under the Indiana Civil Service Complaint procedure which she has failed to exhaust. As a result, we should not reach the issue of whether there is a public right of action under the statute.