MARY J. MOORE, Appellant, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY d/b/a METRO, Respondent.
No. SC98169
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
September 15, 2020
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SAINT LOUIS
The Honorable Christopher E. McGraugh, Judge
Factual and Procedural History
On April 19, 2013, Driver was driving her regularly scheduled school bus route, picking up children before school. When she arrived at an intersection in the City of Saint Louis, the student who is picked up at that intersection was not waiting for her. Driver parked the school bus and turned on its flashers. The student arrived and boarded the bus. After the student safely boarded the bus, a Metro Call-A-Ride bus collided with Driver‘s school bus.
Driver was injured and brought this personal injury suit against Metro. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in Driver‘s favor, awarding her $1.878 million in damages. Metro filed a motion for remittitur, asserting the award should be reduced pursuant to
Analysis
Driver contends the circuit court erred in sustaining Metro‘s motion for remittitur pursuant to
Sovereign Immunity
In 1949, Missouri and Illinois entered into an agreement to create Metro as an interstate compact entity.
The United States Congress approved the interstate compact as required by the United States Constitution‘s Compact Clause,
Driver alleges she sustained injuries due to the negligent operation of a Metro bus. Accordingly, Metro‘s sovereign immunity is waived for purposes of her claim.
Section 537.610
The jury awarded Driver $1.878 million in damages. Following Metro‘s motion for remittitur, based upon the statutory damage cap set forth in
When sovereign immunity is waived for a public entity,
Section 70.429
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations describe the minimum levels of financial responsibility that must be “maintained by for-hire motor carriers of passengers operating motor vehicles in interstate ... commerce.”
Potential Statutory Conflict
Driver alleges the circuit court erred in applying
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to effectuate legislative intent through reference to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 2013). “When the words are clear, there is nothing to construe beyond applying the plain meaning of the law.” Id. (quoting State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Mo. banc 2002)). A court applies rules of statutory construction only to resolve an ambiguity when the legislative intent cannot be determined from the plain statutory language. United Pharmacal Co. of Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 208 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Mo. banc 2006).
Driver‘s argument fails because it presupposes the statutes are actually in conflict, “which is a precondition to the application of the principles of statutory construction.” State ex rel. City of Jennings v. Riley, 236 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Mo. banc 2007).
The mere proposition that Metro must maintain a minimum level of financial responsibility as set forth by federal safety regulations does not conflict with the legislature‘s
Accordingly, there is no conflict between
Conclusion
There is no need to engage in additional statutory construction because the statutes’ plain language is clear and there is no statutory conflict. The circuit court‘s judgment, which reduced Driver‘s damage award to statutory maximum amount allowed, plus interest, is affirmed.
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Chief Justice
All concur.
