449 U.S. 1023 | SCOTUS | 1980
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Under Connecticut law, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor when “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-183 (a) (3) (1975 rev.). Petitioner was convicted of violating this statute after she made a telephone call to a woman with whom she had some personal quarrel. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal in the state courts,
To be sure, a State has a valid interest in protecting its citizens against unwarranted invasions of privacy. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728 (1970). See generally Note, Give Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone: Telephone Solicitation and the First Amendment, 7 Hastings Const. L. Q. 129 (1979). This is especially true when unprotected speech, such as obscenity or threats of physical violence, is involved. But it is equally clear that a State may not pursue these interests by unduly infringing on what would
Beyond the obvious tension between our prior cases and the judgment below is the difference in opinion among those courts that have considered constitutional challenges to similar state statutes. Contrary to the decision reached by the
The foregoing suggests that even if the Court is of the view that the judgment below is correct, there is sufficient reason to grant certiorari and issue a judgment to this effect. Accordingly, I dissent.
On direct appeal in the state courts, the First Amendment argument presented here was raised in and rejected by the Appellate Session of the Superior Court, State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 689, 389 A. 2d 1270, appeal denied, 174 Conn. 803, 382 A. 2d 1332 (1978).
Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 U. S. 14 (1973); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615-616 (1971). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that a similar statute risked criminal prosecution for a variety of situations involving protected speech.
“Conceivably, this section could make criminal a single telephone call made by a consumer who wishes to express his dissatisfaction over the performance of a product or service; a call by a businessman disturbed with another’s failure to perform a contractual obligation; by an irate citizen, perturbed with the state of public affairs, who desires to express his opinion to a public official; or by an individual bickering over family matters.” People v. Klick, 66 Ill. 2d 269, 274, 362 N. E. 2d 329, 331-332 (1977).
Given that the overbreadth may be substantial, petitioner has standing to raise the First Amendment claim even if the words she used were unprotected threats of violence. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). Furthermore, the case was submitted to the jury under an instruction which would have permitted a conviction if petitioner was found to have made either an annoying or threatening call with the requisite intent. The general verdict did not reveal on what ground the conviction rested. Even assuming that the facts could have supported a guilty verdict based on petitioner’s unprotected speech, petitioner may have been convicted for making a merely annoying communication.
Lead Opinion
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.