*2
(West
761-768
Supp.
U.S.C.A.
1975 &
§§
BROWN,
Before
RUBIN and REAV-
Smith,
1982) (DOHSA).
at 1108-
684 F.2d
LEY,
Judges.
Circuit
Smith oc-
12. The
involved
accident
Shelf,
outer
but
curred on the
RUBIN,
Judge:
ALVIN B.
Circuit
4(a) of the
we decided that §
This case raises many of the issues we
1333(a) (Supp.
1980), making
IV
U.S.C. §
Smith v. Pan Air Corp., decided
law
federal
applicable
surrogate
state
We,
(5th Cir.1982).
therefore,
address
occurring
plat-
on fixed
law
accidents
in detail
one issue that distinguishes
forms,
supersede
does not
DOHSA so as
against
Helicopter
judge
right
appeal.
1. Suit was
filed
Bell
also
found Bell
district
Textron,
Textron,
liability
apportioned
a division of
the manu-
to Bell
also liable and
20%
helicopter.
plaintiff
Helicopters,
F.Supp.
facturer of the
Bell and the
to Petroleum
80%
agreed that,
judgment,
Thus,
relating
plaintiffs’
Bell
if Bell were cast
no issues
$225,000
pay
plaintiff
against
and waive
Bell
us.
are before
claims
jurisdiction
admiralty
fore,
to oust
over the
that this exclusion from LHWCA cov-
claim.2
plaintiff’s
erage does not
Barger.
extend to
wrongful
death claim in
case,
Smith involved several claims. Jor
Smith,
unlike the Kolb claim in
is asserted
dan, whose claim was
asserted
his bene
employer,
the decedent’s
(Smith), was
ficiary
flying
plane.
Kolb
*3
4(b) of
Helicopters. Section
the OCSLA
were both
Barger
piloting
helicopters.
provides,
death of
respect to ...
“[w]ith
aircraft,
Barger’s,
like
Jordan’s
had attach
resulting
any
from
occur-
employee
injury
enabling it to land
ments
on and take off
ring
operations
as the result of
conducted
from water. Kolb’s helicopter apparently
on the
pur-
outer Continental Shelf for the
had no such attachment. But each of these
for,
pose
exploring
developing,
removing,
aircraft, whether or not fitted with pon
or transporting ...
the natural
resources
toons,
designed primarily
fly
to
... of the
and seabed of the
subsoil
outer
air not to travel
through the
on water. The
Shelf, compensation
shall be
colleague
respected
apparent
dissent of our
payable
provisions
under the
of the Long-
ly
pontoons
assumes that a
sans
shoremen’s and
Compen-
Harbor Workers’
purpose,
used
to transport
for the selfrsame
(West
sation Act
901-950
U.S.C.A. §§
[33
personnel
platforms,
to and from offshore
Supp.1982) (LHWCA)].”
1978 &
plane
a
a
nor a helicop
not vessel. Neither
133(b).3
933(i)
C.A.
§
Section
undergoes
ter
a miraculous transformation
provides
compensation
LHWCA
that this
pontoons
from aircraft
vessel when
into
are
injured
exclusive
of an
employ-
it,
pilots
by
attached to
and their
do not
this
against
ee
his
employer.
U.S.C.A.
a
act become members of
“vessel’s” crew.
Therefore,
933(i).
Barger
if
§
covered
amphibian adaptations
The helicopter’s
1333(b),
by 43 U.S.C.
there can
§
be no
solely
permit
to
it to
designed
were
take off
recovery against
employer
gener-
his
under
and to
from and land on water
taxi on
juris-
al
if admiralty
maritime law. Even
position
itself for loading
water in order
Barger’s
diction existed because
death re-
unloading
with a view to travel
sulted from an aircraft crash on the high
air.
It was an
through the
aircraft
seas,
Smith,
see
684 F.2d at
recovery
of the water for a
might use the surface
933(i)
would be
barred
and the claim
§
time to facilitate airborne commerce. An
would fail on the merits.
not become
airplane does
an automobile be
Barger
plaintiffs
argue that
cause it has wheels attached and can taxi
seaman,
Barger was a Jones Act
and there
on
The wheels no more
runways.
change
fore
coverage
excluded from
under 43
pontoons
aircraft
into land vehicles than
1333(b).
provides
U.S.C.
That section
§
Just as ves
change aircraft
into vessels.
“employee”
term
does not include
quality
sel
not lose its nautical
merely
does
“a master or member of a crew of any
is anchored for a time to serve as
1333(b)(1).
vessel.”
U.S.C.
For the
§
an aircraft
drilling platform,
does not
Smith,
same reasons discussed in
adapted
it is
become a vessel because
1112-14,
at
we conclude that a helicopter
periods
taxi on the water for brief
float and
“vessel,” and,
cannot be considered a
there-
perform
in order
incidental
functions
Smith,
(1)
“employee”
2. See
Jones Act.
have extended Robison
strange
to
sorts of
Judge
The classic case is
Wisdom’s cele-
things to find them to be a “vessel” and the
Robison,
brated decision in Offshore Co. v.
injured person
seaman,3
a
and the so called
(5th Cir.1959). There,
facts substantial 1972 amendments States Marine LHWCA) express this con- but also Court’s S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 339 Congress determine what clusion we must Rules, 8. The International see 33 U.S.C. § 1602 about on which meant a matter it could through number 1 thought technological non-ex- have 3(a) discussing example, Rule techno- states that: istence. For (a) Congress logical every descrip- word ‘vessel’ advances made since enacted includes COGSA, craft, tion of including nondisplace- water has stated: Court seaplanes, capable ment craft and used or principal in this case is determine Our task being transportation used as a means of Congress thought what have about a water. subject thought about it never or could which 3(e) Rule states that: thought have about we have and one (e) ‘seaplane’ any The word includes thought never other has nor Court *8 designed to manoeuvre on the thought. water. Technology maritime has created a peculiar Rule 31 reflects seagoing concern with transportation system unlike aircraft: Congress when enacted existence in 1936 impracticable seaplane Where it is (note for a omitted). COGSA. lights shapes exhibit of the characteris- Ltd. v. FOREST and LASH Wirth S/S ACADIA positions prescribed tics or in the 1272, (5th Cir.1976). Barge, F.2d lights Rules of this Part she then, shall exhibit question remains what did Con- shapes closely similar 4(b)(1) characteristics gress mean it enacted in 1953 when position possible, (emphasis sup- as is which cuts the mar- the statute off plied). pilot. Moragne itime for the death characterization of controversy prized America, claim, UNITED is not a vessel.9 STATES of Plaintiff-Appellee, ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING Stephen BROWN, Pfeiffer EN BANC Defendant-Appellant. BROWN, Before RUBIN and REAV- No. 82-1011. LEY, Judges. Circuit United Court of Appeals, States PER CURIAM: Fifth Circuit. The Petition for Rehearing DENIED Nov. having the Court polled been at the 30, 1982. Rehearing Denied Dec. request of one of the members of the Court and majority of the Circuit Judges who regular are in active having service not (Rule voted it, in favor of 35 Federal Rules Procedure; of Appellate Local Fifth Circuit 16) Rule the Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane is also DENIED. CLARK, Before Judge, BROWN, Chief GEE, RUBIN, REAVLEY, POLITZ, RAN- DALL, TATE, JOHNSON, WILLIAMS, GARWOOD, JOLLY and HIGGINBOT- HAM, Judges. Circuit BROWN, JOHN R. Circuit Judge, with whom JOHNSON, POLITZ and Circuit
Judges, join, dissenting: For the reasons set forth my dissent to
the panel opinion, I dissent to the failure grant Court to rehearing en banc. TATE, Judge, Circuit dissenting from de-
nial Suggestion Rehearing En Banc:
I join Judge Brown in dissenting from application denial of the for en banc rehearing. Without definitely concluding now I that would reach the conclusions ex- pressed by Judge Brown in his dissent to the panel opinion, I feel they raise concerns import sufficient to warrant
full consideration by the entire Court on this issue of everyday importance to work- servicing
ers our offshore oil industry. ascribing 9. That claims, vessel status to a acki founded on traditional seamen’s legal problems unanswered, work, leaves some longshoremen see never received mainte- (limitation liability, etc.), Sieracki, Shipping Co. v. nance and cure. Seas admiralty’s adaptability. no deterrence L.Ed. Recall, example, the boundless Sier-
