9 Wash. 473 | Wash. | 1894
The opinion of the court was delivered by
— Marx & Jorgenson having obtained a judgment for money against W. S. Parker, summoned the First National Bank of Fairhaven as a garnishee. The bank answered that it had an account with Parker as a depositor, wherein he was credited with $845.14; but it alleged that the money deposited was money of the city of Fairhaven which Parker, as marshal of that city, had collected in his official capacity, and this fact, at the hearing, it established to a moral certainty. The account was kept in the individual name of Parker, but it was understood that none but city money would be deposited in that account, and that none but checks in favor of the city treasurer would be drawn against it. Still, it was in no sense a special deposit, but the money was used by the bank for its own purposes, with the understanding that it would be required at the expiration of each month, when the statute required the marshal to settle with the treasurer. Gen. Stat., § 655.
It was error for the court, of its own motion, to require the city of Fairhaven to appear as an intervenor. It would have neither gained nor lost by the result of the proceeding. Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62.
It was a proper case for an interpleader on the motion of the bank under Code Proc., §152; but no such motion was made. Therefore the city must go out of the case, in any event.
1. What were the rights of respondents as plaintiffs in the garnishment proceeding.
2. What relation did Parker, as marshal, bear to the city of Fairhaven touching the money collected by him and deposited with the bank.
1. It is a general rule in garnishment that the plaintiff can obtain no greater beneficial relief against the garnishee than the judgment debtor would be entitled to, and that if the debtor’s recovery would be limited to a mere legal title without beneficial interest or right of enjoyment in himself the proceeding must fail. A judgment creditor cannot have his debt satisfied out of property held in trust for another, no matter how completely his debtor may have exercised apparent ownership over it, unless it was upon the faith of such ownership that the credit was given. Wade, Attachment, § 416; Morrill v. Raymond, 28 Kan. 415; Farmers, etc., Bank v. King, 57 Pa. St. 202.
Therefore, if the deposit in the bank was, in equity, the property of the city, although it stood in Parker’s name, respondents had no right to a judgment against the garnishee.
2. The respondents present several propositions, supported by authority, to the effect that a custodian of public funds, who is required by law to give a bond for the proper disposition of the moneys coming to his hands, is not a mere bailee, but is a debtor; and the argument is drawn therefrom that the money which he receives is his, and can be applied to the payment of his debts.
The general rule is conceded to be that an agent can, under no circumstances, so deal with his principal’s property or money, that the former cannot, as against him, follow and recover it, or its proceeds, whatever shape he may have caused it to take. And all persons into whose
Now, a collector or treasurer of a municipal corporation, without bond and without statutory obligations, would at common law be a mere bailee, and the rules governing bailments would apply to him the same as any other agent. But it is universal that such' officers are required to give bonds, and that statutes govern their liability, and out of this fact have grown many cases which seem at first glance to sustain the view that they are debtors and not bailees, and that the money they receive is their own.
In Inhabitants of Colerain v. Bell, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 499, it was said:
‘ ‘ The specific money received by a collector, in the collection of taxes, is his money, and not that of the town. ’ ’
In Inhabitants of Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. 112, the court, speaking of a collector of taxes, said:
“His obligation is not regulated by the law of bailments, and the cases cited to that effect are not applicable. He is a debtor, an accountant. ’ ’
In Egremont v. Benjamin, 125 Mass. 15, concerning a town treasurer, the expression was used:
££ He was not a bailee of the moneys received, but an accountant. ’ ’
Halbert v. State, 22 Ind. 125, declared it to be well established that a public officer required to give bond for the proper payment of moneys coming into his hands officially, is not a mere bailee of the money. Rock v. Stinger, 36 Ind. 346, held that the technical legal title to
' A leading case on this subject is United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578, where it was said in an action on the bond of a receiver of public moneys:
“This is not a case of bailment, and, consequently, the law of bailment does not apply to it. The liability of the defendant arises out of his official bond, and principles which are founded upon public policy. ’ ’
‘ ‘ Still they are nothing but bailees. To call them anything else, when they are expressly forbidden to touch or use the public money except as directed, would be an abuse of terms. But they are special bailees, subject to special obligations. It is evident that the ordinary law of bailment cannot be invoked to determine the degree of their responsibility. ’ ’
It seems to us that every one of the earlier cases cited, where the expression was used that such and such an officer was not a bailee, or a mere bailee, or was a debtor, must be regarded from the standpoint of the court and the particular case. They were one and all cases where suit had been brought upon the bond of the officer, and he was attempting to excuse his default because he had lost the money by robbery, or from some other cause over which he claimed to have had no control. But in every such case it was held that his liability was absolute, and the true reason, under United States v. Thomas, supra, must be, not that he was any the less a bailee, but that the statute imposed upon him a measure of duty larger than that found in the common law. If the courts of the states adhered to
Again, we have, in this state, laws which are fully equivalent to the acts of congress referred to so restricting the authority of federal depositaries, with the exception that deposits in banks are not expressly forbidden; for section 57 of the Penal Code makes it a felony for any officer to use any portion of the public money entrusted to him, in any manner or for any purpose not authorized by law, which is the same as a prohibition against using it except as authorized by law. Under the Nebraska case cited it
Although garnishment is a purely statutory proceeding, it is always administered upon equitable principles, and upon the answer of the bank and the proofs, we hold it not to be liable for respondent’s judgment against Parker.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the garnishment proceeding. The First National Bank of Fairhaven will recover costs against respondents, but not against the city of Fairhaven. The city of Fairhaven will not recover costs.
Dunbar, C. J., and Anders, Scott and Hoyt, JJ., concur.