154 Mass. 235 | Mass. | 1891
The following opinion was prepared by Mr. Justice William Alleh, and after his death was adopted as the opinion of the court by a majority of the Justices.
The defendants let offices in their building, retaining control of the halls, entries, stairways, and elevator, which were not let. The plaintiff, while going down the stairs from an office in the building, fell, and was hurt. There was evidence tending to prove that she fell in consequence of the darkness of the stairway. There was no evidence of negligence by the defendants except in not lighting the stairway, and if they owed to the plaintiff the duty of lighting it, there was evidence of negligence on their part. The general duty which the defendants owed to third persons, in respect to the passages of the building, is well expressed in the instructions to the jury at the trial: “ If the defendants leased rooms in the building to different tenants, reserving to themselves the control of the halls, stairways, and elevator, by and through which access was to be had to these rooms, and the general lighting arrangements of those passages, then the defendants were bound to take reasonable care that such approaches were safe and suitable at all times, and for all persons who were lawfully using the premises, and using due care, so far as they ought to have reasonably anticipated such use as involved in and necessarily arising out of the purposes and business for which said rooms were leased.”
The plaintiff was using the stairs by the implied invitation of the defendants, and the question of the defendants’ negligence turns upon whether it was their duty to persons so using them to provide artificial light at the time the plaintiff fell.
The stairs were constructed in a well, three sides of which were closed. At the back of the well, which was about nine feet from the entrance, or open side, the stairs turned and passed down on the third side of the well to the front or open side.
The defendants contended that, if the use of the stairs was dangerous on account of the darkness, the plaintiff was not in the exercise of due care in using them. We think that, under the circumstances, this would not necessarily prevent the jury from finding that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due cáre. She went up in the elevator to the office on the fifth floor, where she had business, and when she had finished her business there was no way of going down except by the stairs. The evidence tended to show that the first flight of stairs she went down was sufficiently lighted by natural light; that the tenant of the office which she had visited saw that the gas was not lighted, and cautioned her to be careful for that reason; that after she had gone down the stairs from the fifth to the fourth floor, and while