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Marvin v. Marvin
557 P.2d 106
Cal.
1976
Check Treatment

*1 No. 30520. Dec. [L.A. 1976.] MARVIN, Plaintiff Appellant,

MICHELLE MARVIN, LEE and Respondent. Defendant *5 Counsel Ross, Woldman, M. Mitchelson, M. N. Robert Fleish-

Marvin Donald McDaniel, man, Brown for Brown & Weston and David M. Plaintiff Appellant. Amici on Miller and Suzie S. Thom as Curiae

Jettie Pierce Ruth Selvig, Plaintiff and behalf of Appellant. R. & Mark A. Goldman and William Bishin for

Goldman Kagon, Defendant and Respondent. Sutter, Treuhaft, Walker, Hill Doris Brin Walker and

Herma John Kay, on of & Hendon as Amici Curiae behalf Defendant Nawi Respondent. Shenk Amici Grant, Stone & H. Grant and

Isabella Livingston, Curiae.

665 Opinion a substantial has been 15 there

TOBRINER, J. years, past During without of in the number marrying.1 increase together couples living when one lead Such nonmarital controversy legal relationships with the of faced Courts dies or Appeal, couple separates. partner cases, arrived at in such have task of determining property rights 34 re (1973) two cases (In Cary Marriage conflicting positions: Estate 862]; Atherley Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d held Law Act have that 41]) Family Cal.Rptr. Code, et division of (Civ. property according § seq.) requires (Beckman and one decision Mayhew community principles, that has 604]) rejected holding. Cal.Rptr. to declare the this resolve We take controversy opportunity distribution which should acquired govern principles nonmarital relationship. Law Act do not The

We conclude: (1) govern provisions a nonmarital the distribution relationship; property acquired during decision. (2) such a remains solely judicial subject courts should enforce contracts between express to the extent the contract founded on the except explicitly In the absence of an consideration of meretricious sexual services. (3) contract, the courts should into the conduct of the inquire express contract, to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied venture, or some other tacit under- joint partnership between the The courts also the doctrine of standing parties. may employ meruit, or remedies such as constructive or quantum resulting equitable trusts, when warranted the facts of the case. *6 for

In the and defendant lived seven instant case together plaintiff this was without all during period years acquired marrying; property a contract When sued to enforce taken in defendant’s name. plaintiff to to the under which she was entitled half support for the trial court pleadings granted judgment payments, defendant, all accumulated thus him with couple leaving on a trial trial court denied Since the plaintiff relationship. during stated with the claim, decision conflicts merits of her its principles above, and must be reversed._ are times as many census indicate that today eight couples 1The 1970 figures perhaps In re (Comment, as cohabited ten ago.” without married years

living together being A Illicit Cohabitation (1974) 25 L.J. Judicial Recognition Hastings Cary: 1. The this setting appeal. factual the trial

Since court rendered for defendant on the judgment true, we must as pleadings, accept allegations plaintiff’s complaint state, whether state, such amended can be to determining allegations cause of action. (See Sullivan Los (1974) Cal.3d County Angeles 710, 714-715, fn. 3 Witkin, 527 P.2d 865]; Cal. Cal.Rptr. Procedure ed. We (2d 1971) 2817-2818.) turn therefore to the pp. specific allegations complaint. that in

Plaintiff avers October of 1964 she and defendant “entered into an oral “the while lived would agreement” together they combine their efforts and and would share and all earnings equally any , accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or Furthermore, combined.” to “hold themselves out to the they agreed as wife” husband and and that would further general public “plaintiff homemaker, render her services as a and cook companion, housekeeper to ... defendant.” thereafter lucrative her career as

Shortly plaintiff “give agreed up an entertainer order her full “devote time to singer” [and] homemaker, as a cook;” defendant... companion, housekeeper return defendant for all of financial agreed “provide plaintiff’s and needs for the rest of her life.” support

Plaintiff that she with lived defendant from October of 1964 alleges of 1970 her and fulfilled under through May obligations agreement. this a result of their efforts and During period earnings in defendant’s name substantial real and acquired personal property, $1 motion worth over In million. including picture rights May however, defendant to leave his household. He plaintiff compelled continued to until November of but thereafter support plaintiff refused to further provide support.

On the basis of these asserts two causes of action. plaintiff allegations first, relief, her asks court to determine declaratory the second a constructive trust seeks property rights; impose one half of the the course of relationship. property acquired during *7 the com

Defendant demurred and then answered unsuccessfully, extensive discovery Following pretrial plaint. attack on the renewed his Defendant came to trial.2 the case proceedings, that had Since motion to dismiss. stipulated a complaint until the of did not terminate Marvin filing defendant’s Betty 1967, court treated the trial of divorce a final decree January motion as one for augmented by pleadings defendant’s judgment the stipulation. motion defendant’s the court

After granted hearing argument to set aside Plaintiff moved defendant. for entered judgment she and her leave to amend allege and asked complaint judgment was final. defendant’s divorce after reaffirmed defendant agreement motion, from the and she trial court denied appealed The plaintiff’s judgment. breach an a cause action states

2. complaint for of of Plaintiff’s contract. express we 215 Cal. 698 P.2d Trutalli v. In 430] Meraviglia [12 contract that nonmarital established the may lawfully principle during relationship. ownership property acquired concerning Vallera 21 Cal.2d this in Vallera v. We reaffirmed principle not “If and woman are P.2d a man 761], stating [who [134 and wife under an live as husband pool together married] trial, an amended asked leave to file complaint. 2When the case was called for plaintiff Santa of action for breach of against added causes two proposed complaint action, Records, was that Santa Ana not a to the asserting Ana party corporation amend, claims that the leave of defendant. The court denied plaintiff alter ego was We argument properly was an abuse of discretion. disagree; plaintiff’s ruling its below. the Court of portion opinion quoted rejected by Appeal motion, set made on the day was in denial of opening No error committed plaintiff’s trial, have added which would leave to file a amended complaint seeking proposed at the As stated counsel and a defendant to the action. by plaintiff’s two counts new not on the we seek to amend the is no about it that Complaint hearing, question “[TJhere of trial.” eve of trial but on day Weintraub, pages 761], the said at In v. court Cal.Rptr. Hayutin it “would have required motion that had it been granted, 508-509 in to such a respect issues, a new factual redoing wholly for the canvassing continuance long purpose had, would have all of which imposed the elaborate discovery previously procedures defendant . . . and substantial inconvenience upon and his witnesses defendant leave to did err in denying The court not additional needless and substantial expense.... Records, Inc., 11 (See also: Nelson v. Specialty file the amended complaint.” proposed Adler, 581, 585 41 Cal.2d 540]; Moss Estate Co. v. 138-139 Cal.Rptr. Co., 1].) P.2d “The ruling Cal.2d 732]; Drug Vogel Thrifty [261 the trial a clear a showing by appellant absent will be disturbed upon appeal not judge Inc., Records, 11 Cal.App.3d (Nelson v. Specialty of discretion. abuse [Citations.]” here 139.) No such showing appears. at p. *8 668 accumulations, and share in their will earnings equally joint equity the interests of each in such

protect property.” In the case before us her cause of action contract plaintiff, basing these maintains that the trial court erred in her upon precedents, denying a on trial the merits of her contention. . that court did not Although for its conclusion that contractual specify ground plaintiff’s allega- action,3 tions stated no cause of defendant offers some four theories to sustain the we to examine them. ruling; proceed

Defendant first and relies on the contention that principally is so related to alleged “immoral” closely supposed character between and himself that relationship plaintiff enforcement of the contract would violate He public policy.4 points cases that a contract between asserting nonmarital is unen forceable if it is in” “involved an illicit Shaw v. (see Shaw relationship 159, 227 (1964) 164 Garcia Cal.App.2d (dictum); v. Cal.Rptr. [38 520] 106 364, (1951) 368 P.2d Venegas or made Cal.App.2d (dictum), [235 89] of such a (Hill v. Estate “contemplation” Westbrook relationship 599, 95 (1950) 602 P.2d see 727]; Hill v. Estate Cal.App.2d [213 458, Westbrook 39 (1952) Cal.2d 460 P.2d Barlow v. 19]; Collins [247 274, (1958) P.2d v. (dictum); Cal.App.2d Bridges Bridges [333 64] 359, (1954) A review (dictum)). 69] numerous California decisions contracts between nonmarital concerning 3The between court and counsel at colloquy on the motion for argument on judgment that the pleadings suggests trial court held the 1964 violated public policy because it Marvin, derogated community property rights defendant’s lawful Betty Plaintiff, however, wife. offered to amend her that she and defendant complaint allege reaffirmed their contract after defendant and were divorced. The trial Betty court denied amend, leave to which ruling the court’s suggests must rest judgment some other than the ground assertion the contract would injure Betty’s property rights. 4Defendant also contends that the contract was it because illegal contemplated 269a, violation of former Penal Code section which “in a state of prohibited living 71, 1, (§ cohabitation and 269a was adultery.” Stats. ch. eff. Jan. repealed Defendant’s to raise the issue is standing because he alone was married and questionable Plaintiff, thus section guilty 269a. unmarried violating being could neither be convicted of adulterous cohabitation nor of aiding defendant’s violation. abetting (See In 318].) re 162 Cal. 85-86 P. Cooper The numerous cases the contractual discussing rights unmarried have couples drawn no distinction between and lawful illegal relationships relationships. (Cf. Weak Weak Cal.Rptr. (bigamous 9] Moreover, if we even were to draw such a distinction—a marriage).) academic largely benefit; endeavor in view of the of section 269a—defendant would not repeal probably final, his with continued after his divorce became plaintiff long plaintiff to amend her to assert that the reaffirmed their contract after sought complaint divorce.

669 such broad however, that courts have not reveals the employed partners, The decisions instead to strike down contracts. uncertain standards and contract between and more standard: a a narrower disclose precise it to the extent that is unenforceable nonmarital explicitly the consideration of meretricious sexual immoral and illicit rests services. issue, Trutalli v.

In the first to address this case Meraviglia, supra, for 11 and lived without the had Cal. years marriage parties together land had The to title to he raised children. man sued had two quiet the woman in name this his own relationship; during purchased to and hold all an defended by agreement pool earnings asserting the assertion illegality agree jointly. Rejecting ment, the this the the court “The that to action at stated that fact parties time to invest their to be held they agreed earnings jointly relation, between them in an were unlawful did not living together other, them from into a lawful with each disqualify entering agreement as so such immoral relation was not made a consideration of their long (Italics Cal. added.) (215 701-702.) agreement.” at pp.

In P.2d both 69], Bridges Cal.App.2d Bridges, were in the divorces from erstwhile process obtaining The two to live share to respective spouses. parties agreed together, and to when their divorces became equally marry property acquired, final. The a man worked as salesman and used his savings purchase children, house, for The woman cared seven three from kept properties. each former the and one from nonmarital relationship, construct When they separated, helped improvements properties. the without the court awarded the woman one-half value marrying, the contract was the the man’s contention that Rejecting illegal, property. court it the stated that: “Nowhere is testified anyone expressly was in the for the of assets and there agreement pooling anything as of accumulations that meretricious relations sharing any contemplated consideration (125 any object agreement.” part at Croslin v. Scott reiterates the 755] rule established in Trutalli and In Croslin Bridges. parties separated a The woman then following three-year relationship. phoned man, her, to return asked him that he build them suggested a lot house on she owned. She in return agreed place house, built lived man there for joint ownership. interest several more When he sued to establish his years. they separated, nonsuit, the Court of stated that Reversing Appeal property. in meretricious “The mere fact to live together parties agree does not make necessarily disposition *10 It is when the is between them invalid. only property agreement the other or the illicit in connection with made relationship agreement, that the latter becomes made a consideration properly agreement, at (154 Cal.App.2d illegal.” other cases have enforcement

Numerous agreements upheld indistin in factual between nonmarital essentially settings partners 42 (In Foster (1974) re from case. Marriage guishable present Weak, 202 Weak v. 49]; 577 Cal.Rptr. supra, Cal.App.2d Cal.App.3d [117 413 P.2d 632, 639; v. Schuenemann 167 (1959) Ferguson Cal.App.2d [334 Collins, 274, 277-278; 166 Ferraro v. Barlow v. 668]; Cal.App.2d supra, 146 849 P.2d Cline v. Festersen 168]; Ferraro (1956) Cal.App.2d [304 117 128 380 P.2d v. 149]; (1953) (1954) Cal.App.2d [275 Profit Profit 106 126 P.2d Garcia v. 25]; Cal.App.2d Venegas, supra, Cal.App.2d [255 364; 38 Padilla v. Padilla 319 P.2d Bacon (1940) 1093]; Cal.App.2d [100 5 v. Bacon 21 540 P.2d 884].) Cal.App.2d [69 hover over the in the somewhat decisions issue

Although past of a we can abstract from form figures Chagall painting, wispy decisions a clear and rule. The fact that a man and those simple in a sexual relation woman live without together marriage, engage between them to does not itself invalidate relating ship, agreements Neither is such an earnings, property, expenses. invalid because have creation merely parties may contemplated or continuation of a nonmarital when entered into it. they between nonmarital fail to the extent that Agreements partners they cases, of In re 5Defendant that all of the cited with the possible exception urges Foster, 125 42 v. 577 and Bridges Bridges, supra, Marriage supra, Cal.App.3d to enforce can be that the seeking Cal.App.2d distinguished ground partner to homemaking contributed either or services additional ordinary contract case, however, in which one services. No that a suggests pooling agreement partner invalid, and dictum Hill v. Estate contributes services is only homemaking Westbrook, 599, 603 P.2d states the A supra, Cal.App.2d opposite. promise 727] course, is, consideration for a services a lawful and homemaking adequate perform 480])—otherwise (see v. Taylor Taylor for their defendant in domestic could not sue wages—and those engaged employment of enforcement would denial no reason his distinction justify advances why proposed (1973) 44 (See Mich.App. such consideration. Tyranski Piggins contracts supported by 595, 597].) N.W.2d rest a consideration of meretricious sexual services. Thus the rule upon defendant, asserted that a contract fails if it is “involved in” or made “in of a nonmarital cannot be reconciled contemplation” relationship, with the decisions.

The three cases cited defendant which have declined to enforce contracts between nonmarital involved consideration that was founded an illicit sexual services. In Hill v. Estate expressly Westbrook, the woman promised keep man, wife, house for the to live him with as man and and to bear his children; will, the man for her in his but died promised provide without so. for the woman based on the doing Reversing judgment *11 services, reasonable value her the Court of stated that “the Appeal seeks, action is a claim which other predicated upon among things, reasonable value of with in decedent meretricious and living him two children. . . . The law does not award for bearing compensation with a man as a concubine and children. ... him As the living bearing is at least in for the value claimed- services for judgment part, had, which it be cannot be must reversed.” at (95 recovery Cal.App.2d retrial, 603.) the trial court found that it could not sever the p. Upon contract and value services place independent upon legitimate claimant. We therefore affirmed a for the performed by estate. judgment v. (Hill Estate Westbrook 39 Cal.2d 458 P.2d (1952) 19].) [247 In the other contract, cited decision to enforce a only refusing Updeck v. Samuel (1954) P.2d the contract 822], “was Cal.App.2d based on the consideration that the live as husband and together wife.” (123 contract as for at Viewing calling the court held it adultery, illegal.6 defendant, not cited 6Although by California only his precedent supports .which is

position v. Heaps Toy 813], In that case the woman to leave her to promised to make a man, refrain from job, to be a marriage, to the and' companion him; home permanent he the woman and agreed her child for support life. The Court of held the invalid as a contract Appeal in restraint of Code, and, Code, (Civ. 1676) marriage § as (Civ. morals” alternatively, “contrary good 1607). The § does not state that opinion sexual relations formed any part contract, consideration for the nor how—unless the contract called for sexual explain relations—the woman’s as a and could be employment companion housekeeper contrary morals. good The alternative the contract in that case holding Heaps Toy, supra, finding morals, is contrary inconsistent with the numerous good California decisions contracts between nonmarital when such contracts are upholding partners not founded consideration, an illicit and is therefore upon disapproved. The decisions in the Hill and cases thus demonstrate that a Updeck contract between nonmarital even if made in partners, expressly of a common is invalid if sexual contemplation living arrangement, acts form an of the consideration for the In inseparable part agreement. sum, a court will not enforce a contract for the pooling if it is based services earnings explicitly inseparably upon Hill, The Court of however, paramour. indicates that Appeal opinion even if sexual services are consideration, the contractual part any severable of the contract consideration portion supported independent will still be enforced. that a contract between nonmarital principle will be

enforced unless based an illicit consider- expressly inseparably upon ation of sexual services not the distillation of the only represents law, decisional but also offers a far more and workable standard precise than that advocated Our defendant. recent decision in In re Marriage 17 Cal.3d 342 551 P.2d offers a Dawley Cal.Rptr. 323] close the contention that an analogy. Rejecting antenuptial agreement invalid if the duration, of short we parties contemplated out that a standard based pointed Dawley subjective *12 of the unworkable; test, is uncertain and such a we contemplation stated, invalidate all “might virtually antenuptial agreements that the dissolution . . . it but no ground parties contemplated provides basis for which principled offend determining antenuptial agreements 342, and which do not.” Cal.3d (17 public policy case a standard which Similarly, whether an present inquires is “involved” in or agreement nonmarital “contemplates” and unworkable. all between vague Virtually agreements can be said to be “involved” in some sense in the partners fact of their mutual sexual or to the existence of that relationship, “contemplate” Thus standards, defendant’s if relationship. taken proposed literally, invalidate all between nonmarital a result might agreements no partners, Moreover, one favors. those standards offer no basis to distinguish between valid and invalid not to such uncertain agreements. By looking tests, but to the consideration we underlying agreement, provide and the courts with a to determine when an practical guide between nonmarital should be enforced. agreement Defendant relies the trial secondly ground suggested by court: that the 1964 contract violated because it public policy impaired Marvin, defendant’s lawful wife. community rights Betty Defendant out that his while from his wife points earnings living apart before rendition of decree were interlocutory community property Code, 169, under 1964 law Civ. and that (former 169.2) §§ statutory to her a defendant’s with to transfer half agreement plaintiff purported interest in that But whether or not defendant’s community property. contract with exceeded his authority manager plaintiff Code, former Civ. defendant’s (see 172), § community property argu ment fails for the reason that an transfer of improper community initio, is not void ab but voidable at the instance of the merely 330, See 9 Cal.2d (1937) aggrieved spouse. Ballinger Ballinger 629; P.2d Trimble Trimble v. 219 Cal. P.2d 477].) Marvin, In the case had the present Betty aggrieved spouse, to assert her in the divorce opportunity community property rights action. Babbitt v. Babbitt (See Cal.2d 1].) and final decrees in that action fix and her limit interest. interlocutory Enforcement of the contract between and defendant plaintiff against awarded defendant the divorce will decree not impair any and thus is not on that account violative of right Betty’s, public policy.8

Defendant’s third contention is lack of noteworthy in advanced its contends He that enforcement authority support.

oral between and himself Civil is barred Code agreement plaintiff section which that “All contracts for settlements provides marriage must A settlement, however, be is an writing....” marriage each which release or contemplation party agrees *13 the would from which otherwise arise modify property rights 643, Corker v. (See 922].) Corker 87 Cal. 648 P. The marriage. (1891) 7Sections 169 and 169.2 were in 1970 Civil In 1972 Code section 5118. replaced by section 5118 was amended to that the provide and accumulations of both earnings “while and spouses from the other living separate are the apart spouse, separate property of the spouse.” 8Defendant also contends that the contract is invalid as an to agreement promote Witkin, (See 1 divorce. encourage (8th ed.) of Cal. Law and Summary 390-392 cases pp. cited.) not, however, there The between and defendant did its terms plaintiff by Moreover, defendant to divorce nor reward him for so require Betty, doing. principle on which defendant relies does not when the is apply marriage beyond question (Glickman v. Collins 13 redemption Cal.3d 858-859 Cal.Rptr. 204]); not whether or defendant’s to was when marriage Betty beyond redemption defendant contracted with is of fact which cannot be plaintiff obviously question resolved on the by judgment pleadings. definition,

contract at issue here does not fall within that and conceivably thus is of section 5134.9 beyond compass the contract

Defendant that enforcement of finally argues 43.5, barred Civil Code section subdivision which that (d), by provides “No cause of action arises for . . . breach of This promise marriage.” rather strained contention from the that a proceeds premise promise includes a and to marriage impliedly promise pool property support after v. (see acquired marriage Boyd Boyd Cal.App.2d to the conclusion 400]) Cal.Rptr. agreements pooling support not of or are barred part accompanied by promise by section. We conclude that section 43.5 is not reasonably susceptible defendant, advanced a conclusion demonstrated interpretation the fact that since 43.5 section was enacted in numerous cases have enforced between nonmarital and in none pooling agreements partners, did court or counsel refer to section 43.5.

In we base our that adults summary, opinion principle who live in sexual relations are voluntarily together engage nonetheless as as other to contract competent any persons respecting course, their Of cannot earnings property rights. they lawfully services, contract to for the of sexual for such a contract pay performance is, essence, and unlawful for that reason. agreement prostitution But their and to hold all they may agree pool earnings in accord with the law acquired during governing that each community property; conversely they may agree partner’s and the from those remains the earnings earnings acquired So as the does separate property earning partner.10 long consideration, not rest illicit meretricious order may choose, their economic and no the courts affairs they policy precludes from such enforcing agreements. instance,

In the that the present alleges plaintiff parties agreed pool their contracted to share in all earnings, they equally 9Our review of the cases between nonmarital many enforcing agreements reveals that of such were oral. In two majority agreements cases v. (Ferguson Schuenemann, Festersen, 413; 380), Cline supra, the court defenses the statute of frauds. expressly rejected grounded upon 10A might keep of other are great variety arrangements possible. *14 which one for services but to earnings agree compensate party property separate, to benefit of their earnings property, the other. choose to They pool only part may venture, tenants or form a or to hold acquired' joint partnership joint property Weitzman, common, (See tenants in other such generally or agree any arrangement. L. Rev. Tradition and 62 Cal. Legal Regulation Marriage: Change of and that defendant The terms of acquired, agreed support plaintiff. unlawful consideration. We the contract as do not rest any alleged upon conclude that the furnishes a suitable basis therefore complaint upon Witkin, the court can render relief. Cal. (See which trial declaratory in The trial court erred Procedure (2d ed.) 2335-2336.) consequently pp. motion for defendant’s judgment pleadings. granting can be to state a cause action 3. amended complaint Plaintiff’s theories contract or equitable implied relief. founded noted, in both of action As we have causes complaint allege plaintiff’s from contract; assert basis for relief an neither independent any express the contract. In In re Cary, Marriage however, that, the the Court of held in view of policy Appeal Act, in Law accumulated Family actual should be divided family relationship Upon examining equally. the to the case realized Cary opinion, present plaintiff’s with defendant cause of alleged relationship might arguably support action between the independent any express parties. have therefore briefed discussed the issue of of a nonmarital of an contract. absence rights partner express our conclusion that states a cause of Although plaintiff’s complaint action based on an contract alone us to reverse the express compels defendant, will resolution issue serve both to judgment Cary retrial and to resolve a conflict manifest guide parties upon presently Court of decisions. published Appeal Both and defendant stand in broad that the law plaintiff should be fashioned to out the reasonable carry expectations Plaintiff, however, contentions: that the parties. presents following decisions and erroneous notions of rest prior Cary upon implicit for his or her into a nonmarital punishing parly guilt entering that such decisions result in an distribution relationship, inequitable accumulated and that Cary correctly during relationship, held that the enactment of the Law Act in 1970 overturned those decisions. decisions Defendant maintains that prior prior response common law of contract and merely applied properly principles who have elected to remain outside the bounds of deliberately persons contends, erred in defendant community Cary, property system.11 11Wenote that a decision to avoid the strictures of the community property deliberate is not the live without Some marriage. couples reason that system couples together *15 the force of the Act vitiated Law that prior

holding precedents. decisions, the truth from examination

As we shall see pre-Cary The defendant. and between lies somewhere plaintiff positions Vallera, 681. 21 Cal.2d Vallera v. this on classic subject opinion Justice four-member Traynor posed for a majority, Speaking wife but with no man as his with a a woman “whether living question: reason to him married that she is belief acquires legally genuine in his of a co-tenant alone the earnings cohabitation rights Cal.2d at (21 accumulations relationship.” during period 664 P.2d 213 Cal. Nat. Bank (1931) 684.) Capital Citing Flanagan p. that her could not claim a nonmarital “wife” which held that 307], that answered estate was husband’s majority community property, that Vallera 684-685.) “in the explains “Equita- (Pp. negative.” question from the reasonable ble considerations expectation arising in entered into the status of benefits continuation of attending In the absence of case.” (P. 685.) not in such a faith are present good to share in concluded, the woman is entitled contract, Vallera express that her funds “in the accumulated only proportion jointly Curtis, Justice its (P. dissenting, toward contributed acquisition.” under which each showed an that the evidence implied argued the relation- in interest an acquired during owned equal party ship. based bar Vallera did not recovery expressly majority opinion But remedies. contract, to nor resort equitable preclude implied not “are considerations assertion that

Vallera’s broad present” equitable led the Cal.2d at 685) (21 the case of a nonmarital relationship based on Courts of recovery preclude language Appeal interpret v. Lazzarevich (1948) theories. Lazzarevich (See such be yet willing commitment that marriage implies, avoid the wish to may permanent fear the loss of others may during relationship; acquired share equally any property welfare, (see Beckman v. Mayhew, supra, from marriage or tax benefits resulting pension, as a 529). possible prelude Others may engage 49 Cal.App.3d and expense dissolving the difficulty In lower socio-economic groups marriage. many a nonmarital relationship; to choose often leads couples former marriage common law the doctrine of believe also incorrectly may unmarried couples we California, married. Consequently are in fact and thus they marriage prevails in a valid marriage not have participated mere fact that couple that the conclude intend to keep that the couple a court’s inference a basis for serve as cannot ceremony can be intention parties’ independent; separate their earnings of their relationship. into the nature a more searching inquiry ascertained *16 677 188, 82 191-192 P.2d v. 49]; (1947) Oakley Oakley Cal.App.2d [200 P.2d 848].)12 [185 when of the issue the of a nonmarital

Consequently, rights partner reached this court in Keene v. Keene 57 Cal.2d 657 (1962) Cal.Rptr. [21 593, 371 P.2d the claimant forwent reliance theories of 329], upon in law or fact. that she had worked on her implied Asserting value, ranch and that her labor had enhanced its she confined partner’s her of action to the claim that the court should a cause impress resulting trust on the derived from the sale of the ranch. The court property on limited its her the argument opinion accordingly, rejecting ground trust when the that the rendition of services rise to a resulting gives aid in not in its services subsequent acquisition property, Peters, Cal.2d at Justice attacked (57 improvement. dissenting, the distinction between the rendition of services and the majority’s contribution of funds or he maintained both property; consideration, services furnished valuable the afforded potentially for a trust. ground resulting

This failure of the courts to an action recognize by contract, based or to an partner upon implied grant equitable remedy, contrasts with the treatment of the Prior to the judicial putative spouse. Act, enactment of Law no statute to a granted rights putative The courts fashioned a of remedies spouse.13 variety accordingly , decision. Some cases to recover judicial permitted putative spouse half on a that the conduct of theory parties implied venture. Estate (1974) (See partnership joint Vargas 714, 717-718 Sousa v. Freitas 779]; (1970) Cal.Rptr. 660, Others 485].) Cal.Rptr. permitted spouse services, to recover the reasonable value of rendered less the value of 95, 9 Cal.2d received. v. (See support Sanguinetti Sanguinetti 12The did cases not determine whether a nonmarital could recover in clearly partner meruit for the value of But when we reasonable services rendered. affirmed a quantum Westbrook, trial court in Hill Estate 39 Cal.2d v. ruling denying recovery we did so in on that whether the “rendered her services because part ground partner 462) reward” was a of fact resolved her expectation monetary (p. question against the trial in a the court court—thus case would allow implying recovery proper based on meruit. quantum Act, Law in Civil Code section classifies property acquired during 13The Family ” “as that such be requires ‘quasi-marital property,’ putative in accord with Civil Code section 4800. divided dissolution of marriage decisions affirmed 111 A.L.R. 342].)14 100-102 Finally, to achieve a fair division of a court to employ equitable principles power Coats (Coats marriage. during putative property acquired *17 Odisio Caldwell v. 142 671, (1956) P. 441]; Cal. 677-678 Cal.App.2d 732, P.2d 14].)15 735 [299

Thus in the cases exhibited a Cary summary, prior schizophrenic an contract between nonmarital inconsistency. By enforcing express consideration, unless it rested an unlawful courts upon contracts. Yet the courts a common law as to applied principle contracts the common law that holds implied principle disregarded to enforce such arise from the conduct of can parties.16 Refusing in which contracts, “in the courts position spoke leaving themselves” v. had (Oakley Oakley, supra, they placed delicto. 188, if were as pari 192), just they guilty parties Justice Curtis noted this his inconsistency dissenting opinion Vallera, enforced, “if an will be out express agreement pointing or reason share there is no legal just why implied agreement 681, 686; Bruch, Cal.2d see cannot be enforced.” (21 Property on the Value De Facto Including Thoughts Rights Spouses And in Homemakers’ Services (1976) L.Q. 117-121.) Keene, that if the Cal.2d Justice Peters observed Keene v. supra, need not that he rendered services in expectation 14The putative spouse prove the reasonable value of those services. reward in order to recover (Sanguinetti monetary 95, 100.) 9 Cal.2d v. Sanguinetti, supra, nonmarital and putative relationships 15The contrast between principles governing Lazzarevich, 708. When in Lazzarevich v. 88 Cal.App.2d most strikingly supra, appears Mrs. divorce in she discovered to her surprise Lazzarevich sued her husband for him, reconciled with married to him. She nevertheless that she was not lawfully The court before finally separated. Lazzareviches lived for another year they together rendered, less the value for the reasonable value of services awarded her recovery received, of the but denied recovery until she discovered the invalidity marriage, support date. the same services rendered after that denote different These terms however do not be or implied. 16“Contracts may express contracts, between evidence which the agreement but have reference by kinds is the direct words of the parties, spoken is shown. If the shown agreement the parties written, if such can be the contract is said to be an one. But or express matter and conduct of the in the of the light subject shown the acts parties, interpreted circumstances, then the contract is an one.” (Skelly and of the.surrounding implied Corbin, 474], in 1 Contracts Bristol Sav. Bank 63 Conn. 83 A. quoted Thus, 41.) (1956)46 Cal.2d 715 as Justice Schauer observed in v. Wilder Desny p. fact, made in from 257], in a sense all contracts distinguished quasi-contractual contracts, in the manner in which the assent are obligations, differing only express 735-736.) (See 46 Cal.2d at and proved. pp. expressed ... it would be a man and woman “were not illegally living together business and a would be (Dis. opn. plain implied.” at p.

Still another cases arises from their inconsistency prior treatment of accumulated effort. To the extent that joint through had contributed the cases held that the property, partner partner funds obtains a share in the lack of proportionate acquisition, despite legal Vallera, 685; Vallera v. ( Cal.2d at standing relationship. supra, Weak, see Weak v. Yet courts have refused 632, 639.) such an interest based the contribution of services. recognize just As Justice Curtis out it “Unless can be that a woman’s points argued *18 cook, valueless, services as and homemaker are it would housekeeper, if, seem when she contributes to the logical of money purchase her interest will be then when she contributes her property, protected, home, services in the her interest accumulated should be property Vallera, (Vallera 681, 21 Cal.2d protected.” 686-687 (dis. supra, opn.); Bruch, cit., see 101, 110-114; Article, L.Q. op. Illicit supra, Family Cohabitation: The the Vallera and Keene Cases on the Impact Rights of of the Meretricious 354, 6 U.C. 369-370; Davis L.Rev. Spouse 635, Comment 48 Wash.L.Rev. 1973, Thus as of the time of the of In re filing Cary, Marriage supra, of the cases held that a nonmarital apparently partner

who rendered services in the absence of contract could assert no express the The facts of right property acquired during relationship. Cary demonstrated the unfairness that rule. unmarried,

Janet and Paul had lived for more than Cary together, held themselves out to friends and as husband eight years. They family wife, children, reared four a home and other purchased property, credit, returns, obtained filed income tax and otherwise conducted joint themselves as were home, married. Paul worked outside the though they and Janet cared for the house and children. generally

In 1971 Paul for a petitioned “nullity marriage.”17 Following on that the trial court awarded Janet half the hearing petition, property all acquired such during was relationship, although traceable to Paul’s The Court of affirmed the award. earnings. Appeal 17The Court of in In re does not Appeal opinion Cary, Marriage explain why court, however, Paul filed his action as a Cary Briefs filed with this petition nullity. that Paul suggest have been may to assert as a In seeking rights putative spouse. decisions which had dénied relief to the home-

Reviewing prior the Court reasoned those decisions rested making partner, Appeal of cohabitation without upon punishing persons policy guilty Act, observed, Law the court aimed eliminate marriage. Family fault or as a But once basis for marital fault or guilt dividing property. excluded, reasoned, the court guilt nothing distinguishes of a nonmarital from of a those Since rights “spouse” putative spouse. “ ” is entitled marital Code, to half (Civ. latter ‘quasi property’ that, § the Court of concluded 4452), to the effect Appeal giving policy Act, Law a nonmarital cohabitator should also be entitled to half the accumulated an “actual during family relationship.” at (34 353.)18 case, hand, neither other claims the

present status of an actual or party putative Under such circumstances an action to “the spouse. instant adjudge case marriage” be would and could not serve as a device nullity pointless contract and adjudicate from the property rights arising parties’ relationship. Accordingly, plaintiff chose here to assert her means an rights civil action. correctly ordinary 18The court also its Cary based decision of Civil Code analysis section which specifies of a property rights putative Section 4452 states that spouse. if the “court finds that either or both party believed in faith that the good marriage was valid, the court should declare such party have the of a status putative and, divide, . . . shall spouse, in accordance with Section that property acquired *19 the . . union . .” Since during section 4800 an division of requires equal community section 4452 to property, Cary interpreted an the require division of equal of a property so as putative marriage, one believed in long spouse faith that the good was marriage concluded, valid. Thus under section the Cary (the “guilty who spouse” spouse invalid) knows the is has the same marriage to half the as does the right property “innocent” spouse. then reasoned that if the to a is Cary “guilty” entitled spouse putative marriage to one-half the marital the in a nonmarital property, “guilty” partner should Otherwise, stated, also receive one-half of the the court “We should be property. obliged to a legislative a intent that who deceit presume person, by leads another believe a them, valid exists between shall be the marriage guaranteed half of legally property they all, most, even have though resulted from the of the acquire may blameless earnings At the same time we must infer an inconsistent intent that partner. two legislative who, other, with each enter an persons candidly unmarried upon family relationship, shall be denied aid whatever in any judicial the assertion of otherwise valid property (34 at rights.” Cal.App.3d Note, cit., This reasoning (See has been criticized commentators. Cary op. supra, 1226, 1234-1235; Comment, L.J. In re Hastings Marriage End the Carey [sic]: of of Putative-Meretricious Distinction in Spouse San L.Rev. Diego California 444-446.) The that commentators note Civil Code section 4455 that an provides “innocent” ato can recover from which party putative spousal support, they infer that the intended to Legislature the “innocent” give only to one-half spouse right under section 4452. quasi-marital property We need not now resolve this the dispute concerning section 4452. interpretation Even if correct is that a Cary holding “guilty” has one-half putative spouse right of the maritál it not does follow that a property, necessarily has an partner In a the identical will putative marriage economic affairs with right. arrange the that dissolution the will be divided If a property expectation equally. “guilty” districts, in other la Estate met with a mixed reception appellate Cary 758, the Fourth District with Atherley, Cal.App.3d agreed in an actual under the Law Act a nonmarital that Cary Family partner an division of the same right equal enjoys family relationship In Beckman v. as a Mayhew, supra, putative spouse.

however, that the the Third District Cary rejected ground Family law with Law Act was not intended to California change dealing nonmarital relationships.

If Law Act Cary interpreted holding Family division accumulated in nonmarital requires equal we with “actual then Beckman v. family relationships,” agree Mayhew the act. distends No Law Act addresses Cary Family language of nonmarital property rights partners, nothing legislative of the act that the considered that history suggests Legislature subject.19 The delineation of the of nonmarital before 1970 had rights decision; been fixed we see no reason believe that entirely by judicial that, Act, Law intended to Legislature, by enacting change state of affairs.

But we we share although reject reasoning Cary Atherley, that the courts perception Cary Atherley application former in the factual those cases would work an setting precedent unfair distribution of the accumulated Justice couple. 529, 535, Friedman in Beckman v. also Mayhew, supra, Keene; the continued of our decisions in Vallera and questioned viability commentators have the need to reconsider those argued precedents.20 *20 not, therefore, We should the of and reject authority Cary Atherley without also the deficiencies in the former law which led to examining those decisions. receives one-half of the

putative spouse under section no of property expectation the “innocent” has been frustrated. In a nonmarital on the other spouse relationship, hand, the or determine parties may to order their economic expressly tacitly manner, in some other and to of such community regardless impose property principles frustrate the understanding may parties’ expectations. the extensive material available on the of the Law 19Despite legislative history Family Act neither nor cites reference which that the ever Cary any plaintiff suggests Legislature the the of considered issue of nonmarital our rights partners, independent property such reference. examination has uncovered no Bruch, cit., 113; Article, cit., L.Q. 20See U.C. op. supra, op. supra, 354; 179, 197-201; Comment, (1975) 6 Golden Davis L.Rev. Comment Gate L.Rev. op. cit., Note, cit., 436; 1246. 12 San L.Rev. L.J. Hastings Diego op. supra, supra, The reason the decisions in an result unfair why principal pre-Cary distribution inheres in the court’s refusal to a property permit nonmarital to assert based partner rights upon accepted principles or We have examined the reasons advanced to implied equity. relief, this denial of and find that none have merit. justify First, we note that cases relief do not rest refusal denying a Indeed, to the extent theory upon any “punishing” “guilty” partner. that denial of relief one it rewards the “punishes” partner, necessarily other him to retain a amount of the by permitting disproportionate thus cannot division of property. Concepts “guilt” justify unequal between two “guilty” equally persons.21 Other in the fare The reasons advanced decisions no better. principal seems to be that from the considerations arising argument “[e]quitable reasonable of... benefits status of ... attending expectation Vallera, are not a nonmarital (Vallera relationship].” present [in But, 21 Cal.2d at a although parties have cannot based relationship obviously any expectations upon married, belief that were other consider they expectations equitable ations remain. The well that will be divided parties may expect in with accord own tacit parties’ understanding absence of such will courts understanding fairly apportion property accumulated effort. We need mutual not treat nonmarital through as married in order to putatively persons principles apply contract, remedies; or extend we need treat them implied equitable do as we other unmarried any persons.22 21Justice of the Finley Washington Court “Under such circum Supreme explains: stances dissolution of a nonmarital this court and the courts of [the other relationship], have, effect, said, sometimes ‘We will wash jurisdictions our hands of such disputes. devices, should and be left must to their own where find just they me, To themselves.’ such seem pronouncements overly fastidious and a bit fatuous. They and, are unrealistic other the fact that among things, ignore (but an unannounced nevertheless effective and rule binding) of law inherent such terminal any statements court of law. The unannounced but inherent rule is that the simply party title, who has or in some instances who is in will possession, enjoy rights ownership of the concerned. often The rule great operates advantage, cunning shrewd, names, and the who wind with possession title to it in their up property, So, at the end of so-called meretricious the courts although relationship. proclaim matters, establishes, will have such do with they nothing proclamation itself *21 involved, to the of law effective rule which tends to binding operate purely or accident reason of the one of the just perhaps by cunning, anticipatory designs 689, (West (conc. v. 50 Wn.2d 311 Knowles parties.” opn.).) 692] 22Insome instances a arise between nonmarital confidential relationship may partners, them be and economic transactions between should governed by principles to such applicable relationships. advanced from time to time The deny remaining arguments moment. There is no the nonmarital are óf less remedies to partners as a than to that services are contributed more reason to gift presume event the better contributed as a that funds are any gift; presume “that the as Justice Peters suggested, approach presume, Keene, 57 Cal.2d v. to deal with each other.” (Keene intend supra, fairly cit., Bruch, L.Q. see (dissenting op. opn.); 113.) to the nonmarital remedies that argument granting out, fail; “with as must

would Cary equal pointed discourage marriage rule was force the be made pre-1970 greater point might to avoid to cause the calculated marriage income-producing partner retain the benefit of all of his or her accumulated (34 thus earnings.” at we the well-established Although recognize public to foster and the institution of (see marriage Deyoe policy promote Court 140 Cal. P. 28]), Superior perpetuation rules which result in an distribution of judicial inequitable accumulated is neither a nor an during relationship just effective out that way carrying policy.

In we believe that the of nonmarital relation- summary, prevalence them, in modem and the social marks this as ships society acceptance no a time when our courts should means the doctrine of the apply unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious to the instant relationship case. As we have nonenforceability explained, agreements for meretricious conduct rested the fact that providing expressly conduct, to and such as the word encompassed suggests, pertained To the nonmarital to such a today prostitution. equate is to do violence to an different matter wholly subject accepted practice.

We are without aware many live.together young couples solemnization in order to make sure that can of marriage, they later undertake This trial successfully marriage. period,23 preliminary serves as some assurance that the will not subse- marriage, aware, end dissolution to the harm of both We are quently parties. stated, we have of nonmarital in other pervasiveness relationships situations.

23Toffler, Books, 1971) 253. (Bantam Future Shock page

684

The mores of the have indeed so society changed radically regard cohabitation that we cannot a standard based on moral impose alleged that have been so so considerations abandoned apparently widely misunderstood, however, Lest we be we take occasion to this many. point of the institution out that the structure itself society largely depends upon we have said in this be taken to of should marriage, nothing opinion from that institution. The of the man and woman derogate joining is at once the most and individually socially productive one can in the course of a lifetime. enjoy fulfilling relationship conclude that the barriers that stand We way judicial may of of a based the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations policy to a nonmarital should be removed. As we have relationship parties the courts now hold that will be enforced explained, express agreements rest on an unlawful We add that unless meretricious consideration. they in the absence of an the courts look to a express agreement, may variety of other remedies in order to lawful protect parties’ expectations.24

The courts into the conduct of the to determine may inquire whether that conduct demonstrates an contract or implied implied of or venture (see Estate Thornton (1972) partnership joint 81 Wn.2d 72 P.2d or some other tacit 864]), between [499 understanding The courts when parties. may, appropriate, employ principles constructive trust Omer v. Omer P.2d (see (1974) Wash.App. trust 957]) (see 1954) resulting Hyman Hyman (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d a nonmarital 149). recover in Finally, may partner quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household rendered less the services reasonable value of received if he can show that he rendered support with the services reward. Hill v. Estate (See monetary expectation Westbrook, 39 Cal.2d 462.)25 a cause of Since we have determined that states plaintiff’s complaint contract, and, as we have can action for breach of an explained, express 24We do not seek to resurrect the doctrine of common law which was marriage, (1898) 121 Cal. (See abolished in California statute in 1895. Norman v. Thomson 200].) 143]; P. Estate Abate Thus we “married,” do not hold that and defendant were nor do we extend to plaintiff plaintiff Law Act hold which the valid or we rights grants putative spouses; the same to enforce contracts and to assert her interest she has rights equitable her effort as does other unmarried through any property acquired person. the evolution of additional remedies equitable 25Our does not opinion preclude in which in cases expectations protect determined of such remedies be remedies suitability may existing prove inadequate; the factual in which arise. in later cases in setting they light *23 be amended to state a cause of action independent allegations contract,26 we must conclude that the court trial erred express granting defendant a judgment pleadings. is reversed and the cause

The remanded further judgment consistent with the views herein.27 proceedings expressed J., J., McComb, J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, Richardson, J., C. and Wright, concurred.

CLARK, J., Concurring Dissenting. The majorityopinion properly on the basis of either or in fact permit recovery express implied between These the issues parties. being presented, Here, resolution reversal of the should requires judgment. opinion stop.

This court should not to determine all attempt anticipated rights, duties and remedies within meretricious every relationship—particularly Rather, terms. these issues should be vague determined as complex each arises in a concrete case.

The indicate that a to a meretricious relation- majority broadly party recover on the basis of and in ship may equitable principles quantum However, meruit. fail to advise us of the circumstances majority limitations on or whether their numerous permitting recovery, recovery, remedies are cumulative or exclusive. under the Conceivably, majority recover half of the opinion party may property acquired during on the basis of recover a bonus relationship general equitable principles, based considerations, on and recover a second bonus specific equitable (cid:127) meruit. quantum raises but fails to answer general sweep majority opinion First, several because the excluded questions. Legislature specifically some to a meretricious from the division rule parties relationship equal of Civil Code section is this court now free to create an equal Second, division rule? termination of the is it relationship, the economic of lawful on equitable impose obligations spouses whether, 26We do not in the absence pass upon question of an express implied contractual to a nonmarital obligation, is entitled to party relationship support from the other after payments terminates. party 27We wish commend the amici for the briefs exceptional quality in this case. argument meretricious when the latter have may rejected matrimony Third, avoid such does not obligations? application equitable princi- examination of the conduct of the ples—necessitating parties—violate *24 Law Act of to eliminate the spirit designed bitterness and from the former fault acrimony resulting system Fourth, divorce? will not application equitable principles reimpose trial courts the burden of domestic unmanageable arbitrating Fifth, will not a meruit disputes? quantum system compensation services—discounted benefits meretricious received—place spouses a better Sixth, than lawful if a meruit position spouses? quantum system allowed, is to be does fairness not inclusion of all services and all require benefits of how difficult the evaluation? regardless

When the to a show meretricious or express in fact intend to create mutual implied they obligations, However, courts enforce the should absence agreement. we should and consider the ramifications before agreement, stop creating intent, economic which violate contravene the obligations may legislative intention of the undue burdens on our trial parties, surely generate courts. overreach, the a nunc tunc

By judicial majority perform pro marriage, it, dissolve and distribute its on terms never contemplated by case law the parties, Legislature.

Case Details

Case Name: Marvin v. Marvin
Court Name: California Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 27, 1976
Citation: 557 P.2d 106
Docket Number: L.A. 30520
Court Abbreviation: Cal.
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