OPINION
{1} In this appeal, we address the jurisdiction of the metropolitan court under the Mobile Home Park Act (MHPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 47-10-1 to 47-10-23 (1983, as amended through 1997). Petitioner Yvonne Martinez rented a mobile home lot in a mobile home park in Albuquerque. The landlord brought an action to terminate Petitioner’s rental agreement by filing a notice of termination of the rental agreement in metropolitan court. The metropolitan court, through Judge Frank Sedillo, Respondent, concluded that the landlord had not provided Petitioner proper notice to terminate the rental agreement, but without request by the landlord, enjoined Petitioner from having social gatherings
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Court in This Case
{2} The issue in the case arises because of the lack of specific language granting jurisdiction to the metropolitan court to issue an injunction. The New Mexico Constitution grants the legislature the authority to create magistrate courts to exercise limited original jurisdiction. N.M. Const, art. VI, §§ 1, 26. The statute conferring civil jurisdiction to magistrate courts includes cases “in which the debt or sum claimed does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), exclusive of interest and costs.” NMSA 1978, § 35-3-3(A) (2001). It specifically denies jurisdiction “to grant writs of injunction, habeas corpus or extraordinary writs.” Section 35 — 3—3(C)(6). The legislature expressly granted the metropolitan court the jurisdiction of magistrate courts, as well as jurisdiction over other matters not pertinent to this case. NMSA 1978, § 34-8A-3(A) (2001). The metropolitan court has jurisdiction over “civil actions in which the debt or sum claimed does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), exclusive of interest and costs.” Section 34-8A-3(A)(2). Thus, to the extent the magistrate court has jurisdiction under the MHPA, the metropolitan court also has jurisdiction. Therefore, our reference to the jurisdiction of the magistrate court in this opinion also includes the jurisdiction of the metropolitan court.
{3} Petitioner argues that the metropolitan court did not have the authority to grant the injunction in this case without a clear expression of legislative intent. She contends that the New Mexico Constitution vests the sole jurisdiction to grant an injunction with the district courts and that the proper way to read any difference in the statutes is to harmonize them such that “litigants who wish to sue for damages which exceed $10,000 or injunctive relief can do so in the district court, and litigants requesting relief which is not prohibited in the courts of limited jurisdiction may do so in either the district or magistrate [or metropolitan] court.” We address these arguments, and the issue of the metropolitan court’s jurisdiction, as matters of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See State v. McClendon,
{4} As a court of limited jurisdiction, the metropolitan court’s authority is restricted to authority affirmatively granted by the constitution or statute. State v. Ramirez,
{5} In enacting the MHPA, the legislature included a specific provision concerning subject matter jurisdiction. Section 47-10-10(D) reads:
The management or the resident may bring a civil action for violation of the rental agreement or any violation of the Mobile Home Park Act in the appropriate court of the county in which the mobile home park is located. Either party mayrecover actual damages, or, the court may in its discretion award such equitable relief as it deems necessary, including the enjoining of either party from further violations.
{6} To ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting this provision, we look principally to the plain language of the statute, using the ordinary meaning of the statutory language unless the statute indicates a different intent. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque,
{7} If we were to interpret this language of Section 47-10-10(D) to mean that an action under the MHPA must be brought in the district court, as Petitioner would apparently contend, the plain language of Section 47-10-10(D) would not make sense as written. Such an interpretation would require us to rewrite Section 47-10-10(D) so that either (1) the “appropriate court” would mean only the “district court” as discussed; or (2) the word “court” in the second sentence would not refer to “the appropriate court of the county in which the mobile home park is located” in the first sentence, but would refer only to the “district court of the county in which the mobile home park is located.” We will not rewrite a statute. James v. N.M. Human Servs. Dep't,
{8} We are mindful that there are times when the plain meaning of a statute may not indicate the true legislative intent because of latent ambiguity or intent indicated by “equity, legislative history, or other sources.” State v. Smith,
{9} However, in order to harmonize the statutes as Petitioner suggests, we would have to read Section 47-10-10(D) to restrict the ability to issue an injunction to the district court. Not only does the plain language of Section 47-10-10(D) read to the contrary, but the legislature’s expressed intent does not have any latent ambiguity, particularly when read in conjunction with the UORRA. See Roth v. Thompson,
{10} With regard to Petitioner’s concern about the constitutional grant of injunctive authority to the district courts, even though Article VI, Section 13 grants district courts the power to issue writs of injunction, the constitution does not limit such power to the district courts. Article VI, Section 13 does not preclude the legislature from exercising the constitutional authority under Article VI, Sections 1 and 26 to grant such authority to courts of limited jurisdiction.
{11} As to Petitioner’s reading of the grant of magistrate court jurisdiction, although a grant of injunctive authority under the MHPA may appear to be contrary to Section 35-3-3, Section 47-10-10(D) addresses the specific ability of a court of limited jurisdiction to issue an injunction for a violation of the MHPA. Section 35-3-3 is a general statutory provision concerning jurisdiction. As matter of statutory, construction, we will give effect to the specific of two conflicting statutes, unless they can be harmonized. State v. Cleve,
{12} As a separate point in her brief in chief, Petitioner argues, based on State v. Bailey,
{13} Bailey does not apply to this case. First, as opposed to the Motor Vehicle Code, the MHPA provides the statutory authority for the court to issue an injunction. Second, the landlord filed a notice of non-compliance with the rental agreement to commence this case. This filing provided Petitioner with notice that the landlord contended that she was violating the rental agreement because she “created disturbances with other tenants in our park.” Section 47-10-10(D) specifically addresses violations of a rental agreement. Because it grants discretionary injunctive relief against further violation of an agreement, it provided Petitioner notice of the possibility that the court could issue an injunction. Cf. State v. Cooley,
Conclusion
{14} We conclude that the metropolitan court has the authority to issue an injunction
{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.