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Martinez v. Martinez
754 P.2d 69
Utah Ct. App.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 MARTINEZ, Plaintiff C. Karen Appellant, MARTINEZ, Defendant M.

Jess Respondent.

No. 860159-CA. Appeals

Court of of Utah.

April *2 Hansen, (argued), Crist

Neil C. Crist Bountiful, Spratley, plaintiff ap- & pellant. Salahor, M. Liapis,

Yasemin H. Paul Kasting (argued), City, Kent M. Salt Lake respondent. defendant JACKSON, Before BILLINGS DAVIDSON, JJ.

OPINION DAVIDSON, Judge: appeals Plaintiff from a decree of divorce by the entered Second District Court. part, affirm part, reverse in remand.

FACTS were June married on 1968; subsequently, three were children plain- born. the time marriage, At high gradu- tiff and defendant were school ates and defendant an en- serving was Army. listed man the U.S. defend- After discharge service, accept- ant’s from the he Base, employment ed at Hill Air Force he Utah where worked as an instrument repair gross mechanic with an annual sala- $10,000.00. ry approximately Defendant higher began his education in 1970. De- fendant his testified discussed pursuit of a and that thought “good it idea” that she but terribly in “wasn’t favor of it” it because consuming. time testi- would be Plaintiff fied she was favor of the decision be- family cause the would “have a fu- better completed ture.” Defendant under- his program graduate years five and one-half education, During phase later. of his supported family defendant his wages G.I. Bill Plaintiff benefits. gave birth children in undergraduate, de- While an defendant school, par- apply cided to to medical agree application ties that defendant’s marriage. threatened their medical school Plaintiff was concerned that defendant’s employment during years lack of four financially appropriate detrimental adjustments” would be family and that school agreement medical would se- changes the event of future verely ability “spend limit defendant’s in financial circumstances. plaintiff. time” with much the children and After counsel, hired new she Seeing adamant, plain- that defendant was filed a verified complaint amended in No- agreed during him” tiff “stick vember in which the distribution of *3 that, years believing four next as a result exemptions tax remained the same. On sacrifices, their mutual the family of would however, May plaintiff filed a mo- eventually enjoy higher standard of liv- tion for leave to amend the complaint ing. subsequently granted. which was This Defendant entered school in medical 1977 amendment listed salary defendant’s as graduated Family support and in 1981. $100,000.00 per requested annum and loans, savings, was derived from student the child and awards re- remainder of defendant’s G.I. Bill en- significant flect the increase in defendant’s titlement, $7,000.00from defendant’s moth- requested income. Plaintiff attorney fees estate, plaintiff’s er’s and and costs which would reflect the current part-time employment. state litigation opposed of the as to that Upon completion school, of medical de- anticipated in 1983. Plaintiff request- also accepted internship Pennsyl- fendant in ed the trial court to strike the previously reluctantly Plaintiff vania. left Utah. The proposed of exemp- distribution federal tax family’s first in Pennsylvania residence tions for the children. in an was isolated location with no tele- Trial to the May court was held on phone playmates and no for the children. 1985. The decree of divorce awarded cus- family larger then rented a home in a tody plaintiff subject children plaintiff and sought employment town reasonable Plaintiff visitation. received supplement salary defendant’s as an intern. per per $300.00 month child child position Plaintiff testified she found a subject per to an abatement of $100.00 a fast at food restaurant but defendant did month child in the event that a child not want her there to work because it should for live with defendant an extended embarrassing. would be Because of the period. The of exemptions distribution tax friction between the and defend- was as initially agreed stipulation relationship admitted ant’s with another separation Alimony and settlement. woman, plaintiff requested they seek mari- awarded in the amount $400.00 counseling tal but defendant refused. Be- period years month for being five plaintiff’s prospects cause of lack for period years nonterminable for a of three employment Pennsylvania suitable and plaintiff even if remarried. Plaintiff was discord, plaintiff marital the chil- attorney awarded in the fees amount of family dren returned to the home in Utah $2,500.00. also Plaintiff was awarded the to wait for finish his defendant to medical mortgage home eq- to a and an training. Although plaintiff understood uitable lien in favor defendant for the practice defendant intended to medicine in $17,528.00 sum of payable the occur- Utah, training defendant his completed enumerated, rence contingencies. future accepted employment Pennsylvania. The award of the home necessi- complaint Plaintiff filed a verified for monthly tated that she continue to make 15,1983. stipula- February divorce mortgage payments of $309.00. separation signed agreement, tion following presents Plaintiff issues July and filed with the court on (1)

29, 1983, to defendant for review: did the award agreed defendant could exemptions of the two violate federal exemptions federal tax tax claim two law; fees, (2) attorney exemption children while she retained were the awards inadequate agree- support, the third so as child. The settlement discretion; (3) recognized also need ment to “make constitute an abuse defendant’s medical prop- marital tion of tax exemptions during period erty subject to division? stipulation separation agreement Therefore, was in effect. defendant was

DISTRIBUTION OF TAX INCOME exemptions entitled to the stipulated two EXEMPTIONS prior the entry of the decree of divorce. Plaintiff contends the distribution of However, plaintiff's amended com exemptions state and federal income tax plaint put in 1985 of tax distribution two of the children to defendant vio- exemptions proceed issue in divorce Supremacy lates the Clause the U.S. ing. provisions separation light Constitution Tax Re- agreement longer were no effective. Plain its form Act and effect on 26 U.S.C. tiff requested exemptions the tax for all 152(e) (1988).1 three children but the trial court’s order did 152(e)(1) Subsection describes the normal request. not honor that This is con result parent situation where custodial claims *4 trary general provisions to the of section exemption the tax for a An excep- child. 152(e). Any argument stipulation that the provided 152(e)(4)(A). tion is in subsection separation agreement and qualifies as a parent The noncustodial may claim the ex- pre-1985 instrument, where will emption qualified pre-1985 when there is a ingly relinquishes right her exemp to the parents instrument between the which law, neglects tions under plaintiff’s federal parent states the noncustodial shall be rejection of its post-divorce terms exemption entitled for the child and period. By amending complaint, plain her parent provides yearly at least $600.00 tiff modified and affirmatively rejected the support. child’s The definition of a pre-divorce distribution. Plaintiff is enti qualified pre-1985 instrument stated in tled exemptions to the tax for all 152(e)(4)(B) subsection as: children in view of custody the award of purposes For paragraph, this the term failure of defendant to estab “qualified pre-1985 instrument” means any exception general lish to the rule stat any separate decree of divorce or mainte- ed above. agreement— nance or written

(i) 1, which January is executed before AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

(ii) argues which Plaintiff pro- on such date contains the trial court

vision subparagraph (A)(i), awarding described in abused its discretion in attorney $2,500.00 only fees of when she asked for $7,871.00. clearly Plaintiff (iii) demonstrated which is not modified on or after need recognized for assistance. The court such date in a which modification ex- by making However, that need the award. pressly provides paragraph this the court considered written shall statement of apply agree- not to such decree attorney fees as a ment. basis the award. generated Extensive fees were by interest parties stipulated to the distri preparation expert testimony exemptions bution tax the chil support offered to the valuation of the separation agreement dren filed with degree. argument medical That was re the court in 1983. The distribution was jected by the lower court. find no incorporated in the verified amended com abuse of discretion in the award. plaint also year. Subparagraphs filed that (i) (ii) 152(e)(4)(B) of subsection appeal are Because did defendant not cross by issue, satisfied the 1983 filings. There was no we do not consider whether prior written modification January there presented was sufficient evidence expressly revoked the justify any distribu- trial court to attor- 1. The decree of comput- divorce utilizes the term "deduc- lowance subtracted when tion" emption" the United States Code utilizes "ex- ing tax owed. referring when to the individual al- ney Newmeyer fees. v. Newmeyer, 745 economic reality, the children who reside (Utah 1987). P.2d with their mother will enjoy not standard a. living remotely comparable to that of AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT their father. 78-45-3,-4 Utah Code Ann. §§ The award established the trial court (1987) establish obligation par of both justified cannot be applying when support ents to their children and “[a] factors listed in Utah Code Ann. right child’s support paramount.” to that 78-45-7(2) (1987).3 We find Woodward, Woodward v. her children are left in precariously bal- (Utah 1985). The Supreme Utah Court con anced financial existence while defendant is may tinued “The trial court fashion such relatively affluent. Plaintiff and the chil- orders relation to the children great dren are in need of assistance. and their as is reasonable and nec defendant has no responsibility sup- for the essary, considering the needs of port anyone plaintiff, other than children, but ability also the children, and himself. parent pay.” Id. Plaintiff contends the award of $300.00 month child was present At the time the courts of this inordinately so low that it constituted an state do not guidelines have uniform abuse of discretion the trial court. We employ in determining an award of child agree. support.4 Many jurisdictions, other how- ever, have established child guide- The trial gross court found defendant’s *5 schedules, lines or $100,000.00 upon based income was current eco- per annum or $8,333.00 per month, nomic data as to rearing at the the cost of chil- time of the divorce, dren, while it to plaintiff’s by determined be used trial Although courts. gross $1,033.00 income per month.2 we do not use the approaches numbers or The court plaintiff monthly found that fashioning case, the award in this a $2,050.00 expenditures of inwas need general comparison illustrates the inade- of financial assistance from defendant to quacy of the award. Because these formu- assist the children “in maintaining a stan- upon adjusted incomes, las are based we living comparable dard of more to that directly compare cannot the numbers. enjoyed by their father.” Nevertheless, each, it is clear that under support the higher. would be much For Assuming spend the three children Colorado, example, in an income shares year plaintiff, of the with guideline state, approx- the award would be gross income, monthly including awarded $1,535.00. imately support Under Wisconsin’s alimony, $2,333.00. child is Guidelines, Support Child After taxes which were re- have been deducted from the portions cently adopted taxation, neighboring of income our to states of plaintiff’s Nevada, monthly approxi- only net Idaho and where noncus- meager parent’s mates her monthly expenses todial income is leav- considered and ing leeway emergencies, gross no presently presump- where income is 29% necessary replacement expenditures, award, support tive the child for the three any grim $2,320.00. amenities of life. Under such children would be (c) earn; plaintiff 2. The lower court ability obligor also found that ex- of the to pected (d) earn; salary a ability 25% reduction in her because of obligee of the to voluntary position (e) transfer to a less stressful obligee; the need of the employment. within her (f) age parties; (g) obligor responsibility for the 78-45-7(2) following 3. Section lists the factors support of others. awarding prospective sup- to be considered in port: notes, however, that a Task Force 4.This Court (a) presently living established the Judicial Council is the standard of and situation of the propriety adopting parties; investigating Uniform (b) Support upon par- relative wealth and income of the Child Guidelines Utah based ties; current economic data. the economic herself; Under circumstances cient income for ability and the case, support provide of this the award of child the husband support.” Id. inequitable must 411-12. be modified. The dis argues sent the case must be remanded to Jones, (Utah Jones v. 700 P.2d 1072 determine the children’s need and the abili 1985), the Court conducted an extensive ty party pay support. of each child analysis of these three Although factors. findings fully note the of fact do not ad judge carefully trial considered the However, dress the child factors. Jones, factors outlined in plaintiff because we believe this not to be reversible error and the living children were in an artificial- totality because the of the factual evidence ly depressed living, standard of the award “clear, uncontroverted, in the record is per $400.00 month of terminable capable supporting only finding alimony inadequate. We refuse penal- judgment” favor of the of the need for ize trying to live within her Deliran, support. Acton v. 737 P.2d failing means and higher to show neces- 1987); (Utah Marchant v. Mar sary expenses.6 chant, (Utah App.1987). application An of one of English replete The record is also with the financial justify standards could the award made needs of the children and the relative abili this case. Plaintiff poor endured a stan- ties of and defendant to meet living during dard of marriage. She Nothing gained by those needs. could be money spend had little then so she purpose except remand for this delay should have little now. That result will increased award. Based preserve “the living standard of she en- reasoning, above we award the sum of joyed during marriage.” But such a result child, $600.00 month is unfair. A divorce court is a court of age continue to 21 if the child is a full time equity. It is not preserve remand, student and not married.5 Ón status of limited party income for one

trial court shall enter its order for child affluence for the other when the one sacri- support in accordance with Utah Code Ann. help ficed to the other achieve such afflu- (1987). 30-3-5.1 totality ence. When the of the English *6 applied standards are the clearly award is

AWARD OF ALIMONY inadequate. The standard relating of review The court below also abused its discre- alimony requires that we not disturb the limiting tion the alimony award of to a trial court’s award unless “such a serious period years; being of five nonterminable inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear by remarriage reason of years. for three abuse of English discretion.” English, v. Olson, In (Utah Olson v. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1977). 565 P.2d 410 The Utah 1985), Supreme the Utah analyzed Court Supreme Court in that quoted often case similar fact situation plaintiff wherein the states important that “the most function of high graduate wife was a school and had alimony provide support is to for the wife spent majority marriage the bearing the nearly possible as at the standard of rearing and the six children. De- living enjoyed during marriage, she and to fendant husband paid was a well consul- prevent becoming public the wife from provided tant govern- who his services to charge.” Id. at 411. The Court continued agencies mental on a contract basis. While that a trial court should consider “the fi affirming the award in the nancial wife, conditions and needs of $1,600.00 month, the amount of the Court ability produce of the wife to a suffi- striking modified the by two-year award its age by 5. The award actually spent 21 was made the trial rather than estimates of what she pursuant court (1986). to Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 needed to sustain herself and her children at a living upon reasonable standard of based family total income. plaintiffs expenses 6. A review of shows them to extremely upon be low and based what she

75 making alimony perma- limitation and from the earning capacity increased afford- changed subject nent to future circum- ed degree the medical and the numerous modification, of its stances. years the enjoyed Gardners the standard of pointed to the Court wife’s limited edu- living afforded the medical degree. cation, her experience, lack work and That is case not the here. The Court not- expectation she “no that had reasonable ed, “The which cases have refused to hold obtaining employment years two hence that professional that degrees practice and con- to support will enable her herself at a stitute property subject marital to valua- living approaching standard of even tion and distribution have nonetheless as- during marriage.” she Id. sessed degree and divided value Paffel, See also 732 P.2d Paffel practice or legal basis of other (Utah 1986). 103 equitable remedies.” Id. at 1080-81. For previously the reasons stated and Court pattern described common fact record, facts in based we hold applicable acknowledgment this entitled to an award of degree’s equitable worth as a situation continuing on a basis and we where “the is supported through- husband permanent alimony in the sum of long out a graduate professional pro- provisions month to the $750.00 gram by working wife, the couple (1987). Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 graduation. is divorced after soon In such cases, there few are marital assets to dis- THE MEDICAL AND DEGREE tribute, and the courts have considered oth- EQUITABLE AWARD OF er ways compensating spouse.” Id. RESTITUTION at 1081. This is essentially situation We next must determine whether presented marriage here. While this has degree defendant’s prop medical is marital many years continued for assets erty subject to division. In the recent case are the home and the enhanced Gardner, of Gardner v. P.2d 1076 capacity earning capaci- of defendant. The (Utah 1988), Supreme the Utah Court dis ty recognized fashioning must be those problem cussed this noted there is “legal necessary remedies” authority jurisdictions from other on both readjust assist her life. The However, Court, sides the issue. this valuation and distribution medical Petersen, Petersen v. 239-42 degree in case is not a alterna- viable Rayburn v. Rayburn, (Utah App.1987) tive. speculative Valuation would be in the (Utah P.2d App.1987), ana extreme, ignores distribution fact lyzed the issue and held that medical personal that the to defendant.7 degree is not marital property subject to rule, prefer up- to follow the *7 agree division in a divorce decree. Rayburn, Petersen held in that a medi- Supreme the with Utah Court “that an degree cal subject is not to valuation and professional degree educational or is diffi However, distribution in a divorce. that cult value and such a valuation does striking example highly paid case is a aof easily understanding not common fit the professional disposing of wife Gardner, his with a property.” the character of 748 support just minimum amount that P.2d at 1081. The Court in Gardner was professional reaching required is a of income to address the level issue because significant professional was for which the and his there other accu both during marriage resulting mulated wife have prevents striven. This wife argued specialty estimating It is future that the value of a in the same A decision locale? change degree speculative happenstance totally is or medical no more than or could even damages degree. measuring However, wrongful in a death Can case. terminate the value of the medical death, wrongful change in the measurement defendant return to court then begins upon at death and is to no future valuation based more and distribution Here, prevent plaintiff variables certain Could introduced the decedent. we circumstances? guess making which could must at the future course of defendant's defendant decisions from degree? practice impact career. Will in the same he continue the value 76 enjoying spouse

from her labor tions and sacrifices of the in benefit one support goals. in her husband’s enabling degree the other to attain a sacrifice See Weitzman, The generally compensated L. Divorce years have by many been Revolution, 5, (1985). 124-35 ch. lifestyle of the comfortable degree permitted. alimony Traditional marriage in From the time of 1968 analysis nicely equity works to assure in 1982, separation parties until their such cases. enjoyed pleasures of the material few “During case, In of recurring typi life. The court found that the 14 another kind together, plain- that the lived fied years Marriage Graham re Gra [In extensively in ham, tiff assisted Defendant’s ob- (1978)], 574 Colo. P.2d 75 education, taining college degree medical where occurs shortly divorce after addition, plaintiff internship. made obtained, degree alimony is traditional in order substantial sacrifices to facilitate analysis hardship often work be would completion of Defendant’s medical cause, spouses while modest have schooling internship.”8 Plaintiff ac- divorce, incomes at the time of the one is cepted necessary sacrifices significant of a in the [threshold] aspirations anticipation defendant’s earnings. Moreover, crease future benefits. trial record shows the spouse so who sacrificed the other could following exchange: degree precluded enjoy attain Q. Okay. any Was there discussion of ing anticipated dividends the future benefits that would be obtained provide.... ordinarily will In such through this? cases, analysis must become A. fairness, Yes. He told me if that more achieve an creative to [defendant] sacrifice, I would if I would see it award of “rehabilitative” “reimburse through, someday he would make it alimony, ment” not terminable re up to me and would have we material marriage, appropriate. See, bemay e.g., gone items that we had without. And Haugan Haugan, 117 v. Wis.2d his hours would be flexible and he would (1984); Mahoney N.W.2d 796 Maho spend have more time to with himself (1982). ney, 91 453 A.2d N.J. If and the we just children. would be Id. n. 4. This the situation where our patient. analysis “must more become creative Defendant offered no rebuttal to the ex- Equity achieve fairness.” Id. demands change. recognition of the sacrifices and contribu- Petersen, by plaintiff

This Court in tions made de- 737 P.2d at foresaw the situation now at issue. fendant’s medical education. The defend- Writ- ing Court, Judge recognized by plaintiffs Orme ant has enriched been efforts and, might therefore, that an occasion arise whereby one has earned spouse high benefit, reaching level of permanent award of some financial just at the time of divorce rather right, than the in her own will allow her frequent more par- situation which the share in benefits the economic achieved enjoyed ties the benefits of the hus- through joint their efforts. The modified band’s medical education for a number award of merely traditional main- Judge years. wrote: Orme plane tains on a modestly above one, experienced by pat- during In cases instant like the life *8 set, may marriage. terns be largely have Even this modest award been potential through happening can lost predicted both be of some future reliability, with some and the contribu- circumstance.9 dissent would restrict family surely 8. We must wonder whether defendant could home and would not have had completed plaintiff’s part-time have or would have entered and work. benefit of plaintiff medical school had obtained a divorce likely alimony recipient 9. forces the to earlier. Defendant gated would have been Traditional obli- understanding pay alimony support. to with and child make future choices He probably may would in ali- not have the benefit of the that such result the loss of choices

77 plaintiff supported to an award traditional contributed to and de- acquired newly defendant’s lev- based fendant’s educational achievements. el of Because there has been little income. The case law remedies in this situation in- property accumulated and because the establish spectrum, narrowly those separation, plain- come after acquired was focusing support provided on financial to to permanent tiff is entitled a more reme- professional spouse, he or while she dy- student, was a to those consider engendered This issue has much case totality non-professional spouse’s of the ef- profes- Many law. have held that a courts family forts in the venture obtain eco- property sional is marital sub- through nomic stability For education. ex- ject to but nevertheless believe distribution Hubbard, ample, in 603 at P.2d remedy some must be created for the wife was to recover from her phy- allowed spouse supported who the attainment of sician husband contributions his direct degree. that A threshold is the factor support, professional school and training meaning “support” when term is expenses, plus reasonable interest and ad- applied non-profession- to the efforts of the justments for inflation. spouse. “support” Must equate al direct A recognizing case more than fi- strict provided through financial assistance full nancial contributions is Saint-Pierre v. employment spouse time while the student Saint-Pierre, (S.D.1984), 357 N.W.2d 250 devotes her full his or time efforts to Supreme which the Court of South Dako- “support” course work? Is rendered held, case,” ta “in proper the trial court spouse full time are whose activities devot- should “all consider relevant factors” in providing a home ed environment for the awarding “reimbursement or rehabilitative Here, and spouse family? student alimony.” These included “the amount of children, principal pro- bore spouse’s contributions, the supporting his viding maintaining child care the do- foregone opportunities or her to enhance or setting, employed part- mestic and was also improve professional skills, or vocational years time for several while defendant at- marriage and the following duration plain- school. tended medical To hold that completion spouse’s the nonsupporting only gener- tiff’s value is the income she education.” Id. professional ignores ates the value of her contributions Washburn, v. Washburn 101 every aspect family other life. Wash.2d logical (Wash.1984), is conclusion that motherhood and valueless; nurturing Supreme pre- Washington of children is Court listed and serving maintaining analyzed trial home worth- several factors the court less; mother, functions “in determining proper home- must consider maker, helpmate nothing supporting amount compensation contribute for the family. spouse.” supporting to a to so limit value refuse These include the support. Certainly, spouse’s definition our our for direct education- contributions Supreme costs, analyzing al Court traditional no more than one-half what the couple “the distributions has never limited a would have earned had efforts recovering spouse what she monetari- wife student not been directed studies,” Huck v. marriage. “[a]ny to the towards his edu- ly contributed Huck, (Utah 1986). opportunities cational or which the P.2d We hold career gave finding supporting spouse up in order to ob- accordance with court’s 30-3-5(5) husband, helped mony. (6) (1987). physician See Utah Code Ann. from her whom she §§ school, No should be into mak- through one forced medical be limited choices,

ing particularly such the other when curiam maintenance. The party, position through joint enjoys who his force her to decision reasoned "To do so would parties, efforts of similar re- under no forego remarriage perhaps even be celibate strictions on behavior. We note what Okla- many years simply return on her to realize a Supreme homa bard, Court wrote in Hubbard Hub- past twelve sacrifices of the investments and (Okla.1979), respond- 603 P.2d 747 when omitted). (footnote years.” Id. at 752 *9 ing argument recovery to the that the wife’s (9) sufficiently employment, or by tain lucrative The contribution party one to the education, city training the the to move to where student or increased earn- spouse school[,]” ing power to attend of the wished other. earning prospects future of each “[t]he (1982), Wis.Stat. 767.26 Haugan See also spouse, including earning potential the Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 343 N.W.2d spouse professional the student with the (Wis.1984). 800-01 n. 4 degree.” Clearly, jurisdictions some statutes a trial court to Wisconsin allow require courts to examine and value the requiring grant pay- an order maintenance marriage partner’s contributions to a devel party considering

ments to either after sev- opment. appears This the be fair and Among eral factors. these are: equitable Therefore, approach. we hold (4) party educational The level of each is entitled to an award of marriage the time of and at the time “equitable restitution” in addition to tradi the action is commenced. alimony. equitable tional use the term restitution to describe the order to (5) earning capacity party of the establish a clear distinction between it and maintenance, seeking including edu- traditional any or other form of background, training, cational employ- spousal support. maintenance or The func skills, experience, length ment work equitable tion of restitution is to enable a job market, absence the custodial spouse to share newly obtained earn responsibilities for children and the ing capacity spouse of a former who has expense necessary acquire time and capacity through signifi achieved that training sufficient education or to en- request cant efforts and sacrifices of the party appropriate able the to find em- ing spouse which were detrimental to that ployment. spouse’s development. nothing It is more (6) feasibility party seeking that the equitable sharing than an rewards self-support- maintenance can become common expectat efforts and ing living reasonably at a standard of ions.10 comparable enjoyed during to that marriage, and, so, length if of time Factors analyzed to be in deter necessary goal. to achieve this mining equitable an award of restitution include, (1) but are not limited to: (8) Any agreement by mutual made (2) length marriage; the financial during marriage, or before personal development contributions according to the terms of which one requesting sacrifices spouse; made party has made financial or service (3) the duration of these contributions and contributions to the other with the ex- during marriage; (4) sacrifices the re pectation reciprocation or other com- sulting disparity capacity be future, pensation in the where such requesting spouse tween the and the made, repayment any has not been spouse (5) thereby; benefited agreement mutual made during amount of accumulated during marriage before or concern- marriage.11 An equitable award of res ing any arrangement for the upon plaintiff's financial titution will terminate remarriage, parties. may payable lump be emphasize specific spouse 10. We nature of the facts to share in the economic benefits degree. presented earned as a result of this case and stress restitution would not in the more be awarded 11. Because this case establishes a new form of frequent marriage case where the lasted for award, spousal we hesitate to state that the many years professional after the determining equitable enumerated factors in There, granted. been sufficient assets would writing restitution are all inclusive as of the appropriate have been accumulated and an dis- Duncan, opinion. See Biswell v. requesting spouse tribution to the would enable (Utah App.1987). 86 n. 5

79 periodically depending subject sum or over time on upon to divorce, division even the circumstances of each case.12 where this pos- achievement has been made through

sible the assistance of the other CONCLUSION have, spouse. nonetheless, acknowl- edged judgment of the trial that may court af- there be situations where in part part. firmed in equity reversed extraordinary demands an award case is remanded to the trial for court nonterminable or rehabilitative reimburse- purpose taking any further evidence alimony ment in order compensate to a may necessary be to determine the spouse who substantial financial “endure[s] amount of equitable restitution to be or sacrifices her own education to defer[s] of pay- awarded and its manner help” other spouse in obtaining an ad- entry judgment pursuant ment degree. Rayburn vanced Rayburn, v. 738 opinion. against to this Costs defendant. (Utah App.1987). P.2d 241 might This (a) occur where: en- mutually

BILLINGS, J., concurs. deavor to one spouse’s earning increase JACKSON, capacity, but Judge at the time of (dissenting): spouse trial the who has benefitted from the en- I respectfully loyally dissent. deavors is merely the threshold of a Loyal majority, but not their earnings, Petersen, substantial increáse opinion, flag being I their decision as at the 4; (b) 737 at 242 P.2d n. there is insuffi- judicial forefront of I regret activism. property cient marital from to make I my colleagues could not dissuade from compensatory contributing award to the breaking ground new with the invention of spouse. Gardner, See Gardner v. 748 “equitable opinion restitution.” The manu- (Utah 1988). P.2d 1081 In such remedy (1) factures divorce that is out- cases, spouse has who made substantial scheme;1 statutory (2) side our without financial sacrifices and in- contributions to precedent pronouncements in the crease the capacity the other Court; Supreme (3) requested by Utah not spouse recompense is entitled to for those appellant;2 (4) forced on the trial beyond contributions that are duty (5) development; courts for further not support normally marriage, associated with justice needed do to the See, any less e.g., benefits received. Ro- fact, may, inequity. case and work Brown, berto v. Wis.2d 318 107 N.W.2d (1982); 358 Mahoney Mahoney, 91 N.J. EQUITABLE RESTITUTION (1982). A.2d 453 527 OR SUPPORT Petersen, jurisdictions Petersen v. P.2d Decisions from other involv- (Utah App.1987), ing this court that an compensation spouse held has who degree advanced is not property marital contributed to the ad- attainment following example, Supreme ny subject 12. For the Utah $750 in the sum of month against unnecessarily ty- provisions (1987)," Court’s admonishment of Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 § couple together ing i.e., after divorce as stated in 1079, increase from the $400 awarded Gardner, defendant's lien on However, the trial court. no statute is cited might family extinguished the amount credited home be and the equitable basis restitution. Our divorce against the overall only statutes and case law the distri- authorize equitable recognize restitution. We that this property support bution and an award probably be would a fraction of the total spouse the benefit of the children. Utah equitable amount of restitution awarded. (1987). Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 -10.6 majority acknowledges 1. The the existence of argued 2. Mrs. trial and on Martinez both at remanding sup- our divorce port statutes the child appeal professional degree is a majority issues. The states: remand, (a) divorce. Since interest to division "On enter the trial court shall its part of law restitution was not a Utah order for child in accordance with Utah crafted, i.e., (1987),” opinion the trial until this was presented Code Ann. 30-3-5.1 raise total $1,800 not conducted and the evidence was amount of child $900 to month; (b) theory. permanent alimo- under that ”[W]e award monies, generally involved four vanced have inheritance funds from student *11 (which required factors: loans the trial court him to repay), proceeds and from his G.I. Bill. [F]irst, loss of the hus- they share the part-time during Mrs. Martinez worked earnings during peri- foregone band’s second, years three of the seventeen of their mar- investment; pro- the wife od of riage. earnings Her ap- nominal total capital to enable her vides the financial $2,300 third, proximately applied forego earnings; family were husband to those living expenses. During marriage, forego opportunities may she to further vacations, family purchased took modest development of her own ca- fourth, homes, significantly, furnishings, two pacity; and most furniture and and they expect gain a return on the Equity simply two automobiles. does not through full of the investment con- extraordinary remedy costs demand an in this Thus, marriage. injustice tinuation case extraordinary because no is working spouse predicates her sacrifice present. personal and educational ad- income Even if Mrs. Martinez had made substan- expectation on the of future vancement tial financial contributions or educational sharing returns to her from in her hus- in sacrifices order to further her husband’s earning capacity. band's enhanced career, education and there are other rea- Krauskopf, Recompense Financing for why hybrid sons the creation of a new Spouse’s Legal Education: Protection for equitable award of restitution is not war- Capital, the Marital Investor in Human in hypotheti- ranted this case. Unlike the 379, (1980). 380 28 Kan.L.Rev. this court in Pet- contemplated cal by case extraordinary The award fashioned ersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. in which the inappropriate is this case spouse an only with advanced is First, for several reasons. Mrs. Martinez reaping the threshold of an enhanced in- provide capital did not the financial divorce, come at the time of the Dr. college enabled her to attain his husband already earning gross Martinez was an- Instead, degree. Dr. advanced Mar- $100,000. merely nual income of He is not provided family’s tinez fi- bulk of the significant earnings; at the threshold of he support, in paying nancial addition to already standing parlor. is in the In addi- his education. This is not the classic tion, here accumulated real and “working spouse/student spouse” situation personal property compensa- from which a necessitating extraordinary an award. $34,- tory property could be made:

See, Hubbard, e.g., Hubbard v. home; equity in three vehicles worth (Okla.1979); Haugan Haugan, 117 $3,995; $2,000; an IRA account valued Wis.2d 343 N.W.2d 799-800 value; stocks unknown and household (1984); Roberto, 318 N.W.2d 358. $6,500. furnishings presence valued at earnings of both substantial and accumu- Second, presented no evidence was property lated at the time of the divorce Mrs. Martinez deferred her own career or provides adequate rendering an basis education order to the education advance extraordinary remedy, an if Mrs. Martinez of her Both husband. recompense. is entitled to high school educations at the time of mar- riage. Mrs. Martinez testified at trial that case, presented On the facts there this she wanted to continue her education own why are additional reasons I believe so, someday yet begun doing but had majority’s disposition mis- appeal though employer pay even her would three- (1) guided: equity can achieved under be her fourths of school costs and would allow alimony current distribution working. her to continue (2) law; award of statutes and case equitable coupled

While Mrs. Martinez raised the children restitution with the ma- performed responsibili- generous jority’s the household ties, (3) provided family’s pri- double-dipping; Dr. Martinez an award awards effect, restitution, mary financial in the form of his treats the professional “property” education as sub- years minable for three continuing ject period division dissolution of a mar- years, five is so low as to riage. prejudicial constitute clear and abuse $1,033 discretion. Mrs. Martinez earns First, fashioning alimony, an award of gross month. must the trial court consider the financial court, plus awarded the trial net her recipient condition and needs monthly $846, earnings provides her spouse,3 ability spouse of that be $1,246 with approximately with self-supporting, ability and the of the other meet monthly expenses, excluding *12 spouse pay. to Paffel, v. Paffel sums awarded for child support. In con- 96,100-01 (Utah 1986); Jones, Jones v. 700 trast, enjoys Dr. Martinez approximately (Utah 1072, 1985). P.2d 1075 $7,750 gross monthly Considering income. Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were married for the disparate earning capacities, the trial approximately years. seventeen The trial alimony court’s award was insufficient court found that Dr. incurs ex- Martinez inequitable in provide it that failed to the penses with employment associated his of a comparable with standard of liv- $7,000 approximately leaving per year, ap- ing. proximately $93,000 annually $7,750 per Second, earnings based on Dr. Martinez’s Mrs. approxi- month. Martinez earned trial, at the time of majority the in- has $1,033 mately per month estimated support creased total child to $900 $2,050 required per that she month to meet $1,800 and increased the duration and expenses the for herself and the three chil- alimony permanent amount of to a award order, temporary support dren. Under the per of An equitable $750 month. of award $1,100 receiving she been month in top already restitution on generous support. sought She additional mo- alimony support awards of and child fash- up nies to make the difference between her ioned by majority duplicative the and not earnings expenses net provide and to necessary to equity. achieve major with the means to make house repairs. In professional the event a that Finally, degree an advanced is the memo- degree asset, was not viewed aas marital of rialization an individual’s “attainment sought she an not award to skill, qualification the and educational upon remarriage. termination background prerequisite which is the the trial capacity.” Wehrkamp

The court stated it enhanced that considered large 264, disparity Wehrkamp, (S.D.1984); the between the v. 357 N.W.2d 266 respective earning Petersen, abilities and fact 737 at (quot P.2d 240 cf . inadequate ing Graham, that the wife’s were Marriage resources In re 194 Colo. However, 429, to meet her I agree (1978) (en banc)). needs. with 574 P.2d 75 The Mrs. Martinez degree that the trial court failed value of an advanced lies in the apply correctly these potential earnings factors pos increased made alimony, award degree $400 month nonter- sible other factors determining recipient high In enjoyed "need” which the a standard spouse, divorce, living many years prior nonstudent the trial court is not limited to the considering only living expenses language clearly pre- the low in- of Gardner was aimed at during spouse venting spouse high curred the time other divorced a degree. suffering major studied obtain an advanced earner from in stan- decline Supreme Gardner, living recently following Utah Court stated in dard of lan- a divorce. This involving degree, guage prohibiting case also an advanced should not be construed as "equalize parties’ respective making should trial court from recipient spouse’s that raises living living standards them a maintain level from what standard where, here, possible living during marriage as close as it the standard of Gardner, enjoyed during major marriage." spouse experiences 748 student increase 1081; Boyle Boyle, marriage’s earnings just prior P.2d at 669, accord v. P.2d 735 to the termi- (Utah Petersen, words, App.1987); recipi- 671 737 P.2d at nation. other the "need” 239; Olson, 564, (Utah necessarily spouse Olson v. 704 ent is not P.2d 566 this situation 1985); (Utah Higley Higley, managed during v. P.2d 676 381 what he or she live 1983). Although marriage years. Gardner involved a lean school If employment. mony,4 through the ad and conditions creation of a dis- does not fall within tinctly cleverly disguised itself new form of vanced mari- “property” of marital sub prece- the classification tal for which there is no divorce, ject to distribution then nei dent. an individual’s enhanced earn

ther should CHILD SUPPORT ing capacity. Hodge Hodge, 337 Pa.Su (1984); per.Ct. 486 A.2d 951 Wehrk duty Both husband and wife have a 266; Stern, amp, 357 N.W.2d at Stern v. their children. Utah Code Ann. (1975). 66 N.J. 331 A.2d 257 78-45-3, (1987). -4 “Child §§ need, approximate awards should actual declares that: and, possible, when assure the children a The function of restitution is to living comparable standard of to that which spouse newly enable a to share the ob- they experienced if would have no divorce earning capacity tained of a former Peterson, had occurred.” Peterson v. spouse capacity who has achieved that (Utah App.1988). P.2d through significant efforts and sacri- requesting spouse fices of the The trial court found that Dr. Martinez *13 spouse’s were detrimental to that devel- $7,750 approximately gross earned income nothing opment. eq- It is more than an per month. Dr. Martinez testified that his sharing uitable of the rewards of both earnings two-year were established under a parties’ expecta- common efforts and contract, employment that he was in the tions. bracket, tax and he had no tax 50% shelter. The trial court also found that By creating a divisible interest in Dr. Mar- $1,033 approximately Mrs. Martinez earned earning tinez’s capacity, enhanced this gross per month. Mrs. Martinez proper- court has awarded a nonterminable monthly earnings testified to net of $846 ty in goes interest a medical plus royalties nominal from an oil well. beyond compensation approved the in Pet- anticipated earnings in She a reduction majority ersen. The has limited its voluntary as a result of her in cutback award to Mrs. Martinez’s contributions to- working hours. Mrs. Martinez calculated ward her husband’s medical education living monthly expenses for herself and the costs; step it has taken the further of $2,050. only three children at This was the providing recompense financial lost ex- evidence of the dollar amount of the chil- pectations. reject any compensa- I would monthly support. dren’s need for The ma- earning tion formula based on future ca- jority disregard has elected to that evi- pacity. The factors and variables involved they figure dence because think the was in the valuation of an enhanced Having rejected only too low. the evidence capacity speculative are as as those in- need, of the children’s makes attempt volved an to value an advanced independent its own estimate. degree; speculation such can lead to inequity. Using their own estimate of need and the incomes, parties’ gross monthly majori-

Provision for Mrs. Martinez’s needs is through generous ty per per best dealt with but fair has awarded month child $600 $1,800.5 distribution of and award of ali- for a total of Their action fails to majority’s equitable by 4. Unlike the award of resti- ed under the trial court with an award calculated tution, modified, Wisconsin, guidelines an can be from Colorado and award circumstances, markedly appropriate though even have different the court's ex- terms under meanings. Although majority continuing jurisdiction. ercise of disclaims re- Utah Code 30-3-5(3) (1987). support guidelines liance on the child er from oth- Ann. particularly here, This is do, fact, jurisdictions, they rely important presented in the situation where potentially greater amounts available in other working Dr. Martinez is limited duration. under a contract of jurisdictions justify $600 to award of in order an per month child. majority opinion interchanges problem analysis 5. The the terms The with this is that the "adjusted gross comparing jurisdictions "gross guidelines adopted income” and other are income” purposes in Utah. amount of child award- irrelevant for of an award party charge each of: they account for the effects on those debts that have been paying. (1) changes Tax tax rate under Act;6 (2) their of the tax Reform Paragraph 19 of Findings the written of

exemptions for all the children to Mrs. Mar- “[pjlaintiff Fact states that the Mar- [Mrs. tinez; (3) disposition home mort- should be awarded the exclusive use tinez] below; (4) gage debt as discussed their occupancy parties’ and residence to increase a lien in $400 $750 favor of Defendant for $17,528.00 month; (5) the sum ...” The their restitution Decree Divorce language reiterates this award in amount be determined awards “exclusive use and occu- court. trial pancy,” subject to a lien in defendant’s I would remand case the child favor. ruling The court’s oral was: “[t]he taking issue for of further Court will award to the the Plaintiff [sic] evidence a current determination parties, the home of the subject to lien ability par- need children’s for defendant’s equity share in the support, pay ents to be considered amount of one-half of the equity.” net adjustments appropriate with the other The parties’ court’s fi- allocation incomes and liabilities. obligations nancial includes no reference $28,439 mortgage debt. Mrs. Martinez HOME MORTGAGE required pay specified debts parties stipulated The trial their $8,179.73. obligations $28,- totalling jointly-acquired home had a current market specified 439 was not appear does not $63,000 $34,561. equity value of and an in the was required record. Dr. Martinez stipulated figures reveal the existence pay specified obligations debts and total- *14 mortgage obligation of a home in the sum ling $26,169.04. If Mrs. Martinez as- must $28,439. However, of neither the trial pay mortgage, sume and the house her court nor counsel $36,- identified sizeable post-divorce responsibility debt 618.73, $10,449.69 proper- debt in the more his. distribution debts and than ty. do Nor the trial court’s written Find- provides that, C Conclusion Law “[i]n ings specify of Fact who must assume the to make the order distribution ... mari- [of $28,439 mortgage obligation and make the property] equal possible, as as tal Plaintiff payments. The record Mrs. reveals that property should be awarded real ... making monthly Martinez had been a $309 ato lien in favor of for Defendant mortgage payment and therein, the court stated present equity one-half of $17,678.” party being Although that each dis- to assume and sum of support guidelines ap- signif- Child utilize different 6. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a proaches responsibility to allocate impact disposable economic icant in- Dr. Martinez’s parents depending upon children divorced come, assuming ongoing gross income in public varying policy. Cassetty, generally See $100,000 range. He testified at trial that he had "Emerging Support Policy Issues in Child pay to set one-half his aside taxes. Practice,” in Support Obli- Parental Child years, . For later are 1988 and tax there two basic Research, gation: (J. Policy Practice and Cas- individuals, tax rates 28%. 15% 1983). setty ed. addition, effectively rate the law creates third demonstrates, majority opinion As the the rec- Thus, levels. 33% on income above certain support ommended amount of oth- child under portions of Dr. Martinez’s income will be taxed jurisdictions’ may guidelines radically er differ 15%, 28%, all and 33% rather than at 50%. policy underlying because goals adopted by differences Moreover, changed Utah income tax laws have given guidelines state. The in the actions interim. Counsel divorce states, Wisconsin, adjust of some such as do provide the trial court would be well advised parent. for the income This is custodial regarding complete with tax information obviously adoption inconsistent with Utah’s of a distribution, implications property of the alimo- public policy parents respon- holds ny, dependency exemption- sible for the of their For children. arrangements being proposed. The combined reasons, support guidelines these whether disposable income available to the severed fami- higher sup- other states would afford a port level of ly by prudent plan- eq- can be increased tax making an often should not be factor in during ning award a divorce. uitable in Utah. of distribu- equality objective the stated Martinez that Mrs.

tion, requirement mortgage would bur- pay the

assume (½ $14,219.50 additional den widely dispar-

$28,439),despite and the fact disposable income

ate support herself and must

Mrs. Martinez $2,200 per month. less than

the children on specifically iden- failed to the court

Since the court also mortgage,

tify the home $28,439 in amount to include the

failed Martinez Thus Mrs. equity calculation. pay the responsible to personally

became parties.

major debt the home inclusion of

The trial court’s Mrs. debt burden

mortgage in Martinez’s distribu- and debt part discretion, without even

tion is an abuse of income. gross disparity of

looking at the justifies mortgage matter alone

The home

a remand.

CONCLUSION the amount of has fixed paid. This support to be

alimony and child remand, court, on deprives the trial

action debts, prop- adjust the any flexibility to alimony, support awards and

erty, package that har-

fashion an overall The trial court’s all the variables.

monizes eq- that an so restricted discretion will be impossible. This outcome will be

uitable *15 remanded for retrial should instead be

case support and alimony,

on the

distribution issues. MAXWELL, Plaintiff A.

David Appellant, MAXWELL,

Angeline B. Defendant Respondent.

No. 860267-CA. Appeals of Utah.

Court of

6,May

Case Details

Case Name: Martinez v. Martinez
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Utah
Date Published: Apr 19, 1988
Citation: 754 P.2d 69
Docket Number: 860159-CA
Court Abbreviation: Utah Ct. App.
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