OPINION
{1} In this case, we resolve two questions that require us to interpret the Trade Practices and Frauds Act (the TPFA) of the Insurance Code, NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-1 to -30 (1984, as amended through 2007). First, we consider whether a manager of a group of insurance adjusters can be held personally liable for violations of the TPFA. We hold that such an employee is subject to the private right of action created by Section 59A-16-30 of the TPFA and therefore reverse, in part, the district court’s dismissal of the TPFA claims against Defendant Jose Cornejo. Second, we consider what statute of limitations applies to the private right of action created by Section 59A-16-30. We affirm the district court and hold that NMSA 1978, § 37-1^4 (1880), the four-year “catchall” statute of limitations for actions not otherwise provided for, applies to the private right of action provision of the TPFA.
BACKGROUND
{2} This case arises from a class action suit filed pursuant to the private right of action provision of the TPFA, Section 59A-16-30, which our Supreme Court, in Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
{3} Pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA, Allstate and Cornejo filed a number of motions to dismiss the claims against them. Of the motions relevant to this appeal, Cornejo moved to dismiss the TPFA claims brought against him on the ground that the private right of action provision of the TPFA allows third parties to bring suit against only insurers and agents and that he is neither an insurer nor an agent. Allstate moved to dismiss all claims filed against it by Plaintiff Gallegos on the ground that Gallegos’s claims were time-barred.
{4} The district court agreed with Cornejo and dismissed the claims brought against him, ruling that he was not subject to personal liability under the TPFA. The district court also agreed with Allstate and dismissed the claims brought by Plaintiff Gallegos, ruling that the statute of limitations applicable to claims brought pursuant to the TPFA is the four-year “catch-all” limitations period and that Gallegos’s claims were therefore time-barred.
{5} Following the district court’s rulings, two separate appeals were filed in this Court. In the first appeal, all of the Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Defendant Cornejo. In the second appeal, Plaintiff Gallegos alone challenged the district court’s determination that the four-year “catch-all” statute of limitations barred his claims against Allstate. For convenience, we address the two appeals together in this opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6} On appeal from a dismissal pursuant to a Rule 1 — 012(B)(6) motion, this Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true and resolves all doubts about the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs right to proceed. Forest Guardians v. Powell,
DISCUSSION
1. “Persons” Are “Insurers” Who Are Subject to the Private Right of Action Provision of the TPFA
{7} Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it determined that Jose Cornejo is not an insurer or an agent who is subject to the private right of action provision of the TPFA. § 59A-16-30. In order to address this argument, we look first to the applicable provisions of the TPFA.
The Scope of the Trade Practices and Frauds Act
{8} The TPFA is a remedial statute that broadly governs the conduct of
insurers, fraternal benefit societies, nonprofit health care plans, health maintenance organizations, prepaid dental services organizations, motor clubs, agents, brokers, solicitors, adjusters, providers of services contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act [NMSA 1978, 59A-58-1 to -18 (2001) ] and all other persons engaged in any business which is now or hereafter subject to the superintendent’s supervision under the Insurance Code ..., as well as all alien and foreign insurers delivering or issuing for delivery in New Mexico any certificate or other evidence of coverage.
§ 59A-16-1. Our Legislature enacted the TPFA “to regulate trade practices in the insurance business ... by defining, or providing for determination of, practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices so defined or determined.” § 59A-16-2. The TPFA specifies a number of activities that will constitute unfair trade and claims practices and provides a mechanism by which the superintendent of insurance can enforce the provisions of the TPFA. See generally § 59A-16-1 to -30. Importantly, the TPFA also creates a private right of action, which provides that “[a]ny person covered by [the article] who has suffered damages as a result of a violation of that article by an insurer or agent is granted a right to bring an action in district court to recover actual damages.” § 59A-16-30.
{9} Pursuant to Section 59A-16-30, a person covered by the TPFA is only entitled to bring a private cause of action against an “insurer or agent.” Because Plaintiffs have not alleged that Cornejo is an “agent,” the question of whether a private right of action is available against Cornejo depends on whether he is included within the meaning of the term “insurer.” The general definitional section of the Insurance Code defines an “insurer” as “every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.” NMSA 1978, § 59A-1-8(A) (1984). The TPFA, however, is a self-contained sub-part of the Insurance Code that modifies the definition of insurer and provides that “[f]or the purposes of [the TPFA], the societies, organizations, clubs and persons [mentioned in 59A-16-1] shall be included within the meaning of ‘insurer[J and contracts issued by them are included within the meaning of ‘policy[.]’” § 59A-16-1. Thus, under a plain reading of the statute, the Legislature has broadened the definition of “insurer,” for purposes of the TPFA, to include entities and individuals that are not within the definition of insurer elsewhere in the Insurance Code.
{10} Cornejo argues that interpreting the term “insurer” to include persons such as himself for purposes of the TPFA would conflict with the Insurance Code’s general definition of insurer in Section 59A-1-8, a violation of the rule that a statute whose construction is in question is to “be read in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter.” Quantum Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t,
Persons Are Included Within the Meaning of the Term “Insurer” for Purposes of the TPFA.
{11} In interpreting the scope of the private right of action provision of the TPFA, this Court’s primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See State v. Moya,
{12} Subsection 1 of the TPFA, which defines the TPFA’s scope, is divided into two sentences. The first sentence provides that the TPFA
shall apply as to insurers, fraternal benefit societies, nonprofit health care plans, health maintenance organizations, prepaid dental services organizations, motor clubs, agents, brokers, solicitors, adjusters, providers of services contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act ... and all other persons engaged in any business which is now or hereafter subject to the superintendent’s supervision under the Insurance Code.
§ 59A-16-1. Thus, the plain language of this sentence indicates, and the parties do not dispute, that the TPFA applies to all of the named entities and individuals.
{13} The second sentence of Subsection 1 states that “[f]or the purposes of [the TPFA], the societies, organizations, clubs and persons shall be included within the meaning of ‘insurer.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). The Legislature’s use of the definite article “the” immediately preceding “societies, organizations, clubs and persons” indicates that “societies, organizations, clubs and persons” refers to the fraternal benefit societies, health maintenance organizations, prepaid dental services organizations, motor clubs and persons listed in the first sentence. Thus, the second sentence of Section 59A-16-1 incorporates within the meaning of insurer, for purposes of the TPFA, all “persons” listed in the first sentence. Consequently, the plain language of the statute indicates that the term “insurer” includes agents, brokers, solicitors, adjusters, providers of service contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act, and all other persons engaged in any business that is subject to the superintendent’s supervision under the Insurance Code.
{14} Cornejo argues that the legislative history surrounding the inclusion of “persons” in the TPFA indicates that the Legislature did not intend for “persons” to mean the persons listed in the first sentence of Section 59A-16-1. Thus, Cornejo essentially urges us to find ambiguity in the Legislature’s use of the word “persons” and depart from the plain meaning rule. Cornejo’s argument hinges on the 2001 amendment to Section 59A-16-1, which added the phrase “providers of services contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act” to the first sentence and altered the second sentence by inserting the phrase “and persons.” 1
{15} Cornejo correctly notes that the amendments to the TPFA were included in a bill that created the Service Contract Regulation Act — -an act that defines what a service contract provider is and sets out the specific obligations and duties that service contract providers must abide by. See 2001 N.M. Laws ch. 206, § 19. Because the amendment to the TPFA was included within this bill, Cornejo argues that the Legislature intended the phrase “and persons” in the second sentence to refer only to the newly included “providers of services contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act.” Id.
{16} Cornejo contends that if the Legislature had intended “persons” to refer to all of the persons listed in the first sentence of Section 59A-16-1, it would have used language such as “all of the foregoing.” What Cornejo’s argument fails to address, however, is that throughout the Service Contract Regulation Act, the Legislature consistently uses the term “providers” to refer to service contract providers and never uses the term “persons” to refer to service contract providers. See, e.g., § 59A-58-4 (stating that providers shall engage in certain activities and comply with the statute). In our view, if the Legislature had intended only to expand the scope of the definition of insurer to include service contract providers, it would have used the term “providers,” as it did throughout the rest of the Service Contract Regulation Act, rather than the term “persons.” We therefore decline to read any ambiguity into the term “persons” in Section 59A-16-1 as Cornejo urges us to do. “A statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.” State v. Elmquist,
{17} Cornejo also argues that applying the plain meaning rule to Section 59A-16-1 will violate the canons of statutory construction by rendering certain words within the TPFA, such as the word “agent” in Section 59A-16-30, superfluous because agents are persons and are therefore included within the definition of insurer in Section 59A-16-1. We are unpersuaded. As noted earlier in this opinion, the first and primary step in statutory construction is to apply the plain language of a statute if that language is clear and unambiguous. It is only when language is ambiguous that this Court will engage in further statutory construction, such as the application of the rule against rendering language superfluous. Johnson v. Francke,
{18} We therefore hold that by amending the TPFA to include the phrase “and persons,” the Legislature intended to broaden the definition of insurer and that the persons listed in the first sentence of Section 59A-16-1 are expressly included within the meaning of insurer. Thus, for purposes of the TPFA, the term “insurer” includes “agents, brokers, solicitors, adjusters, providers of services contracts pursuant to the Service Contract Regulation Act 2 and all other persons engaged in any business which is now or hereafter subject to the superintendent’s supervision under the Insurance Code.” § 59A-16-1 (citations omitted).
A Private Right of Action Exists Against Managerial Employees Like Defendant Cornejo
{19} Having concluded that the persons listed in the first sentence of Section 59A-16-1 are incorporated into the definition of insurer and therefore subject to the private right of action provision of the TPFA, all that remains to be determined is whether Cornejo is included within that definition as well. Cornejo suggests that because Plaintiffs never alleged that he was an adjuster, he cannot be held personally liable even if we hold, as we have, that adjusters, as persons, are included within the definition of insurer and subject to a private right of action. Plaintiffs have alleged that Cornejo was the “Market Claims Manager ... for Allstate’s Albuquerque Market Claims Office” and that he was responsible for the “implementation and enforcement of Allstate’s claim handling protocols in New Mexico” and for “ensuring that Allstate’s New Mexico adjusters and employees comply with all requirements for fair, prompt and equitable claim practices stated in the New Mexico [Unfair Claims Practices Act] while handling every New Mexico [Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 66-5-201 to -239 (1978, as amended through 2003)] claim made under an Allstate MFRA policy.” Plaintiffs’ allegations therefore describe conduct sufficient to make Cornejo a “person” subject to the supervision of the superintendent of insurance. Thus, Cornejo, as a manager of a group of insurance adjusters, is a “person[ ] engaged in any business which is now or hereafter subject to the superintendent’s supervision under the Insurance Code” and, as such a person, he is included within the meaning of “insurer” for purposes of the TPFA. § 59A-16-1. Because Cornejo falls within the meaning of “insurer,” and because a private right of action may be brought against an insurer, we conclude that a private right of action may be brought against Cornejo.
{20} We are not persuaded by Cornejo’s reliance on a statement made by the Hovet Court that “[t]he private right of action under the [TPFA] is limited by statute to violations by insurance companies and their agents.”
{21} Finally, in support of his argument that a private right of action should not exist against individual employees like himself, Cornejo cites a number of cases interpreting a Pennsylvania statute that creates a private right of action against an insurer but not against an individual employee. While Pennsylvania does not allow a private right of action to be brought against an insurance adjuster or other individual employee, see American Home Assurance Co. v. Merck & Co.,
{22} Our holding today is entirely consistent with the express purpose and spirit of the TPFA, which is to “promote ethical settlement practices within the insurance industry.” Hovet,
{23} In addition, our holding does not impose any new or more stringent obligations on persons such as Cornejo who are subject to the TPFA. Both parties acknowledge that individual employees such as Cornejo are, and always have been, required to comply with the obligations imposed by the TPFA and refrain from engaging in unfair or deceptive claims practices. While our holding clarifies who may be sued to enforce the TPFA under its private right of action provision, we do not in any way alter the requirement that all persons conform to the TPFA and refrain from engaging in unfair or deceptive trade and claims practices. Thus, while we hold that Cornejo is subject to the TPFA’s private right of action, this does not change the fact that he has always been required to comply with the provisions of the TPFA.
The Effective Date of the Amendments to the TPFA
{24} While we hold today that a private right of action exists against the persons listed in Section 59A-16-1, we also acknowledge that prior to the 2001 amendment to the TPFA, the definition of insurer, and consequently the scope of the private right of action, did not extend to persons like Cornejo. Prior to the addition of “persons” in 2001, “insurer” was defined to include only “societies, organizations, and clubs.” Thus, prior to July 1, 2002, the effective date of the 2001 amendment, no private right of action would have been available against Cornejo. Consequently, only those plaintiffs who can demonstrate that Cornejo was involved in the handling of their claims after July 1, 2002, may assert a private right of action against him. See Howell v. Heim,
{25} Because we accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and resolve all doubts in favor of Plaintiffs’ right to proceed to trial on review of a Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion to dismiss, we conclude that those Plaintiffs who obtained a final judgment against an Allstate insured after July 1, 2002, have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted at trial. Accepting all facts in the complaint as true, Cornejo, as the manager of the Allstate regional market claims office, could have been involved in settlement negotiations up to the time that a final judgment was entered. Of the named Plaintiffs, only three, Roxanne Martinez, Orlando Sena and Christa Okon, obtained final judgments after July 1, 2002. 3 Thus, those Plaintiffs have stated actionable claims and may proceed to trial. As for the remaining named Plaintiffs, however, we conclude that because they all obtained final judgments prior to the effective date of the amendment to the TPFA, no private right of action exists against Cornejo because his involvement with their claims would have ended at the time that a final judgment was entered in the underlying litigation, if not much earlier. 4 As for the class members about whom we have no information, we leave the determination of the viability of their claims for the district court if and when it becomes necessary.
{26} We therefore reverse the dismissal of Orlando Sena’s, Roxanne Martinez’s and Christa Okon’s TPFA claims against Cornejo and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Cornejo brought by Ramon Gallegos, Charlie Jimenez, Jr., and Adan Carriaga.
II. The Applicable Statute of Limitations for Violations of the TPFA
{27} Plaintiff Gallegos appeals the dismissal of his claims against Allstate and argues that the district court erred in applying the four-year “catch-all” statute of limitations found in Section 37-1^1. Gallegos argues that the district court should have applied NMSA 1978, § 37-1-3 (1975), the six-year statute of limitations for actions founded upon a written contract, instead of the four-year limitations period for actions not otherwise provided for. Allstate argues that the district court either correctly applied the four-year statute of limitations or, in the alternative, that the district court erred and should have applied NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976), the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person. We hold that Section 37-1-4, the four-year statute of limitations for actions not otherwise provided for, applies to suits brought pursuant to Section 59A-16-30, the private right of action provision of the TPFA, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims brought by Ramon Gallegos. We reject Allstate’s alternative argument that Section 37-1-8, the three-year limitations period for personal injuries actions, applies to violations of the TPFA because we hold that violations of the TPFA do not constitute injuries to the person.
{28} This Court has previously addressed the statute of limitations applicable to the TPFA in our decision in Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Associates, Inc.,
Applicable Statute of Limitations
{29} We look to “[t]he nature of the right sued upon, and not the form of action or relief demanded, [to] determine}] the applicability of the statute of limitations” to a cause of action. Rito Cebolla Invs., Ltd. v. Golden W. Land Corp.,
Third-Party Claimant’s Right to Sue Under the TPFA Is Not Contractual in Nature
{30} Gallegos’s complaint alleges that Allstate has violated the TPFA, not that Allstate has breached any contractual duties. In order to frame his claim as one founded on a contract, Gallegos argues that he is deemed to be the intended beneficiary of the insured tortfeasor’s insurance policy and that Allstate has a contractual obligation to comply with the TPFA because a violation of the TPFA is a breach of that contractual obligation. Gallegos further argues that the history of the TPFA, the common law insurance bad faith cause of action, and the cases recognizing a third-party beneficiary’s right of action indicate that a private suit brought pursuant to the TPFA is contractual in nature.
{31} In support of his argument, Gallegos contends that our Supreme Court’s holdings in Russell v. Protective Insurance Co.,
{32} In Russell, an employee sued his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier alleging that the insurer had violated the TPFA by failing to settle his claim in good faith.
{33} If Russell created any doubt as to whether the nature of a TPFA claim is statutory, that doubt was dispelled by the Court’s more recent holding in Hovet. Hovet, like Russell, construed the TPFA to determine whether a third-party claimant is able to bring a private right of action under the TPFA. While Russell addressed whether an employee is able to sue for bad faith in a workers’ compensation context, Hovet arose in the context of vehicular accidents and addressed whether the victim of a negligent tortfeasor is able to sue the tortfeasor’s insurer if it engages in bad faith while settling the victim’s personal injury claims.
{34} In recognizing that this statutory obligation exists under the TPFA, Hovet noted that Russell had allowed “a third party, who can demonstrate a special beneficiary status, [to] sue for unfair claims practices under the Insurance Code,” Hovet,
{35} As a third-party claimant, Gallegos is like an incidental beneficiary of the contract between Allstate and its insured. He is one who “is neither the promisee of a contract nor the party to whom performance is to be rendered,” and although he “will derive a benefit from its performance” he has no personal right to sue for breach of contract. See Fleet Mortgage Corp. v. Schuster,
The Nature of the Common Law Bad Faith Insurance Cause of Action
{36} In addition to arguing that Hovet and Russell hold that a TPFA action is contractual, Gallegos also argues that “[t]he majority of authorities and courts agree that the statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, and not torts, controls bad faith actions against insurers.” What this argument fails to acknowledge, however, is that Gallegos has no contract with Allstate and that his claim is a statutory claim, not a common law bad faith claim. Those courts that have applied a contract statute of limitations to bad faith insurance actions have done so in the context of common law bad faith claims asserted by an insured against an insurer, not by a third-party claimant against an insurer. See, e.g., Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
{37} Despite the differences between his third-party claims under the TPFA and the common law bad faith insurance action, Gallegos argues that we should look to the nature of the common law bad faith action to determine the nature of the statutory action. Gallegos argues that because the common law bad faith insurance action sounds in both contract and tort, we are obligated to apply the six-year statute of limitations for actions founded on a contract to violations of the TPFA. See Crawford v. Am. Employers’ Ins. Co.,
{38} We are not persuaded. The common law of bad faith is not relevant because “[t]hird-party suits against insurers are not allowed at common law.” See King v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
{39} In Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Herman,
{40} While the common law bad faith insurance action is concerned with enforcing a contractual obligation to avoid exposing the insured to personal liability, TPFA claims are statutory actions with a purpose separate from and independent of the common law bad faith insurance action— a purpose that promotes “ethical settlement practices within the insurance industry.” Hovet,
{41} Thus, the purpose of the private right of action under the TPFA is distinctly different from the purpose of the common law insurance bad faith action. The common law action, which enforces the contractual obligations between an insurer and an insured, has no concern for the effect an insurer’s refusal to settle has on the third party. Under a common law theory, the insurer is only obligated to balance its interests against the interests of the insured — not against the interests of a third party. In contrast, the purpose of the private right of action — promoting ethical claims practices in the insurance industry — is directly concerned with the effect an insurer’s actions has on third parties. See id. ¶¶ 14, 15 (noting that third-party claimants are often the only parties affected by failure to settle a claim in good faith). This purpose, and consequently the nature of the third-party right of action, “stems not from the private insurance agreement[,] but from a duty imposed by statute.” Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co.,
{42} As we have already noted, “[t]he nature of the right sued upon, and not the form of action or relief demanded, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations.” Rito Cebolla Invs., Ltd.,
The TPFA’s Private Right of Action Provision is Not Subject to a Three-Year Statute of Limitations
{43} Allstate argues that because the underlying cause of action in this case was for bodily injuries sustained in a vehicular accident, the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person should apply. In support of this argument, Allstate cites American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. J.T. Construction Co.,
The Four-Year Statute of Limitations Period for Actions Not Otherwise Provided for Applies to Violations of the TPFA
{44} Having determined that the nature of an alleged violation of the TPFA is neither contractual nor involves an injury to the person, we hold that Section 37-1-4, which provides that “all other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified [must be brought] within four years,” is the applicable limitations period for actions brought pursuant to the TPFA.
5
The third-party claim brought by Gallegos alleges that Allstate and Cornejo have violated the statutory provisions of the TPFA. As we have previously recognized, where “claims [are] founded on violations of statutes, the claims fall within ‘other unspecified actions’ under the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 37-1-4.” Nance,
CONCLUSION
{45} We hold that a managerial employee such as Jose Cornejo is subject to the private right of action provision of the TPFA and that the four-year statute of limitations period stated in Section 37-1-4 applies to actions brought pursuant to the private right of action provision of the TPFA. We reverse the dismissal of the claims against Jose Cornejo brought by Roxanne Martinez, Orlando Sena, and Christa Okon, we affirm the dismissal of the claims against Jose Cornejo brought by Charlie Jimenez, Jr., and Adán Carriaga, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims brought by Ramon Gallegos.
{46} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The amendment also deleted the word "such" in the second sentence of Section 59A-16-1 so that the statute now reads "the societies, organizations, clubs and persons" rather than "such societies, organizations, and clubs." The substitution of “the” for "such” does not alter our conclusion that the second sentence refers to the specifically listed entities and persons in the first sentence.
. The statutory definition of a service contract provider indicates that service contract providers are also persons. See § 59A-58-2(G) (defining service contract "provider” as "a person who is contractually obligated to a holder" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
. According to the complaint, Orlando Sena obtained a final judgment on February 27, 2004, Roxanne Martinez obtained a final judgment against Allstate on October 31, 2002, and Christa Okon obtained a final judgment on December 9, 2003.
. Plaintiff Charlie Jimenez Jr. obtained a final judgment on July 11, 2000, Ramon Gallegos obtained a final judgment on June 8, 1999, and Adan Carriaga obtained a final judgment on October 10, 2001.
. Other jurisdictions that recognize the third-party right of action for unfair claims practices provide much shorter limitations periods. Montana, for example, only provides third-party claimants one year to bring a cause of action for violations of the statutory duties. See Mont.Code Ann., § 33-18~242(7)(a), (b) (1987) (providing a one-year limitations period for third-party claimants and a two-year period for insureds). While we are required by statute to apply the four-year statute of limitations, we believe that a far shorter time period, like that provided by Montana, would be sufficient.