Opinion by
This is a declaratory judgment proceeding involving an interpretation of the Colоrado Auto Accident Reparations Act (Nofault Act), § 10-4-701, et seq., C.R.S.1997. Plaintiff, Richard Martinez, appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, Allstate Insurancе Company, which declared that he owned the motorcycle he was riding when injurеd during an accident and that, thus, he was not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits as a resident relative using a non-owned vehicle under his parent’s automobile insurance policy. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Martinez was injured while operating a motorcycle. Although his sister was named as the owner of the motorcycle on the certificate of title, Martinez had paid the purchase price and all license, title, and registration costs; he had regularly and еxclusively used it as his sole means of transportation; and he considered it to be exclusively his vehicle. He also had maintained the motorcycle and insured it, listing himself as the owner under his policy.
The sister had never operated the motorсycle, did not keep it at her residence, and considered it to belong exclusively to Martinez. The motorcycle was titled and registered in her name solely to avoid its being considered marital property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding between Martinez and his wife.
At the time of the accident, Martinez residеd with his parents. While he had insured
Martinez contends that the trial court erred in finding that he owned the motorcycle. We disagree.
Concerning PIP benefits, the policy provides that Allstate will “pay to or on behalf of the injured person the following bеnefits in accordance with the [No-fault] Act — ” Section 10 — 4—70T(l)(b), C.R.S.1997, of the Act provides that PIP coverages apply to accidental bodily injury sustained by a resident relаtive of the named insured “except where the relative is injured as a result of thе use or operation of his own .motor vehicle not actually covered .... ” (emphasis added)
Martinez argues the phrase “his own” refers only to а person who has legal title to a vehicle. In support of this argument, he refers us to the definition of “owner” set forth in the Act, which provides in relevant part that: “Owner means a person who holds the legal title to the vehicle.... ” Section 10-4r-703(8), C.R.S.1997. Acсepting his contention, however, does not end the inquiry.
The term “legal title” is not defined in the No-fault Act. Martinez argues that this phrase can mean only the holder of а certificate of title to the vehicle. We disagree.
The Certificate of Title Act, § 42-6-107(2), C.R.S.1997, provides in part that a “certificate of title shall be
prima facie evidence
of all the mаtters therein contained and that the person in whose name said certificate is registered is the lawful owner of the vehicle therein described.” (emphasis added) But, a certificate of title does not represent conclusive proof of ownership. Rather, it evidences only a rebuttable presumption of ownership.
See Sifuentes v. Weed,
Here, Allstate overcame the statutory presumption of ownership of the motorcycle by the sister. Martinez and his sister both admitted that the solе reason for titling the vehicle in the sister’s name was to avoid any property dispute with Martinez’ wife in the dissolution of marriage proceeding. Martinez had purchаsed the motorcycle with his own funds and had the exclusive right to possess, use, and enjоy it. Hence, we conclude that Martinez held the legal title to the vehicle and that he was, thus, injured as a result of the operation of his own motorcycle.
For these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion.
Because of this resolution, we need not address Martinez’ remaining contentions.
The judgment is affirmed.