298 Mass. 390 | Mass. | 1937
These are actions for death under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229, § 5. The plaintiffs’ intestates were the wife and three minor children of the defendant’s intestate and constituted his entire family. All, including the defendant’s intestate, while riding in an automobile in Monson driven by the defendant’s intestate, were killed without conscious suffering by a collision with a railroad train at a grade crossing due to the negligence of the defendant’s intestate, the plaintiffs’ intestates being in the exercise of due care. Of the five victims of the accident, the father, the defendant’s intestate, died first. The trial judge has reported the questions whether the respective plaintiffs as administrators of the estates of the wife and of the minor children have rights to damages under the statute.
We need not decide whether in general the administrator of a wife or minor child can recover under the death statute against the estate of the husband and father. Here the father died first. The wording of the statute is, “a person who by his negligence or by his wilful, wanton or reckless act . . . causes the death of a person . . . shall be liable.” It has been stated repeatedly that no cause of action arises until the actual occurrence of the death for which recovery is sought. Wall v. Massachusetts Northeastern Street Railway, 229 Mass. 506. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 88. Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass. 94, 97. Wescott v. Henshaw Motor Co. 275 Mass. 82, 85. Hutchinson v. H. E. Shaw, Co. 277 Mass. 115. Melnik v. Perwak, 295 Mass. 512, 514. When that event took place in each of the cases at bar the “person” who, in the language of the statute, would “be liable” was himself dead. “It is axiomatic that a corpse is not a person.” Brooks v. Boston & Northern Street Rail
The conclusion is inescapable that none of the actions can be maintained. That result has been reached in the only cases which we have seen dealing with the precise question and is supported by the reasoning in cognate cases. Beavers’ Administratrix v. Putnam’s Curator, 110 Va. 713. Hegel v. George, 218 Wis. 327. Willard v. Mohn, 24 N. D. 390. Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527. Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176. Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493. Moe v. Smiley, 125 Penn. St. 136. Carrigan v. Cole, 35 R. I. 162. Johnson v. Farmer, 89 Texas, 610.
This case must of course be distinguished from cases where the cause of action became complete in' the lifetime of the wrongdoer. In such cases it survives under our statutes against his administrator. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 88. But a cause of action which never came into existence cannot “survive.”
The question raised by the bill of exceptions has become
So ordered.