Martineau v. HansonMartineau v. Hanson
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Frick
The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover judgment upon *553a promissory note made by the defendant to the plaintiff for the sum of $1,750. The defendant answered plaintiff’s complaint, admitting the execution and delivery of the note sued on. He, however, pleaded several defenses to the note, which are to the effect that prior to the execution thereof defendant had employed the plaintiff as agenit to sell certain lands owned by the defendant, and that for his services or commission for procuring a purchaser for said lands plaintiff was to receive all that he could obtain in excess of the sum of $20,800; that plaintiff produced one John H. Earl who, plaintiff represented, was willing to purchase said lands, and was financially able to pay the sum of $23,300 therefor; that the defendant believed and relied on the representations of the plaintiff that said Earl was financially able to pay said sum of money for said lands, and in pursuance of said representations entered into a contract, whereby the defendant agreed to sell said lands to ,said Earl for said sum of $23,300; that said Earl was to make a payment on said purchase price on or before November 1, 1911, amounting to the sum of $5,500; that the promissory note sued on “was delivered to the plaintiff upon the express condition and understanding between the said defendant and the plaintiff that the said note was not to. be paid until the said John H. Earl should pay to the defendant the aforesaid sum of $5,500; that the plaintiff received the said note from said defendant, and at the time of its receipt agreed to the condition upon which the same was delivered as stated, and agreed with the defendant that the said note should not become due until the said John Earl should make the payment of $5,500 which was due on or before the 1st day of November, A. D. 1911, and that said plaintiff further agreed that said note * * * was never to be paid by the defendant unless the said John H. Earl should pay the sum-of $5,500;” that said Earl never paid the said $5,500, or.any part thereof; that said Earl was not financially able to pay the purchase price of said lands, which fact was well known to the plaintiff at the time the contract of sale was entered, into; that the representations of the plaintiff respecting said Earl’s ability to pay for said lands were false; and that the defendant was deceived and misled by plaintiff’s *554representations in that regard, and by reason thereof was induced to execute said note. The defendant also pleaded that the plaintiff made said representations for the sole purpose of inducing the defendant to enter into the contract of sale for said lands, and for the purpose of obtaining the commission evidenced by said note. The ease was submitted to the jury under instructions from the court. ‘The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, upon which the court entered judgment, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
Defendant’s counsel has assigned a large number of errors, and we shall, consider those deemed material in their order. We shall refer to the evidence only to the extent that it may be necessary to illustrate the points decided.
“Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him, is conclusively presumed.”
The section in question is part of the act relating to negotiable instruments, and is found, with some slight changes, in the statutes of the various states which have adopted said act. The statute adopted by the state of Wisconsin is, word for word, like our own, and the Supreme Court of that state, *555in passing upon a similar question to that presented here, in the ease of Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis. 333, 110 N. W. 195, says:
“It is familiar law, nothwitbstanding some conflict in the authorities, that a person may manually deliver an instrument, though it he in the form of commercial paper, to another, on its face containing a binding obligation in vraesenti of such person to such other, with a contemporaneous verbal agreement that it shall not take effect until the happening of some specified event; and that the paper as between the parties will have no validity as a binding contract till the condition shall have been satisfied; and that proof of such condition does not violate the rule that a written instrument cannot be varied by a contemporaneous parol agreement; that such evidence only goes to show that the instrument never had vitality as a contract.”
To tbe same effect are the following eases: Hill v. Hall, 191 Mass. 265, 77 N. E. 831; McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn. 250, 7 Atl. 408, 1 Am. St. Rep. 111; Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228, 14 Sup. Ct. 816, 38 L. Ed. 698; Howell v. Ware, 175 Fed. 742, 99 C. C. A. 318; 1 Daniel, Negotiable Insts. Section 68a; Brannon’s Negotiable Insts. Law, Section 16, and notes.
Counsel for plaintiff contends, however, and it seems the court agreed with him that the effect of the proffered evidence merely went “to show that the note in suit was to be paid out of a particular fund,” and that parol evidence was not admissible to establish that fact. To sustain that contention, the following cases are cited: Gorrell v. Home Life, etc., Co., 63 Fed. 371, 11 C. C. A. 240; National Bank v. Foote, 12 Utah, 157, 42 Pac. 205; Underwood v. Simonds, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 275; Clanin v. Easterly, etc., Co., 118 Ind. 372, 21 N. E. 35, 3 L. R. A. 863; Stewart v. Anderson, 59 Ind. 375; and Central Sav. Banks v. O’Connor, 132 Mich. 578, 94 N. W. 11, 102 Am. St. Rep. 433. A mere cursory reading of the foregoing cases will disclose that the decisions cited by plaintiff’s counsel, with possibly two exceptions, have no controlling influence upon the question raised by defendant’s counsel; and if we were to follow literally the two cases to which we have referred, we would have to repeal section 1568, supra, by judicial edict, and would be required to overrule all the cases we have before cited.
*556
“Broker employed to sell property becomes entitled to his commission when he finds a purchaser satisfactory to his employer and they enter into a mutual contract of purchase and sale, .though it subsequently turns out that the purchaser is unable to comply with his contract, and on that account the sale is not consummated’ by the transfer of the property.”
Of course the rule above stated is based upon the assumption that both the principal and the broker act in good faith. The text of the headnote is fully supported by the case of Riggs v. Turnbull, 105 Md. 135, 66 Atl. 13, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 824, 11 Ann. Cas. 783. There, however, seems to be a well-grounded exception to the general rule stated above, which the authors of 2 Clark Skyles on the Law of Agency, at section 773, state in the following words:
“Yet if the principal in accepting him (the prospective purchaser) as a purchaser did not rely on his own judgment, but rather upon that of the broker, and the purchaser is not able to comply with his contract, the broker would not be entitled to commissions; nor would he be entitled to commissions if the ratification was made on the strength of false statements made by him.”
The foregoing text is supported’ in Butler v. Baker, 17 R. I. 582, 23 Atl. 1019, 33 Am. St. Rep. 897.
*560
The question of want of consideration for the note in question raised by the”defendant, and upon whom rested the burden of proof -in that regard under the rule laid down by this court in Hudson v. Moon, 42 Utah, 377, 130 Pac. 744, in our judgment, is not involved, here. The question was not one of want of, or failure of, consideration. The question was whether the note in question was conditionally delivered or not. If it was delivered upon a condition precedent and the condition was not fulfilled; then the note did not constitute an enforceable contract, and that is the end of the matter.
. While we have not considered all of the assignments separately, yet what we have said upon the whole assignments sufficiently covers the principles which are discussed by counsel. Neither is it necessary to refer specifically to the ruling of the court on the admission or the exclusion of evidence, since the rulings complained of were based upon the theory upon which the court tried the ease,- and in so far as that theory is contrary to the law herein expressed, the court will, no doubt, modify the rulings upon a retrial of the cause if one is had. The foregoing statement applies to .the instructions complained of and to the refusal of defendant’s request to charge which we have not specifically discussed.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment is reversed, and the. cause is remanded to the District Court of Cache *561County, with directions to grant a new trial and to proceed with the case in accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellant to recover costs.
STRAUP, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.