OPINION
In this slip and fall ease, the main issue on appeal is whether there is any evidence to support the plaintiffs verdict. We resolve that issue against the plaintiff and enter a judgment for the defendant in accordance with the motion made at the end of all the evidence.
I.
After falling on the asphalt at Washmas-ters Auto Center, a Nashville carwash, Harriet Teresa Martin 1 brought suit in the Davidson County Circuit Court where a jury found that she had sustained damages in the amount of $125,148.18. Upon the jury’s determination that the Defendants, Washmas-ter Auto Center, U.SA. d/b/a Washmasters Auto Centers, and Murfreesboro Road Auto-wash Corporation, d/b/a Washmasters Auto Centers, were 75% at fault and the plaintiff 25%, the trial court entered a judgment against the defendants in the amount of $93,-861.14.
The defendants moved the trial court to set aside the judgment on the jury verdict and to enter a judgment in accordance with their motion for a directed verdict. In the alternative, the defendants moved the trial court for a new trial. The trial court denied *316 these motions and on this appeal the defendants have raised issues involving the plaintiffs failure to prove that the defendant car-wash was negligent.
“Where there has been a verdict for the plaintiff approved by the Trial Judge, in considering a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict the Court of Appeals must look at all the evidence, construe it most favorably to the plaintiff, take the plaintiff’s evidence which supports his theory as true, discard all countervailing evidence and indulge all reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict.”
Tennessee Liquefied Gas Corp. v. Ross,
II.
The proof in its most favorable light to the plaintiff shows that on December 28, 1989, Teresa Martin stopped at the Washmasters carwash in Nashville to get her car washed. While on the premises, Ms. Martin fell causing injury to her knee and giving rise to this action. Because this case places at issue Washmasters’ negligent operation of its car-wash, a detailed account of the carwash and its method of operation must be given. The Washmasters facility consists of a main building, a smaller building used for specialty detailing services, and a paved asphalt area which separates the two buildings. After turning over their cars to attendants, customers enter the main building where there is a customer service area and a lobby in which they can wait. Here, there are windows in the wall through which customers can watch their cars as they move through a car washing tunnel.
In 1989, Washmasters’ most popular package, “the Works,” included an alkaline pres-oak, a foamy tire cleaner, another alkaline, forty gallons of water, a hot wax, a shine plus, a polysilicone, and a final rinse of nine gallons of water. After receiving this treatment, the vehicles run through a forced air drying area at the end of the tunnel. Testimony established that some water might remain on the car and might drip off as the car emerges from the tunnel. When the manager was asked about the chemical residue included in this water, he stated that there would be none — that any liquid which drips off as the car emerges from the tunnel would be pure water.
When the cars reach the end of the tunnel, employees get in and drive them out of the tunnel and into one of several bays in the main building. Here, employees typically vacuum the interiors of the cars removing trash from them which could include liquid trash. In addition, on a busy day, the windows might be cleaned in this area. Once a car is finished in the bay area, an employee drives it out of the main building across a drain between the indoor bay and the outside asphalt area.
Once outside, an attendant will perform the final work on a car such as cleaning the tires, the windows, and the interior. The cleaning solutions are kept in squirt bottles in carts in this outside area. The window cleaner used is an all-purpose cleaner diluted with water at a ratio of twenty-four units of water to one unit of cleaner. The tires are cleaned by squirting a pad with Protect-All and then wiping the tires, although, sometimes, Protect-All is applied directly to the tires. Protect-All is a water-based chemical which, upon the label, states that it reduces friction. A degreaser may be sprayed to remove minor tar from the exterior of the cars. The carwash manager testified that carwash employees might occasionally drop the plastic bottles of cleaners causing some cleaner to spill out onto the asphalt.
The carwash employs supervisors, known as “loose persons,” who roam the premises in search of problems that have arisen and customers in need of assistance. These employees pick up trash and take care of any spillage which might necessitate blocking off portions of the bay area in order to clean up a spill. The carwash manager testified that on a day such as the day that the plaintiff fell, Washmasters would have had six loose persons monitoring the carwash.
When the work in the pick-up area is completed and the ear is ready, an employee waves a towel to signal to the customer. It *317 is undisputed that the most feasible way for customers to retrieve their cars after exiting the lobby is to walk through the bay areas, across the drain, and onto the asphalt work area where the cars are waiting. Robert Whitaker, an expert for the defendant who is a structural engineer, testified that the surface of the bay floor consists of textured concrete paving stones which are widely used and recommended for car and pedestrian traffic. Mr. Whitaker observed that water accumulates in the bay area. He noted that, as the surface is made of precast concrete, it does not absorb anything. Although water would soak through the mortar joints of this surface if the stones had been installed, as recommended, in sand, Mr. Whitaker testified that they were installed in mortar. Moreover, the bay area has no slope to it further accounting for the accumulation of water.
On the other hand, according to this expert, the asphalt surface of the outside pickup area, where the plaintiffs injury occurred, is absorbent and thus even an oil spill will not stay on the surface for long periods. Mr. Whitaker testified that the asphalt, with its textured surface, has good traction even when wet. Both Mr. Whitaker and the ear-wash manager testified that water pools cannot accumulate on the asphalt surface because there is a slight grade toward the drain that separates the asphalt from the bay area.
When the plaintiff saw that her car was ready around 10:30 on the morning of December 28, she walked out of the Washmas-ters lobby and through the bay area with a purse over her left shoulder and a car seat in her right hand. After crossing the drain which separates the bay area from the outside asphalt area, plaintiff took several steps and then fell. She testified as follows, “[a]s soon as I walked off of the brick-type surface past the drain, maybe three or four steps, I immediately went down, slipped and went down on my left knee.... What I slipped on was very slippery; I mean, it had to be. I went straight down.”
Ms. Martin testified that the carwash was very busy on the day of her accident and that she noticed “a lot” of water on the asphalt area prior to falling. When asked if it were possible that she slipped on something that a customer dropped or rainwater, Ms. Martin said, “I don’t know. It wasn’t visible.... This was something slippery other than just rainwater or ice water.” She stated that no employee of the carwash had warned her about the slippery condition of the surface either on the day that she fell or on any of her previous eighteen or twenty trips to the carwash. She also testified that, on her previous visits, she had never noticed any dangerous condition.
As for prior accidents on the premises, Mr. Andriotto, the car wash manager, testified that he had slipped in another area of the facility while running at the carwash on one occasion in 1984; however, he had no idea what he slipped on. Other than this, no evidence was presented at trial that anyone had fallen at the Washmasters facility.
III.
In light of the evidence presented at trial, defendants contend that the trial court was in error in failing to direct a verdict in their favor. A directed verdict is appropriate when the evidence supports only one conclusion. Williams v.
Brown,
*318
We must determine whether, as a matter of law, Ms. Martin’s evidence would enable a reasonable person to conclude that her injury was, more probably than not, caused by Washmasters’ negligence. While business proprietors, such as Washmasters, are not insurers of their patrons’ safety, they are required to use due care under all circumstances.
Smith v. Inman Realty Co.,
Alternatively, the notice requirement is met if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant’s method of operation created a hazardous situation forseeably harmful to others. Hale v. Blue Boar Cafeteria Co., (Tenn.App., unpublished opinion, filed at Jackson, Feb. 21,1980).
IV.
The defendants assert that plaintiff offered no proof as to what caused her to fall. She did not prove that defendants created a dangerous or defective condition or that defendants had notice of such a condition. While plaintiff is correct in her argument that she is not required to prove the specific slippery substance that caused her to fall,
see Beske v. Opryland USA, Inc.,
The proof showed that water and perhaps friction-reducing chemicals may accumulate in the indoor bay areas of the car wash across which the plaintiff had to walk in order to retrieve her clean vehicle. Although the plaintiff testified that she noticed water on the asphalt surface where she actually fell, the uncontroverted expert testimony was that this surface was highly absorbent and sloped toward a drain so that liquid substances would not accumulate. The plaintiff acknowledged that pavement wet from rainwater alone is not slippery and that Washmaster could not have avoided rainwater being on this outside asphalt area. The plaintiff’s theory seems to be that the defendant created this dangerous condition by allowing slippery ear wash chemicals to be on the ground—chemicals which came into contact with plaintiff’s feet either as she walked through the bay area or as she emerged onto the asphalt area.
While plaintiff’s theory is not implausible, it must be more probable than any other theory in order for this Court to uphold the verdict.
See Tennessee Liquefied Gas Corp. v. Ross,
*319
In
Chambliss v. Shoney’s Inc.,
In upholding the trial court’s decision, this Court stated that “[t]here is no evidence of the source of the water which caused the plaintiff to fall.”
Id.
at 273. “Other than the presence of snow and slush outside, there is no evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that a puddle in the restroom would result from the snow and slush outside.”
Id.
at 274. In the reasoning of
Chambliss,
we find support for our conclusion: other than the fact that the defendant carwash uses potentially slick chemicals, there is no evidence that these chemicals were on the outside asphalt surface making this surface dangerously slick. As we in our case acknowledge the possibility of plaintiffs theory, the
Chambliss
court recognized that its plaintiffs “trackage” explanation was a possibility though remote in light of the distance between the outside entrance and the restroom.
See also Durham v. Webb,
No. 02A01-9502-CV-00033,
Even if Ms. Martin failed to show that Washmasters created a hazardous condition, the verdict would stand if she could show that the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant carwash had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition created by someone else. Ms. Martin testified that the slippery substance was not visible to her before she fell. However, this Court has noted that notice is not based upon the ability to see the hazardous condition, but the visibility of the event which caused the hazardous condition to be present.
Benson v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc.,
We next address the plaintiffs assertion that the “Method of Operation” theory of liability as outlined in Hale v. Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. (Tenn.App., unpublished opinion, filed at Jackson, Feb. 21, 1980), is applicable to these facts. The defendant in Blue Boar was a self-service cafeteria which was set up so that customers selected food from a line and then carried it to tables in one of two dining areas. Though waitresses would come to the tables to take drink orders, there was a service stand where the defendant kept ice, water, tea, coffee glasses and cups, as well as a depository for dirty dishes. Id. at 3. Customers would serve themselves drinks from this service stand.
The floor in the self-service area, which was adjacent to the carpeted smaller dining area, was hard tile. It was necessary for all occupants of the small dining room to walk through the service area in order to go to the cash register or to leave the restaurant. The proof showed that it was customary during rush hours for beverages to spill or for bits of food to accumulate on the floor. Employees were instructed to clean the floor prior to meals and any other time that they observed debris on the floor. The plaintiff fell on water in this area, but she could not show *320 who spilled the water or that the defendant had notice that it had been spilled.
The court reviewed the law “in slip and fall cases where the alleged cause of the injury was a transitory, temporary or unusual defect, condition or accumulation of foreign substances on floors” and found the law to be that notice must be shown if the substance upon which the plaintiff fell was not placed there by the defendant.
Id.
at 5
(citing Stringer v. Cooper,
If a proprietor of a place of business need not have notice of a defective condition caused by it or any of its employees, it appears logical not to require notice of a hazardous situation created by the method in which the proprietor chose to operate its business. We, therefore, hold that in situations of this nature it is not a matter of knowledge in or actual or constructive notice to the proprietor. In these situations the questions are: (1) whether the condition created by the chosen method of operation constitutes a hazardous situation foreseeably harmful to others, (2) whether the proprietor used reasonable and ordinary care toward its invitees under these circumstances, and (3) whether the condition created was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.
Blue Boar at 6.
The three-question test announced in
Blue Boar
completely omits any requirement of notice under the theory that a defendant who has created a dangerous condition needs no notice of what he has done.
See id.
at 5
(quoting Stringer,
As applied to the case at bar, there is no material evidence to support the plaintiffs verdict under the Method of Operation standard either as initially stated in
Blue Boar
or under the test focusing on constructive notice. As for the latter, the proof did not indicate that car wash chemicals had ever before mixed with the water on Washmasters’ floor giving rise to a “general or continuing” slippery condition. The plaintiff testified that, in her previous eighteen to twenty visits to the carwash, she had never noticed a dangerous condition at Washmasters. Furthermore, there was no evidence that “slip and fall” accidents at the carwash were a common or “recurring incident.”
See Beard,
Likewise, analyses under the standard of
Blue Boar
leads to a conclusion that the carwash was not negligent. In determining “whether the condition created by the chosen method of operation constitutes a hazardous situation foreseeably harmful to others,” we look to the deficiency of the evidence as articulated in the preceding paragraph. Because there is no proof that slippery conditions or resultant falls have ever been a problem at Washmasters, we cannot say that there is any evidence that the defendant’s mode of operation created a hazardous situation.
See Beard,
Because the plaintiff has not offered any material evidence upon which the jury could have found that the defendants were negligent, we set aside the jury’s verdict and grant judgment in favor of the defendants. In light of our disposition of this case, the remaining issues concerning the grant of a new trial are pretermitted. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for any further necessary proceedings. Tax the costs on appeal to the appel-lee.
Notes
. By the time the plaintiff's case came to trial, she had divorced and remarried such that her name was Teresa Taylor Gentry. However, for purposes of this appeal, the plaintiff will be referred to by her previous name under which she initiated these proceedings.