201 P. 492 | Idaho | 1921
Appellants filed a petition in this court, setting forth that respondent wrongfully detained their minor son, Dean Martin, in the Idaho Industrial Training School and unlawfully deprived them of his custody. This court issued the writ, and ordered that it be made returnable before the district court of the eighth judicial district at Coeur d’Alene.
The material issues in that court are the following: Respondent in his return alleged that he detained the body of Dean Martin, as Superintendent of the Idaho Industrial Training School, and not otherwise, under and by virtue of an order of commitment duly made and entered by M. G. Whitney, acting in his official capacity as judge of the probate court of Kootenai county. The appellants demurred to the return on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to warrant respondent in retaining the custody and control of the body of Dean Martin as against the appellants. The demurrer was overruled. In their answer, appellants denied that the order of commitment made by the probate judge had any force or effect as against themselves as justifying the detention of the body of Dean Martin by respondent. They further answered that they were respectively the father and mother of Dean Martin, a minor of the age of fifteen years, and that he had always lived and re
After argument upon appeal, this court directed the writ to issue, and that the minor be returned to the custody of his parents.
The demurrer to the return should have been sustained.
In the cases of In re Sharp, 15 Ida. 120, 96 Pac. 563, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 886, and Allen v. Williams, 31 Ida. 309, 171 Pac. 493, it was held that the parents are in no way bound by the action of a probate judge in committing a juvenile delinquent to the Idaho Industrial Training School. It was pointed out in those cases that the parents are entitled to their day in court, and that to hold a commitment of a minor child by the probate judge to be binding upon the parents, without their having been provided an opportunity to be heard, would render the juvenile delinquent law unconstitutional.
The right of a parent to the custody, control and society of his child is one of the highest known to the law. The family is a unit of society and is so recognized by the state. The parents of children are recognized as their natural guardians, and the presumption is that they are fit and proper persons to exercise that trust. It is incumbent upon him who seeks to invade the home and remove a child from its protec
Counsel for respondent contend that the return of respondent is in strict compliance with the law. .C. S., sec. 9280, on which they rely, is in part as follows:
“The person upon whom the writ is served must state in his return, plainly and unequivocally:
“1. Whether he has or has not the party in his custody, or under his power or restraint.
“2. If he has the party in his custody or power, or under his restraint, he must state the authority and cause of such imprisonment or restraint.
“3. If the party is detained by virtue of any writ, warrant or other written authority, a copy thereof must be annexed to the return, and the original produced and exhibited to the court or judge on the hearing of such return.....”
In a case such as this, where application for the writ is made by the parents of a minor child committed merely as a juvenile delinquent, subdivision 2 of the section is applicable and the return must state the authority and
Counsel for respondent also call attention to C. S., sec. 6711, which is as follows:
“In pleading a judgment or other determination of a court, officer or board, it is not necessary to state the facts conferring jurisdiction, but such judgment or determination may be stated to have been duly given or made. If such allegation be controverted, the party pleading must establish on the trial the facts conferring jurisdiction.”
As applied to cases of this nature, we think this statute provides that in the answer to the writ the parents of the child may traverse the statement in the return that the officer detains the body of the child under the authority of an order of commitment duly made. If such an issue be raised, then of course the defendant must show the jurisdictional facts in the proceeding which resulted in the commitment.
Counsel for respondent also contend that the commitment of Dean Martin cannot be attacked collaterally in a proceeding of this nature. Upon this question we express no opinion. The case at bar is not a collateral attack upon the commitment. It presents new issues. If it be true, as suggested by counsel, that in considering the new issues it will become necessary to try anew in a different tribunal the same matters considered by the probate court in the proceeding which resulted in the commitment, the conclusive answer is that the parents are entitled to have these questions tried anew. Due process of law requires that they be accorded their day in court, with opportunity afforded to present their ease and defend their rights.
The court found, among other things, that the appellants were honorable and law-abiding citizens and able to take care of and provide for Dean Martin, who is their youngest child. Under this state of the record the district court should have issued the writ.
For the reasons set forth above, this court entered its order directing the return of Dean Martin to the custody of his parents.