MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This suit, challenging the apportionment of councilmen within the town of Stratford, presents initially the question of whether apportionment on the basis of registered voters, rather than total population, violates the one person-one vote requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs are residents and qualified voters in each of the ten voting districts of the Town. Defendants are the town’s councilmen, town manager, town clerk, and a political party’s town chairman, all of whom have responsibilities for the conduct of elections. The suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). After a motion for a temporary restraining order was denied, the Court held a hearing on August 6, 1975, on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, plaintiffs urged that the injunction hearing be combined with a hearing on the merits, Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 (a). Defendants indicated that some factual disputes could be resolved by stipulation, but asserted the right to advise the Court by affidavit of factual matters they wished to contest. The hearing was concluded on the understanding that a decision would be rendered on the merits if appropriate, based on the undisputed facts, but if the Court encountered factual disputes material to resolution of any of the issues in the case, an opportunity for a further hearing on the merits would be afforded. After examining the stipulation of facts and the affidavits submitted by both sides, the Court concludes that the undisputed facts provide an adequate basis for decision, and the case can be decided as if submitted on cross motions for summary judgment.
The Charter of the Town provides that there shall be a town council consisting of eleven members, one to be elected at large, and one from each of ten districts within the Town. Stratford Town Charter, § 2.1.1. The council is required to appoint an election district revision commission within ninety days after the adoption of the Charter, which occurred on July 16, 1964, and to appoint another commission every ten years thereafter. § 7.1.4. The commission is obligated to rearrange the boundaries of the ten election districts “in such manner as to follow most natural geographic divisions” and each district is to include “not more than twelve per centum and not less than eight per centum of the total number of electors who were entitled to cast their votes at the last preceding regular town election.” § 7.1.5.
An election district revision commission was appointed and conducted meetings in 1974. At a special meeting of the town council held on December 16, 1974, the commission’s report, including a map of ten recommended voting districts, was accepted by a divided vote. An ordinance specifying the election districts in accordance with the council’s action became effective June 3, 1975. This suit followed on July 21.
To substantiate their challenge to the new election districts, plaintiffs submitted a map and description of the new districts to Robert W. Marx, the director of a division of the U. S. Bureau of the Census. By affidavit Marx reported the results of an analysis done by his division, applying the census data from the census made on April 1, 1970,
Defendants contend that, in the circumstances of this case, registered voters are a permissible basis on which to apportion council seats, and that the apportionment is within constitutional standards when tested by the numbers of registered voters in each district. As of June 30, 1973, there were 28,089 registered voters in Stratford; thus an ideal district based on registered voters would contain 2,809 registered voters. The comparable figure as of June 30, 1975, is 2,828. If the 1973 figures are used, the 1975 apportionment produces a deviation
Defendants assert that the deviation resulting from registered voter figures is within acceptable limits and that, if justification is needed, it is supplied by a “rational municipal policy” of recognizing local growth patterns and leaving growth districts with a slightly smaller number of registered voters than the norm. The issues on the merits thus become whether registered voters may be used as a basis for apportionment and if so, whether the deviation in the Stratford apportionment exceeds Fourteenth Amendment limits.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, see
Burns v. Richardson,
Whether use of registered voters is permissible
only
when it produces a plan not substantially different from what a
However, it must be acknowledged that in
Burns
the Court expressed concerns about the use of registered voters as an apportionment basis. Because voter registration depends on the political activity of those eligible to register, there is a risk that “improper influences” might skew voter registration patterns.
If
Burns
were the Court’s last word on the subject, use of registered voters as an apportionment basis would be a matter of some doubt. See also
Ely v. Klahr,
As a matter of democratic theory, it may well be argued that each representative ought to represent approximately the same number of people,
Two practical considerations also support the use of registered voter figures. First, the data are kept current, thereby permitting the equality of an apportionment plan to be tested against figures available for the year in which the election is held. Population figures are available only at ten-year intervals. This factor, however, may import into the use of registered voter figures a requirement of currency. In
Burns
the Court cautioned against the use of registered voter figures for more than “interim” use.
The second practical advantage of registered voter figures over population figures is the ease of using the data. Lists of registered voters are maintained by street addresses, making it simple to draw district lines and readily determine how many registered voters are being included. On the other hand, population data from the Bureau of the Census normally disclose the boundaries and population of what are known as census blocks. These units are often too large to form election districts within a town. Stratford, for example, having chosen to form ten election districts, could use whole census blocks if they happened to be of nearly equal population and happened to come in multiples of ten, or if, equally unlikely, all the census blocks in the town could be grouped into ten compact districts of equal population. Otherwise election districts must be formed out of parts of census blocks. When that occurs, it is not clear how many people live in the fragmented blocks. In that event, one must either resort to basic census records, as Marx did, or rely on estimates, see
Kapral v. Jepson,
For these reasons, I conclude that registered voter figures can be used as the basis for apportionment, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, at least for apportionment within a municipality. 3
If registered voter figures may be used in Stratford, the next question is whether the current districts conform to constitutional standards. From the 9.9% total deviation permitted in
White v. Regester, supra,
without justification and the 11.9% total deviation permitted in
Abate v. Mundt, supra,
with justification, it appears that a 10% line has been implicitly set and that any greater total deviation requires justification. See
White v. Regester, supra,
Plaintiffs assert the requisite justification can be found in a policy of recognizing growth patterns by deliberately leaving growth districts with a somewhat smaller number of registered voters than the norm. This contention must be rejected, wholly apart from the unresolved dispute between the parties as to which districts have in fact recently experienced the most growth. If registered voter figures are to be permitted as an apportionment basis partly because of their currency, it would be illogical to permit excessive deviations based on uncertain predictions of growth. Whenever a community chooses to reapportion, it has current voter registration figures available. If it anticipates uneven municipal growth and wishes to apportion on the basis of it, it can always reapportion as often as current registration figures reflect such growth, but it cannot deliberately create election districts with an unduly small number of registered voters and thereby diminish the weight of the votes of those in other districts until such time as the expected growth occurs. Understandably a community may be reluctant to reapportion frequently. Within some reasonable period of time, perhaps ten years, the governmental interest in maintaining constancy of election districts to promote candidate identification and lessen voter confusion may itself justify deviations that occur after a valid apportionment plan has been originally promulgated. See
Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
Even if anticipated uneven growth could justify a total maximum deviation beyond 10%, there is no indication in this ease that the extent of deviation was held to the minimum necessary
I conclude that the total maximum deviation of approximately 15% requires justification, and that the alleged justification of allowing for population growth will not suffice in the absence of evidence or even a claim that the deviation below the norm in specific districts was held to the minimum necessary to allow for the projected growth in those districts. The apportionment plan for town council seats is therefore not consistent with the Equal Protection Clause because the weight of a person’s vote in those districts with a number of registered voters above the norm has been unwarrantedly diminished. 8
There remains the question of the timing and extent of an appropriate remedy. In
Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
the Court observed that in “awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should eon
The existing deviation may warrant some relief, but not the drastic alteration of an at-large election nor a prompt judicially-required reapportionment. While the latter technique could probably be accomplished rapidly, it might move some voters into new districts in which they would be denied the opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates, and there simply is not sufficient time to reschedule a new candidate endorsement and primary timetable.
Of course, the duly constituted officials of Stratford may choose to bring their apportionment plan into conformity with federal requirements prior to the November 4 election. The 1975 registration figures disclose that only a slight adjustment would be necessary. Only the 1st and 3rd districts deviate from the norm by more than 5%, and by coincidence these districts are adjacent to each other. It appears that a shift of approximately 100 registered voters, and perhaps less, from the 3rd District into the 1st District would bring the total maximum deviation below 10%. The map discloses a section of the 3rd District that appears to be easily moved into the 1st District. If primary challenges are occurring in either district, it may be preferable to leave the districts as is for the current election. Initial discretion as to the timing of a conforming change is left to the town authorities. If a change during the coming election encounters the objection of lack of local authorizing regulations, that can be remedied by application to the Court for an order approving a proposed change to carry out federal law requirements.
In view of all the circumstances, the Court concludes that an appropriate judicial remedy is to require preparation of a new plan of apportionment, consistent with the standards outlined in this opinion, by December 31, 1976. Initial responsibility for preparing such a plan should rest with the entity contemplated by Stratford’s charter, an election district revision commission designated by the town council in accordance with § 7.1.4. of the charter. Only upon failure of such a commission to adopt a conforming plan will this Court intercede more directly.
Accordingly, judgment will enter for the plaintiffs declaring that the present apportionment of councilmanic election districts in the town of Stratford is not
Notes
. Plaintiffs computed a larger deviation below the norm, but their computation erroneously divided the difference in population between the norm and the smallest district by the population of the smallest district, whereas percentage deviation from the norm is obtained by dividing the difference by the norm.
. Reapportionment cases have mentioned various measures for assessing the extent of deviation from an ideal plan in which each district has exactly the same population. Among the measures are the average deviation from the norm of all districts, the ratio of the largest district to the smallest district, the smallest percentage of the population that can elect a majority of the seats, the number of districts with a deviation greater than 3% or 5%, and the sum of the smallest and largest deviations from the norm. This last measure, referred to in the decisions as total maximum deviation, is the measure the Supreme Court appears to have used in deciding how much deviation is permissible.
See, e. g., Gaffney v. Cummings,
Use of the total maximum deviation carries with it a serious shortcoming. Combining the largest deviation above the norm with the largest below the norm permits a large deviation in one direction to be somewhat minimized by spreading the deviations in the other direction evenly among a large number of districts. For example, one district might be 19% above the norm and nineteen districts might by 1% below the norm. Such an apportionment causes a far greater degree of dilution of the weight of each person’s vote in the largest district than a plan under which the largest district is 10% above the norm and the smallest is 10% below the norm, yet the total maximum deviation for both plans is 20%.
If the constitutional vice is dilution of a person’s vote by placing too many people in his district, or excessively weighting a person’s vote by putting too few persons in his district, then the appropriate measure of unconstitutionality ought to be the largest single deviation above or below the norm. That statistic reflects the extent to which the votes of people in that district have been over or undervalued. Examination of the total maximum deviation does, however, serve to highlight not only how much the weight of a person’s vote in the largest district has been diminished compared to the proper weight that would result if all votes were weighted equally, but also how much the weight of that vote has been diminished compared to the weight of a person’s vote in the smallest district, thereby reflecting the greatest extent to which one person’s vote is weighted more than another person’s vote. In any event, the Supreme Court has indicated that total maximum deviation is the measure to be used, and this Court is obligated to use it.
. One possible objection to apportionment based on voter registration is the anomalous effect that occurs when registration increases in one district to a greater extent than in other districts. The extra voters who register are diminishing the weight of their votes and the votes of other registered voters in that district. There are two responses to this concern. First, this effect is simply the parallel of what occurs in jurisdictions apportioned on a population basis when one district experiences a more rapid population growth than other districts. Second, a marked increase in the rate of registration in one district compared to other districts may well make an apportionment based on
.
Kapral
approved use of registered voter figures on a finding (a) that population figures were out of date and unreliable because of recent growth, and (b) that registered voter figures correlated well with population figures, at. least in the year of the census. Neither party in this case has sought to demonstrate whether or not registered voter figures correlated uniformly with population in the election districts in 1970. Plaintiffs have sought to establish that the percentage of the town’s population that was registered was roughly tlve same in each year of the last four decennial censuses. That correlation tells nothing about the relation of registered voters to population among election districts within the town. In light of
Cummings,
I do not believe such a correlation need be shown. If population figures are as subject to criticism as the Court indicated, there would seem to be no virtue in demonstrating that voter registration figures correlate well with them.
See also Pate v. El Paso County, Texas,
. There is some indication in
White v. Regester, supra,
that total maximum deviation should not be used as the sole criterion of meeting constitutional standards.
White
observed that the total maximum deviation was 9.9%, that the average deviation was 1.-82%, that only 23 of the 90 districts deviated above or below the norm by more than 3%, and that only three districts deviated by more than 5%. “These deviations,” said the Court, did not establish a
prima facie
case of discrimination.
If this group of deviations are computed for the registered voter figures for Stratford, the 1973 figures disclose a maximum total deviation of 14.3%, an average deviation of 4.68%, 9 of 10 districts with deviations in excess of 3%, and 4 of 10 districts with deviations in excess of 5%. The 1975 figures disclose a maximum total deviation of 15.7%, an average deviation of 3.69%, 5 of 10 districts with deviations greater than 3%, and 2 of 10 districts with deviations greater than 5%. On balance, these alternative measures of deviation are not so
. There does not appear to be any reason to permit a greater total maximum deviation to stand without justification in this case than the 10% target figure implied by the Supreme Court as the outer limit when apportionment is based on population. If anything, the permissible deviation when apportionment is based on voter registration might well be smaller, since the data is generally more current and more accurate than population figures, and it was the infirmities in population data that persuaded the Court to permit deviations up to 10% without justification.
. The affidavit from a member of the commission asserts that the 1st, 2nd, 8th, and 9th districts are the growth districts. If the 1973 voter registration figures are examined, they disclose that the 1st, 8th, and 9th districts are each between 7% and 8% below the norm, while the 2nd district is only .03% below the norm. If the 1975 figures are used, the 1st district is below the norm by 8%, the 2nd district by 5%, the 9th district by 2%, and the 8th district is above the norm. There is no indication or even a claim that the commission considered population projections that would justify these disparate degrees of deviation below the norm.
. The ten election districts from which each of the district councilmen are elected also serve as the electoral base for election to the Planning & Zoning Commission and the Board of Zoning Appeals. These bodies consist of five members, one elected from each of five Planning Districts. The Charter provides that Planning District I shall consist of the First and Second Councilmanie voting districts, Planning District II shall consist of the Third and Fourth Councilmanic voting districts and so on. Stratford Town Charter, §§ 4.2.1, 4.3.1. In this suit lilaintiffs also challenge the apportionment of seats on the Planning & Zoning Commission and the Board of Zoning Appeals.
The 1970 census figures disclose that the largest Planning District is 15.5% above the norm, and the smallest is 19.9% below the norm, producing a total maximum deviation of 35.4%, which is excessive if population is the only permissible basis. If registered voters are used, the 1973 figures disclose that the largest Planning District is 5.3% above the norm, and the smallest is 4.3% below the norm. With 1975 figures, the comparable results are 4.6% and 6.0%. The total maximum deviation is 9.6% using 1973 figures and 10.6% using 1975 figures. The closeness of these figures to 10% precludes a finding that the apportionment of seats on either the Planning & Zoning Commission or the Zoning Board of Appeals violates constitutional standards. Cf. White v. Regester, supra.
