10 Ct. Cl. 276 | Ct. Cl. | 1874
delivered the opinion of the court:
• The claimant was employed by the defendants’ agents as fireman and laborer, at the Naval Academy at Annapolis, at wages of $2.50 per day, with the understanding that between October and June his time of working was to be twelve .hours each cal
Upon the passage of that act the petitioner, with other laborers at the Academy, applied to the defendants’ agents to know what was to be done with reference to it, and was present wlen it was decided by the superintendent of the Academy that ;he wages would not be increased, and that if any of the men would not work the full hours he would put others in their piases. The claimant thereupon returned to his work and continued so employed until he was discharged, October 15,1872, a period o" more than fifty-one months, laboring each calendar day betweei October and June twelve hours, and at the end of each and ever month, during the whole time, he accepted payment for hi month’s work at the original contract price, without protest o. objection. This acquiescence of the claimant in the terms an nounced by the superintendent as those upon which alone he could continue in employment, his returning to his work and continuing as before, and his accepting $2,50 a day for each calendar day, in monthly payments, for more than four years afterwards, constituted, in our opinion, a renewal of the original contract by which he agreed to' receive that rate of pay for twelve hours’ work.
The question then arises, What is the effect of that act upon a special contract, made’ since its passage, wherein a laborer contracts to work for the United States twelve hours each cal-’ endar day, at a rate agreed upon, and accepts payment each month while in service at the contract rate ? We are of opinion that the act has no application to such a case. It does not regulate the compensation to be paid to employés, but leaves that to be determined by the contract of the parties or the rules of law; nor does it place laborers and mechanics under any disability to make contracts, nor prohibit them from working more than eight hours each calendar day, nor in any way prevent them from waiving its intended beneficial provisions. The claimant is entitled to pay for his labor. If he has entered into a special contract, he is bound by the whole of it, and can
The claimant was either employed under a special contract, in which case the contract controls the rate of his pay, and he has been fully paid in accordance with its terms, as we have shown, or he was at work upon an implied contract, in which case he would be entitled to what his services were worth, and the facts show that they were worth no more than he has received. It appears that firemen employed in Annapolis in similar work, laboring twelve hours a day, were paid only $2 a day, while the claimant was receiving $2.50 for like work and the same hours of labor. No evidence is produced that his services were worth more, or that the current rate of pay to others for similar work was greater. Therefore upon neither the special contract nor a quantum meruit is the petitioner entitled to recover.
But the claimant seeks to recover extra compensation for each day that he worked twelve hours between June 25,1868, and May 19, 1869, under the provision of the Act May 18, 1872, directing the proper accounting officers, in the settlement of all accounts for the services of laborers-, workmen, and mechanics, between those dates, to settle and pay the same without reduction on account of reduction of hours of labor by the Eight-hour Lato, “when it shall he made to appear that such was the sole cause of the reduction of wages.” (Rev. Stat. § 3689, p. 732.)
The claimant’s wages and hours of labor remained the same after as before the passage of the Eight-hour Law. The accounting officers were made the judges of the fact and the cause of the reduction of wages, when claimed, and were authorized to settle accounts under that act. To them he submitted his
Whatever benefits the Right-hour Lato might have conferred upon the claimant while employed at the Naval Academy, he neglected to avail himself of, and has waived and lost by his own acts, and cannot recover in this action.
The claimant’s petition is dismissed.
The Chief-Justice was not present when this case was submitted, and took no part in the decision.