OPINION
The conviction is for robbery with a firearm; the punishment, sixty years.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.
James T. Clark testified that on April 1, 1968, appellant, armed with a pistol, еntered his supermarket in Dallas and demanded his money. All of the cash registers were emptied and appellant put the currency in' a bag and after determining that the safe contained only silver, he fled.
Cuba Sheehan, an employee of the stоre, identified the appellant as the robber.
Appellant testified that he was in Coppell, Texas, on the day in question аnd that he did not commit the robbery.
He was impeached by his priоr criminal record which included convictions for desertion at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1948; for attempted larceny in Oklahoma in 1949; for grand larceny in Arizona in 1954; for violating the Dyer Act in Fort Worth in 1954; fоr felony theft in Dallas in 1956; for burglary in California in 1958; for two separate offenses of burglary in Dallas in 1960; for burglary in Odessa in 1961. It was shown that he was released from the penitentiary on March 1, 1968, and was convicted for theft of property under the value of $50.00 for an offense which occurred on March 3, 1968, and was assessed punishment оf 150 days in the county jail.
In his first ground of error the appellant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant motions by both аppellant and his counsel to permit said counsel to withdrаw from the case. The record reflects that appеllant was indigent and that on September 18, 1968, the court appointed Honorable Jon Franks to represent him. The record furthеr shows that the case was passed some six times “generally” аnd three times at the request of the appellant. The cаse was tried on April 7, 1969.
On March 14, 1969, counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating as a reason therefor that appellant was not sаtisfied with counsel and that they were unable to cooperate and that they did not see eye to eye.
The contеntion here is that appellant did not agree with and was dissatisfiеd with his court-appointed counsel. In Jackson v. United States,
“If thе defendant does not agree with his counsel, he has a right to рresent his own contentions; but the sovereign is under no duty to searсh for counsel until it finds one who will agree with him.”
*921 The record refleсts nothing prejudicial against the appellant except the evidence against him.
No abuse of discretion has beеn shown. The first ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, thе appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel failed to subpoena two witnesses who, apрellant contends, could have testified favorably to his defеnse of alibi. It is shown, by appellant’s own testimony, that appеllant did not know where the witnesses were at the time of trial.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is not shown.
The Court fails to find in the record any indication that “the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation.” Wilson v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.