Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of the theft by taking of four motor vehicles. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on the verdict.
1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict shows the following: The jury was authorized to believe the testimony of appellant’s co-defendant that it was he, appellant, and another who planned and executed a theft of four tractor trailers from the truck leasing company where the co-defendant was employed. He also testified that they drove the stolen trucks to a field belonging to appellant from which location appellant disposed of them. According to the co-defendant, appellant paid him $3,000 for his part in the theft.
“Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act will be sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict. [Cits.]”
Sparks v. State,
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. The indictment charged appellant with the theft of “four International Harvester Model 9670 tractor trucks, all motor vehicles and the property of Rollins Leasing Corporation d/b/a Rollins Truck Leasing. . . .” According to appellant, the lack of specification as to the year and the license and serial numbers renders the description of the four trucks insufficient.
“ ‘In an indictment for larceny the description of the stolen property should be simply such as, in connection with the other allegations, will affirmatively show the accused to be guilty, will reasonably inform him of the transaction charged, and will put him in a position to make the needful preparations for his defense. [Cits.]’ [Cit.]”
State v. Traylor,
3. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress tape recorded evidence. The evidence was obtained when, at the instigation of the GBI, the co-defendant tape recorded a conversation between himself and appellant. Citing OCGA § 16-11-66, appellant asserts that, because the conversation itself did *553 not constitute the commission of a crime and was not directly in furtherance of a crime, the recording should have been suppressed.
The statutory proscriptions of OCGA § 16-11-66 apply only to third parties who are not participants in the recorded conversation.
Mitchell v. State,
4. Appellant further asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to read transcripts of the recorded conversation. A proper foundation having been laid, the transcripts were not erroneously furnished to the jury.
Brooks v. State,
5. The jury was permitted to listen to a tape recording of a telephone call made by appellant to a GBI agent. Appellant contends that this was error.
Appellant first urges that there was a violation of OCGA § 17-7-210 (a), insofar as the State failed to provide him, within ten days of trial, a written summary of the statements that he made in the recorded conversation. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-210 (a), appellant was entitled to receive only summaries of those statements that he made while in police custody. Appellant was not in custody but was free on bond when he made the telephone call to the GBI agent. See generally
McCoy v. State,
Appellant also asserts that the admission of the recording was error because a proper foundation was not laid for its introduction. It does appear that the foundation was incomplete. The State made no showing that the mechanical transcription device was capable of taking testimony or that the operator of the device was competent to operate it. See
Brooks v. State,
supra at 734. However, it also appears that the recorded conversation was not inculpatory. Appellant’s defense was that he had first become aware of the stolen trucks when his co-defendant bragged to him that he had stolen four trucks and had parked them in an isolated field belonging to appellant. Appellant asserted that he verified that the trucks were on his property and ordered his co-defendant to remove them. The taped conversation with the GBI agent was to the effect that appellant did not know if he could now learn who had the trucks or where they were, but that if he could locate them he would bring them to the GBI or notify the GBI of their location. These statements were not inculpatory, but were entirely consistent with appellant’s defense. Therefore, the admission of the taped conversation without a proper foundation was harmless er
*554
ror at most.
Johnson v. State,
6. The trial court did not err in refusing to give two of appellant’s requested charges. Neither charge was supported by the evidence.
Jones v. State,
7. At the conclusion of the charge, appellant was afforded an opportunity to object. After stating several objections, appellant specifically reserved his right to make further exceptions. See
White v. State,
Although there was perhaps sufficient evidence to authorize a charge on the
principle
of recent possession, the charge that was actually given in the instant case was potentially “misleading and confusing to the jury” for another reason. The charge is an erroneously incomplete statement of the law and is inappropriate for use as a jury instruction. For purposes of
appellate
review, the following is the applicable rule: “ ‘[Rjecent possession of stolen goods will not automatically support a guilty verdict for theft or burglary under the
Jackson v. Virginia
standard in every case. Instead, recent possession is to be viewed as probative evidence of the crime, [cit.], and reviewed along with the other evidence in the case to determine whether any rational juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Cit.]”
Bankston v. State,
The instant charge on recent unexplained possession was not couched in terms of a permissible inference, but employed seemingly mandatory language. Evidence of recent unexplained possession of stolen property will authorize but not require the trior of fact to infer guilt and an appellate court may find it sufficient in itself to support a conviction for the crime of theft by taking. Such evidence is sufficient in itself to support a conviction only if the jury has found “that the presumed fact (the defendant committed the crime) follows from the proved facts (proof of a burglary [or a theft] and recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods by the defendant) beyond a rea *555 sonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Williamson v. State, supra at 58. Although there was more evidence of appellant’s guilt than recent unexplained possession, we cannot say, with any degree of certainty, that the erroneous instruction was harmless. Under the charge, the jury might have totally disbelieved any other evidence of appellant’s guilt but nonetheless concluded that a verdict of guilty was required simply because the State adduced evidence of appellant’s recent unexplained possession.
The right to except to the charge having been preserved in the trial court and the erroneous charge having been enumerated on appeal, the only question for resolution is the effect of counsel’s failure to argue in this court the more compelling reason why the instruction is a “misleading and confusing” jury charge. Had appellant’s counsel filed an
Anders
motion, appellant would be entitled to a new trial as the result of this constitutionally infirm charge. When an
Anders
motion is filed, we conscientiously examine “the record and transcript to determine independently if there are any meritorious errors of law.”
Jackson v. State,
8. Appellant’s remaining enumerations of error are not supported by meaningful argument or citation of authority. Accordingly, they are deemed abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 15 (c) (2);
Northern Assur. Co. v. Roll,
Judgment reversed.