Thе plaintiff, Timothy P. Martin, is a Texas prisoner in administrative segregation. In his section 1983 suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), the Texas Board of Corrections, and TDCJ Director Wayne Scott, Martin challenges the conditions of his administrative segregation on due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment grounds. 1 The magistrate reviewing Martin’s сomplaint determined that it was frivolous and dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
On appeal, Martin claims that section 1915A does not аpply to prisoners who are not suing in forma pauperis (IFP). In addition, Martin asserts that his complaint is not frivolous and thаt the magistrate abused her discretion by denying his motion to amend his complaint. We affirm.
Martin first contends that section 1915A does not apply to prisoners who are not proceeding IFP. The plain language of this section, however, indicates that it applies to any suit by a prisoner against certain government officials or entities regardlеss of whether that prisoner is or is not proceeding IFP. In pertinent part, section 1915A provides:
(a) Screening. — The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after doсketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a government entity or officer оr employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. — On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the сomplaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
2
Thus, as а suit by a prisoner against state agencies and officers, Martin’s complaint is clearly within the ambit of section 1915A аnd we join the Sixth and Tenth Circuits in holding that this section applies even when a prisoner has paid the required filing fee.
See, e.g., Ricks v. Mackey,
No. 97-3181,
We now turn to the question of whether Martin’s complaint was frivolous. In his complaint, Martin contends that the additional restrictions imposed on those in administrative sеgregation violate his due process and equal protection rights and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We review the magistrate’s determination that Martin’s complaint is frivolous for an abuse of discretion.
Siglar v. Hightower,
Martin’s due process claim is frivolous. In
Pichardo v. Kinker,
Martin’s equal protection claim is also frivolous. Significantly, Martin is not claiming that he is treated differеntly than others in his level of administrative segregation. Rather, he claims that he is treated differently than inmates in other lеvels of administrative segregation. The comparison made by Martin dooms his equal protection claim at thе outset, for he does not take the position, which would likely be frivolous, that prisoners in different levels of administrative segregation are similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis. Consequently, his comрlaint fails to implicate the Equal Protection Clause.
Like the other allegations in his complaint, Martin’s claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment is frivolous. The conditions complained of by Martin, including his contention thаt he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when he became ill after being fed Vita-Pro—a soy-based meat substitutе—simply do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.
See Helling v. McKinney,
Finally, Martin contends that the magistrate abused her discretion when denying his motion to amend his complaint. This motion, however, was filed after the magistrate had dismissed Martin’s complaint and entered final judgment. Accordingly, the magistrate lackеd the power to grant this request and Martin could only move for re
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Martin’s complaint as frivolous.
Notes
. Specifically, Martin contends that his constitu•tional rights have been violated becausе the prison has limited his recreation and visitation time, restricted his ability to possess certain personal property, required him to wear a jumpsuit, denied him the right to buy certain commissary items, denied him dessert with his meals, required him to be handcuffed every time he left his cell, and fed him Vita-Pro.
. Martin also appears to argue that section 1915A unconstitutiоnally restricts his access to the federal courts. A cursory review of this provision, however, reveals that it doеs not restrict a prisoner’s access to the federal courts. Instead, section 1915A merely institutes certain scrеening procedures once a complaint is received by a district court. In this regard, section 1915A is analogоus to the version of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) that was in effect before Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. in its prior form, section 1915(d) provided that in an IFP case, a court “may dismiss the case if ... [the court is] satisfied that the action is frivolous оr malicious.” The function of section 1915A is also quite similar to the roles played by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 12(b)(6). Thus, because these related screening devices are, or were, of unquestionable constitutionality, Martin's contention that section 1915A is unconstitutional is without merit.