435 Pa. 391 | Pa. | 1969
Opinion by
Appellee, Edward J. Martin, brought suit against the Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company (Suburban) for damages arising out of injuries suffered when two of Suburban’s trolleys collided on April 20, 1966. The jury returned a verdict for Martin in the amount of $12,141.50, which it broke down, although not requested to do so, into $141.50 for specials, $2,000.00 for pain and suffering, and $10,000.00 for impaired earning capacity. Post-trial motions were denied by the court below and judgment entered on the verdict.
Suburban on this appeal raises four points. Suburban complains, first, that the court erred in refusing Suburban’s motion to withdraw a juror when, in his rebuttal speech to the jury, plaintiff’s counsel referred to Suburban as a big company with lots of money. While such a comment was certainly improper, it would appear from the context not to have been a deliberate attempt to appeal to the sympathy of the jury. Suburban had indicated that Martin was remiss
This issue is governed by the general rule discussed in McCune v. Learner, 383 Pa. 434, 437, 119 A. 2d 89 (1956), where we stated: “We have repeatedly held that the matter of withdrawing a juror because of the line of argument pursued by counsel in addressing a jury or at any stage of the proceeding is subject largely to the discretion of the trial court: Richman v. Watkins, 376 Pa. 510, 521, 103 A. 2d 688; Bourd et al. v. Berman, 359 Pa. 183, 58 A 2d 442; Libengood et al. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 358 Pa. 7, 11, 55 A. 2d 756. Whether a court abuses its discretion in refusing to withdraw a juror because of improper remarks of counsel must be determined by the circumstances under which the statement was made and by the precautions taken by the court and counsel to prevent its having a prejudicial effect: Clark v. Essex Wire Corporation, 361 Pa. 60, 63 A. 2d 35; Wilhelm v. Uttenweiler, 271 Pa. 451, 112 A. 94.”
In light of this standard, we cannot say that the court below erred in refusing to withdraw a juror.
Suburban next argues that appellee failed to present sufficient evidence to support a claim for loss of darning capacity. Intermingled with this argument is one that the $10,000.00 awarded for this claim resulted from the-undue emphasis placed upon such a
Suburban’s third argument is that the appellee’s medical evidence was so contradictory that it cannot support the verdict. Actually, despite vigorous cross-examination, appellee’s witness, Dr. Connor, remained firm in his view that the earlier injury suffered by appellee was merely a strain and that the herniated disc did not arise until the accident on April 20, 1966. The opinion below is particularly helpful on this point.
Finally, Suburban claims that the charge on negligence was so conflicting and contradictory that a new trial is necessary. It points out that in one place the court informed the jury that the appellee had the
The judgment is affirmed.