JOHN MARTIN, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; WILLIAM RHODES, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; EUGENIA MOTE, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; THOMAS MEISSGEIER, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; HUGH D. MATTHEWS, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; BETTY D. SCYPHERS, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; SARAH AKTEPY, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; FRANTZ M. JEAN, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee; MARVIN MYERS, Claimant-Appellant v. PETER O‘ROURKE, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent-Appellee
2017-1747, 2017-1761, 2017-1768, 2017-1771, 2017-1772, 2017-1774, 2017-1780, 2017-1862, 2017-1967
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Decided: June 7, 2018
Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL and MOORE, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.
Appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Nos. 16-2493, 16-2495, 16-2500, 16-2502, 16-2503, 16-2504, 16-2506, 16-2507, 16-2511, Judge William S. Greenberg.
JOHN AUBREY CHANDLER, King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, GA, argued for claimants-appellants. Also represented by ELIZABETH VRANICAR TANIS; CHRISTOPHER ROBERT HEALY, Washington, DC; THOMAS G. HENTOFF, LIAM JAMES MONTGOMERY, STEPHEN RABER, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC.
ALEXANDER ORLANDO CANIZARES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, JONATHAN KRISCH, Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
The nine individual appellants in this consolidated appeal are veterans or spouses of veterans who have appealed the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (“VA“) denial of their claims for service-connected disability benefits. Based on delays that have occurred in each of their cases, Appellants petitioned for writs of mandamus, asking the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court“) for relief. The Veterans Court denied the petitions. Although we do not opine as to whether we agree with the Veterans Court‘s conclusion in each case, we hold that the Veterans Court did not apply the proper standard for evаluating mandamus petitions based on unreasonable delay. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the
I
Veterans are entitled to compensation “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service, during a period of war.”
A veteran begins the process of seeking bеnefits by filing a claim with a VA regional office. If the veteran receives an unfavorable “rating decision” from the regional office (e.g., a denial of a claim for disability benefits), he or she begins the appeal process by filing a Notice of Disagreement. See
Once the veteran files a Form 9, the VA completes a Certification of Appeal. See
After these often-significant periods of delay, the BVA will issue its deсision. Overall, the average time from the filing of
The BVA‘s decision may then be appealed to the Veterans Court,
II
Appellants, along with eight other veterans, petitioned the Veterans Court to issue writs of mandamus in response to alleged unreasonable delays in each of their cases.3 Appellants’ mandamus petitions are substantially identical. Each broadly discusses the delays experienced by veterans awaiting resolution of their disability benefits claims with the VA. For example, the petitions allege that “[a] veteran whose disability benefits are denied by the VA wait[s], on average, 1448 days from the time the VA denies the veteran‘s request for benefits to the time that the [BVA] rules on the veteran‘s appeal.” E.g., J.A. 101. Appellants argue that this аpproximately four-year delay violates due process. Id. Each mandamus petition only briefly addresses the facts of the individual petitioner‘s case. See, e.g., J.A. 104–05.4
The Veterans Court entered final judgments denying Appellants’ petitions between January and March 2017, and each Appellant timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
III
This court‘s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited. We “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.”
Appellants raise two arguments on appeal: first, that the Veterans Court should have applied a different legal standard to analyze their mandamus petitions based on unreasonable delay; and second, that the Veterans Court improperly denied their due process claims. Based on these arguments, Appellants ask this court to enter an order finding the delays suffered by Appellants unconstitutional and directing the Secretary to eliminate unreasonable delay. Alternatively, Appellants ask us to remand these cases with instructions to apply a different legal standard when analyzing unreasonable delay.
A
Appellants’ claims of unreasonable delay arise by way of mandamus petitions filed in each of their individual cases. Under the All Writs Act, “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
With respect to mandamus petitions alleging unreasonable delay, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained that “[b]ecause the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the merits may be defeated by an agency that fails to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction.” Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (”TRAC“), 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603 (1966) (noting that the All Writs Act “extends to the potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected“). Mandamus is thus an appropriate procedural vehicle to address claims of unreasonable delay in this context.5
The statute that outlines the Veterans Court‘s scope of review,
(a) In any action brought under this chapter, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, to the extent necessary to its decision and when presented, shall—
. . .
(2) compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . . .
Section 7261 provides the standards the Veterans Court must use when reviewing actions of the Secretary. In this case, Appellants allege that the Secretary has unreasonably
To answer this question, the Veterans Court employs the standard outlined in Costanza v. West, 12 Vet. App. 133 (1999) (per curiam). Appellants contend, however, that the Veterans Court should instead use the standard outlined by the D.C. Circuit in TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79–80. As explained below, we agree with Appellants that TRAC provides a more appropriate framework for analyzing claims of unreasonable delay.
1
Since 1999, the Veterans Court has applied the Costanza standard to evaluate mandamus petitions based on alleged unreasonable delay. There is little to be said about this standard‘s origin. In a shоrt, per curiam opinion, the Veterans Court held that a mandamus petitioner had not satisfied the second mandamus requirement (a clear and indisputable right to the writ) because “[h]e had not demonstrated that the delay he complains of is so extraordinary, given the demands and resources of the Secretary, that the delay amounts to an arbitrary refusal to act, and not the product of a burdened system.” Costanza, 12 Vet. App. at 134. Later cases applied this same standard, and the en banc Veterans Court in Rib-audo v. Nicholson seemed to approve of the standard. See 20 Vet. App. 552, 555 (2007) (en banc) (“When delay is alleged as the basis for a petition, this Court has held that a clear and indisputable right to the writ does not exist unless the petitioner demonstrates that the alleged delay is so extraordinary, given the demands on and resources of the Secretary, that it is equivalent to an arbitrary refusal by the Secretary to act.“).
Although this court in a handful of non-precedential decisions has acknowledged the Veterans Court‘s use of the Costanza standard, we have yet to adopt the standard or endorse its use in a precedential opinion. See, e.g., Philippeaux v. Shulkin, 702 F. App‘x 977, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2017); McChesky v. McDonald, 635 F. App‘x 882, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Davis v. McDonald, 593 F. App‘x 992, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Jackson v. Shinseki, 338 F. App‘x 898, 901–02 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2
Before the Veterans Court‘s decision in Costanza, some circuits had been using the standard developed by the D.C. Circuit to analyze mandamus petitions based on alleged unreasonable delay by an agency. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79-81; Indep. Min. Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997); Towns of Wellesley, Concord & Norwood, Mass. v. FERC, 829 F.2d 275, 277 (1st Cir. 1987). In TRAC, the D.C. Circuit explained that the overarching inquiry in analyzing a claim of unreasonable delay is “whether the agency‘s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79. The D.C. Circuit pointed to six factors as relevant to this inquiry: (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason“; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it exрects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by
Other circuit courts have adopted the TRAC standard to evaluate mandamus petitions based on alleged unreasonable delay. In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When deciding whether to grant a mandamus petition on the grounds of unreasonable delay, this court applies the six factor balancing test set out by the D.C. Circuit in TRAC.“); Towns of Wellesley, Concord & Norwood, Mass., 829 F.2d at 277. And, even the Veterans Court in its early days considered some of the TRAC factors when evaluating a mandamus petition based on unreasonable delay. See Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3, 9-11 (1990).
3
With these two proposed frameworks in mind, we turn to the question before us—namely, the proper standard for evaluating claims of unreasonable delay in the VA‘s adjudication of veterans’ benefits.
In Appellants’ view, the Costanza standard is insurmountable, as it focuses solely on the VA‘s interests at the expense of the veterans’ interests. Further, Appellants contend that by requiring a “refusal” to act, the Costanza standard effectively requires a petitioner to demonstrate an affirmative or intentional refusal to act by the VA. Meanwhile, Appellants assure us, the TRAC standard provides a more balanced approach because it requires consideration of the veterans’ interests and does not require a showing of intent. We agree. As explained below, the six TRAC factors serve as a useful starting point for the Veterans Court to analyze mandamus petitions based on unreasonable delay in the VA‘s processing of benefits claims and appeals.
The first TRAC factor—that “the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a ‘rule of reason,‘” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80—is considered to be the most important factor in some circuits. In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d at 786 (“The most important is the first factor, the ‘rule of reason,’ though it, like the others, is not itself determinative.“). The second TRAC factor, of course, rеlates to the first factor, as “a timetable or other indication of the speed with which [Congress] expects the agency to proceed” may “supply content” for the rule of reason. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.
Although no congressional timetable for handling these benefits claims currently exists, other considerations can help form a “rule of reason” as to an appropriate timeline. The “rule of reason” analysis must, of course, look at the particular agency action for which unreasonable delay is alleged. It is reasonable that more complex and substantive agency actions
With these considerations in mind, we see no reason to articulate a hard and fast rule with respect to the point in time at which a delay becomes unreasonable. Because, among other factors, reasonableness depends on the particular agency action that is delayed, a two-year delay may be unreasonable in one case, and it may not be in another. For example, the delay may be the result of the VA‘s duty to assist the veteran or a delay in obtaining certain historical records.9 Alternatively, the delay may be the result of a failure to complete clerical or ministerial tasks for the veteran. This “rule of reason” inquiry is best left to the discretion of the Veterans Cоurt.10
The third and fifth TRAC factors address what seems to be Appellants’ primary concern—namely, that Costanza leaves no room for the Veterans Court to consider the interests of each veteran. Under the third factor, the court considers that “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Veterans’ disability claims always involve human health and welfare.
Under the fifth factor, the court considers the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay. As other courts have noted, these two TRAC factors often overlap. In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d at 787 (referring back to the threat to human welfare and concluding that “children exposed to lead poisoning due to the failure of EPA to act are severely prejudiced by EPA‘s delay, and the fifth factor
The fifth factor incorporates an analysis of the effect of a delay on a particular veteran. For example, the Veterans Court may find that it more strongly favors a finding of unreasonable delay where it is evident that a particular veteran is wholly dependent on the requested disability benefits. As Appellants point out, many veterans depend on these disability benefits for basic necessities, such as food, clothing, housing, and medical care. At the same time, however, the Veterans Court may find this factor does not weigh heavily toward a finding of unreasonable delay where the veteran has a sustainable source of income outside of the VA benefits system.
The fourth TRAC factor requires consideration of the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority. This factor addresses the government‘s primary praise of the Costanza test—that the Veterans Court should be able to take account of the practical realities of the burdened veterans’ benefits system. See Appellee‘s Br. 27. We agree with the government that this is a consideration to include in the unreasonable delay analysis, and we think the TRAC standard sufficiently encompasses this concern.
This fourth factor allows the Veterans Court to consider the impact granting mandamus in a particular appeal may have on other agency activities. In other words, the VA may consider as one aspect of the overall TRAC analysis the fact that the VA has fixed resources, and that the agency is in a better position than the courts to evaluate how to use those limited resources. See In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 76 (“In short, we have no basis for reordering agency priorities. The agency is in a unique—and authoritative—position to view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate its resources in the optimal way. Such budget flexibility as Congress has allowed the agency is not for us to hijack.“); cf. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“[A]n agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.“); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (“The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.“). The VA is necessarily constrained by the resources Congress appropriates. While forcing the VA to focus such limited resources on addressing delays in certain appeals will inure to the benefit of some veterans, such efforts may work a detriment to other veterans who are also relying on the VA for various types of assistance.
This inquiry may also include the impact оn other applicants who have filed claims for benefits. For example, granting a mandamus petition may simply shift a finite number of resources from one pending claim to another. Other circuits have expressed similar concerns in other agency contexts. See, e.g., In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 75 (“Assuming constant resources for the generic drug [approval] program, a judicial order putting [the mandamus petitioner] at the head of the queue simply moves all others back one space and produces no net gain.“).
Finally, the sixth TRAC factor goes directly to a primary dispute regarding the Costanza standard. In Appellants’ view, Costanza requires a mandamus petitioner to show an intentional or affirmative refusal to act by the VA. The government disagrees that Costanza requires actual
It is unclear whether the Veterans Court has required a showing of intentional refusal to act when applying Costanza. Regardless, in our view, the sixth TRAC factor gives this type of inquiry its due. Undеr this factor, the Veterans Court need not find “any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude” to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. A writ may be appropriate under the TRAC analysis even where there is no evidence of bad faith. See In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d at 787 (“Even assuming that EPA has numerous competing priorities under the fourth factor and has acted in good faith under the sixth factor, the clear balance of the TRAC factors favors issuance of the writ.“). And certainly, in the unlikely event that an individual could show that the VA “singled [the individual] out for mistreatment,” such evidence would tend to favor issuance of the writ. In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d at 75.
Accordingly, today we adopt the TRAC standard as the appropriate standard for the Veterans Court to use in evaluating mandamus petitions based on alleged unreasonable delay. And, “[t]o the extent [our] prior non-precedential rulings diverge from our holding today, any perceived conflict is superseded by today‘s precedential authority.” Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
B
Appellants also contend that, under the factors outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the delays they have experienced violate procedural due process.
Appellants’ mandamus petitions broadly ask the Veterans Court to “declare that the VA‘s conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” and to “impose a remedy sufficient to address these violations of [Appellants‘] constitutional rights.” E.g., J.A. 102. The petitions also ask the Veterans Court “to require [the VA] to process promptly the individual claim embodied in this petition, and to declare that the delays regarding the approximately 146,000 pending appeals violate the veterans’ due process rights.” E.g., J.A. 104 ¶ 11. Finally, the petitions conclude by asking for an order “hold[ing] unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution any statute, regulation or practice that interferes with prompt and speedy appeals.” E.g., J.A. 117. In sum, Appellants’ petitions ask the Veterаns Court to broadly declare that the entire process is unconstitutional. Cf. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (noting that a claim under
Given our holding that the Veterans Court should have conducted a more searching inquiry in evaluating Appellants’ mandamus petitions, the Veterans Court will have the opportunity to determine, under the TRAC standard, whether the delay in each individual case was unreasonable. As the D.C. Circuit has explained,
a claim that a plaintiff has been denied due process because of delayed agency action is essentially no different than an unreasonable delay claim; indeed, if there is any difference at all, it is that an unreasonable delay claim would likely be triggered prior to a delay becoming so prolonged that it qualifies as a constitutional deprivаtion of property.
Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2010). If the Veterans Court, employing the TRAC analysis,
IV
Although this opinion will require remanding certain cases for consideration under the TRAC standard, we note some individual cases have become moot. In Ms. Aktepy‘s
case, the BVA recently issued its decision, making her appeal moot. As to Ms. Scyphers, while it appears that the original appellate proceedings regarding her Notice of Disagreement filed in October 2014 concluded with a grant of benefits in her favor, she has now filed a Notice of Disagreement with respect to the effective date of that award of benefits. ECF No. 82-1 at 4; see also ECF No. 69-1 at 3. This second Notice of Disagreement was filed in November 2017; the VA issued the SOC in January 2018; аnd Ms. Scyphers filed her Form 9 in April 2018. ECF No. 82-1 at 4. Because the delays on which her original mandamus petition was based have essentially been reset, we find her appeal moot. With respect to her recently filed appeal, Ms. Scyphers remains free to, in the future, file a mandamus petition based on delay, should the need arise. Finally, and regretfully, the parties have informed us that Mr. Myers passed away during the course of this appeal, and the parties agree that his appeal is now moot.
V
For the reasons above, we hold that the Veterans Court should look to the TRAC factors as guidance when evaluating mandamus petitions based on unreasonable delay in the VA‘s adjudication of benefits claims. We vacate and remand the appeals of Mr. Martin, Mr. Jean, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Meissgeier, Ms. Mote, and Mr. Rhodes for reconsideration under the TRAC standard.11 We dismiss the appeals of Mr. Myers, Ms. Scyphers, and Ms. Aktepy as moot.
VACATED-IN-PART, REMANDED-IN-PART, AND DISMISSED-IN-PART
COSTS
Costs to Appellants.
MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I join the majority opinion in full, but write separately because more needs to be said and done. In the cases before us today, we once again find ourselves faced with the fundamentally flawed program that is the veterans’ disability benefits system. Established with the intent of serving those who have served their country, the veterans’ disability benefits system is meant to support veterans by providing what are often life-sustaining funds. Instead, many veterans find themselves trapped for years in a bureaucratic labyrinth, plagued by delays and inaction.
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs’ own figures illustrate the wide scope of the problem. In a 2017 report, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board“) stated that after the receipt of a notice of disagreement, it takes the Vеterans Benefits Administration (“VBA“) an average of 500 days to prepare a statement of the case. The veteran then has 60 days to file a substantive appeal but on average only takes 37 days. Once the appeal is received, it takes the VBA an average of 773 days to certify the appeal. This is a ministerial process that involves checking that the file is correct and complete and completing a
Of course, certification of an appeal only moves a veteran‘s case out of the hands of the VBA and into the hands of the Board where the case enters a new bureaucratic morass. Once the appeal has been certified (the two-page form which takes the VA on average 773 days to complete), a veteran must wait, on average, another 321 days for the appeal to be docketed by the Board.1 Even after being asked repeatedly at oral argument to explain how docketing could possibly take so long, in post-argument letters to the court, the government could not explain why the average veteran spends more than ten months waiting for his appeal to be “docketed” which the government explains is distinct from the certification and hearing stages. At our appellate court, cases take, at most, 30 minutes to docket. But, the ministerial acts of certifying the appeal (2 page sheet attached) and docketing the appeal take the VA on average 1,094 days.
In total the appeals process takes over five and a half years on average from the time a notice of disagreement is filed until the Board issues a decision, which often sets the stage for more proceedings on remand. In short, even when veterans win on appeal, they have lost years of their lives living in constant uncertainty, possibly in need of daily necessities such as food and shelter, deprived of the very funds to which they are later found to have been entitled.
The delays faced by veterans affect not just them, but their families and friends as well. Even if a veteran is fully entitled to benefits, should he die during the pendency of the resolution (or appeal) of his disability benefits claim, the veteran and his family lose the right to the deserved benefits unless the veteran has a spouse, minor children, or dependent parents. See Youngman v. Shinseki, 699 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Adult children and extended families, who have provided years of financial or other support to the veteran because he was not receiving his disability benefits, cannot recover the benefits the veteran was entitled to during that time. In the cases before us today, three of the veterаns died while their cases were pending before the VA or this court.
While it is understandable that preparing the statement of the case, and other substantive steps in the process, may take significant amounts of time, it is unconscionable
Under separation of powers, we do not have the authority to require the Secretary to take specific actions to fix these many problems across all veterans’ casеs—an action desperately needed. Instead, we are constrained to the facts of the particular cases in front of us. However, the proceedings in these cases illustrate the fundamental problems with the system—problems that have been acknowledged by the VA. Although the systemic resolution of these matters is not within the scope of this court‘s authority, there is little doubt as to the President‘s ability to take action.
The President signed into law the
I hope the many minds which are focused on these problems, this new legislation, Congressional oversight and the VA reforms will improve what all acknowledge is a deeply flawed veterans’ disability benefits system. In the meantime, it is the job of the courts to review individual cases with claims of unreasonable delay. As in these cases, the VA acts quicker when a mandamus petition has been filed. Under the correct mandamus standard which we adopt today, veterans should have a much easier time forcing VA action through the
It is unfortunate, but the takeaway from all this is quite simple: hiring a lawyer and filing a mandamus petition forces the VA to act. Absent unusual circumstances, certification and docketing should be ministerial acts which take very little time to perform. Cases which languish at this non-substantive stage are good candidates for mandamus based on unreasonable delay and due process violations unless the government can proffer a reason for the delay specific to the case.
The men and women in these cases protected this country and the freedoms we hold dear; they were disabled in the service of their country; the least we can do is properly resolve their disability claims so that they have the food and shelter necessary for survival. It takes on average six and a half years for a veteran to challenge a VBA determination and get a decision on remand. God help this nation if it took that long for these brave men and women to answer the call to serve and protect. We owe them more.