This is a partition action in which the plaintiff claims an interest in land as a tenant in common by virtue of a deed from the grantor not joined in by his spouse. The district court concluded the deed was valid and ordered the land to be partitioned by sale. The court of appeals reversed. On our review, we agree with the court of appeals. We reverse the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Robert Martin Jr. (“Bobby”) purchased a forty-acre tract of land in Appanoose County on contract for $12,000 on November 1, 1993. The real estate contract named Bobby as the buyer, and the sellers gave Bobby a warranty deed in 1999 after Bobby completed the payments required under the contract. Bobby lived in a mobile home located on the land.
Bobby’s father, Robert Martin Sr. (“Bob”), provided funds to Bobby to assist in the purchase of the land. After the purchase in 1993, Bob moved his personal property, equipment, and numerous items described as “junk” onto the land, with Bobby’s assistance. In addition, Bob made several improvements to the land. He built a pond and a driveway, cleared trees, graded the land, and installed water pipes. Bob claimed that Bobby acknowledged on numerous occasions that they both owned the land.
Bobby married on June 13, 1999. His wife, Sheryl, lived in the home located on the land until Bobby filed for divorce in November 1999. At that time, Bobby and Sheryl separated, and Sheryl moved out of the home. Bobby and Sheryl had two children together.
During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Bob and Bobby entered into an agreement, entitled “Agreement Regarding Real Property.” Under the agreement, Bob and Bobby acknowledged they both owned the forty-acre tract of land. They signed the agreement on February 21, 2000. That same day, Bobby executed a quitclaim deed that conveyed the land from himself (as the sole owner) to himself and Bob as tenants in common. Although Bobby and Sheryl were still married at the time, Sheryl did not sign the deed. Bobby apparently placed the deed in a safe, because he “thought it wasn’t good” at the time, and neither Bob nor Bobby recorded the deed.
Bobby and Sheryl were divorced a year later on February 21, 2001. The court awarded the homestead property to Bobby. On July 18, 2003, after a dispute arose with Bobby, Bob recorded the quitclaim deed. There was no explanation as to how or when Bob acquired possession of the deed. Bob then filed a petition for partition on August 18, 2003. Bob claimed that he and Bobby owned the land as tenants in common by virtue of the quitclaim deed. He asked the court to have it partitioned by sale. Bobby responded to the petition by claiming Bob had no ownership interest in the land because the quitclaim deed by which Bob claimed to have acquired his interest was not executed by Sheryl as required by Iowa Code section 561.13 and was invalid. See Iowa Code § 651.2 (2003) (stating the defendant’s answer in a partition action may deny the interest of the plaintiff); accord Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1203(2). The district court held the quitclaim deed was valid, and Bob had a one-half undivided interest in the land as a tenant in common. The court ordered the land to be partitioned by sale. The district court also awarded Bob attorney fees of $2,728.52.
The district court found that the facts of this case were unique, and did not fall *735 within the purpose of the statutory requirement under section 561.13 for the spouse to join in a conveyance of the homestead. Accordingly, it held that section 561.13 should not be applied to invalidate the deed because to do so would result in manifest injustice. The specific facts identified by the district court to support its conclusion that the statute was inapplicable were that the homestead was premarital property of Bobby, Sheryl moved from the homestead prior to the time the quitclaim deed was executed, Bobby was granted the homestead in the dissolution of marriage based on a stipulated agreement between Bobby and Sheryl, and Sheryl was not asserting any rights to invalidate the deed. Instead, the district court found Bobby was using the statute to assert a “technical defect” and that he was not seeking to use the statute to benefit Sheryl or the children. The district court also found that if the statute did apply, then the stipulation entered into by Bobby and Sheryl that included an agreement that Bobby would be awarded the homestead constituted a ratification of the quitclaim deed and validated the deed under section 561.13.
Bobby appealed. He claimed the quitclaim deed was invalid because the land constituted his homestead, he was married at the time of the conveyance, and his former wife never joined in the conveyance to Bob. The court of appeals reversed. It held the quitclaim deed was invalid because Bobby was married at the time the deed was executed and his wife did not sign the deed. It rejected any notion that the statute could be applied to support a contrary result based upon the particular equities of the case. Bob applied for, and we granted, further review.
II. Standard of Review
An action to partition property is an equitable proceeding. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1201(1). Therefore, our review is de novo.
Thiele v. Whittenbaugh,
III. Discussion
There are many statutory and legal requirements that must be met for a deed to result in a valid conveyance. See generally Iowa Code ch. 558. One requirement is that a spouse must join in a conveyance of the homestead. Iowa Code section 561.13' provides, in relevant part:
A conveyance or encumbrance of ... the homestead, if the owner is married, is not valid, unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the execution of the same or a like instrument, and the instrument or power of attorney sets out the legal description of the homestead.
Id. § 561.13.
A conveyance by deed does not take place until the deed is delivered.
See McNertney v. Kahler,
There is a longstanding presumption that delivery occurs on the date the deed is signed.
Orud v. Groth,
The evidence in this case fails to rebut the presumption of delivery on the date the deed was executed. Although Bob claims in his brief “Bobby delivered the quit claim deed later, after his marriage had been terminated,” there is nothing in the record to support this claim. There is no evidence of how and when Bob acquired possession of the deed. The only evidence on the issue was Bob’s testimony that he “got it back later.” This evidence is vague and insufficient to rebut the presumption that the deed was delivered when signed. It certainly does not establish that the deed was delivered after Bobby and Sheryl divorced. Therefore, we conclude the conveyance was attempted when Bobby was married, and the language of section 561.13 is implicated to govern the validity of the conveyance.
Section 561.13 invalidates deeds not signed by both spouses “unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument” that sets out the legal description of the homestead. Iowa Code § 561.13. If the statute is not satisfied, the deed is invalid as to both the husband and the wife.
Beal Bank v. Siems,
The district court found section 561.13 was satisfied in this ease because Sheryl executed a “like instrument” that legally described the homestead. The “like instrument” the court relied on was the stipulated dissolution decree between Bobby and Sheryl, which provided:
the homestead of [Bobby], which was owned by [Bobby] prior to his marriage to [Sheryl], and legally described in Exhibit 1’ shall be awarded to [Bobby], solely, subject to any and all amounts due upon said property to any party, including real estate taxes, which [Bobby] shall assume, pay and hold [Sheryl] harmless from any amounts due thereon.
We think the district court read the words “like instrument” too broadly. The words “like instrument” are not meant to enlarge the class of documents by which the spouse can join in the conveyance beyond instruments of conveyance or encumbrance, such as deeds or mortgages. Rather, the words “like instrument” mean only that the spouse need not sign the same deed as the owner in order to join in the conveyance. Until 1981, the statute required a joint instrument. See Iowa Code § 561.13 (1981) (“No conveyance or encumbrance of, or contract to convey or encumber the homestead, if the owner is married, is valid, unless the husband and wife join in the execution of the same joint instrument, and the instrument sets out the legal description of the homestead .... ”). In 1981, however, the legislature amended the statute to also allow the husband and wife to effectuate the conveyance by separate instruments:
No A conveyance or encumbrance of, or contract to convey or encumber the homestead, if the owner is married, is not valid, unless and until the husband and wife join in the- execution of the same- joint spouse of the owner executed the same or a like instrument, or a power of attorney for the execution of the same of a like instrument, and the instrument or power of attorney sets out the legal description of the homestead
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1981 Iowa Acts ch. 81, § 1. An explanation of the bill noted that the change
eliminates the requirement that both spouses execute the same joint instrument in order to convey or encumber the homestead. Instead, the spouse of the titleholder, if the spouses do not hold joint title to the property, may execute a like instrument or power of attorney for the execution of the instrument or a like instrument conveying or encumbering the homestead.
Explanation of H.F. 430, 69th Gen. As-semb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1981).
Although a decree for dissolution of marriage may constitute a muniment of title, a dissolution decree, or a stipulation, cannot be viewed as a conveyance of land to a nonparty to the dissolution of marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (court required to divide property of the parties in a dissolution decree and transfer title of the property by such means as ordering the parties to execute a quitclaim deed or ordering a change of title for tax purposes and delivery of the deed or change of title to the county recorder). Because Bobby attempted to convey his property while he was married, and Sheryl never signed the quitclaim deed executed by Bobby — or another deed or like instrument that transferred the property to Bob — section 561.13 invalidates the conveyance.
We also reject the district court’s alternative line of reasoning that section 561.13 did not invalidate the deed because
Sheryl has never taken any action to invalidate the Quit Claim Deed; rather, it is Bobby who seizes the opportunity to plead a technical defect in his own earli *738 er, and counseled, act. And, he does that solely for his own benefit and not in the stead of Sheryl or the couple’s children.
This argument has no basis in our law. Section 561.13 makes a deed
invalid
— that is,
void
— without the signature of both spouses, not merely voidable by the spouse who did not sign. Iowa Code § 561.13;
Beal Bank,
Moreover, while it may be tempting for trial judges to fashion remedies viewed to be fair and just under the particular circumstances of a case, the law has defined those concepts and must dominate the decisionmaking process.
See Iowa State Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel,
Our law has chosen to provide special procedures to protect homestead rights, and has defined this protection in a comprehensive manner. We have said:
[T]he purpose of the homestead laws is “to provide a margin of safety to the family, not only for the benefit of the family, but for the public welfare and social benefit which accrues to the State by having families secure in their homes.”
Brown v. Vonnahme,
We disagree with the district court that section 561.13 did not invalidate the deed because Bobby sought to invoke the statute “for his own benefit.” The statute not
*739
only exists to benefit Bobby, but the whole family unit, including the children who remain with the parents under a joint custody arrangement.
See generally In re Marriage of Tierney,
Finally, to the extent the district court relied on Sheryl and Bobby’s estrangement at the time the deed was signed, we reject that reasoning as well. The statute applies “if the owner is married,” Iowa Code § 561.13, and we interpret this phrase strictly,
Gustafson v. Fogleman,
IV. Conclusion
The district court erred in finding section 561.13 was satisfied, or alternatively, did not apply in this case. A conveyance was attempted while the owner was married, and the spouse did not execute the same or a like instrument joining in the conveyance. It was therefore void. Title never passed to Bob through the quitclaim deed, and Bob has not raised any other grounds to support his claim of ownership. The partition action therefore fails. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.