JANET MARTIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KENTFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
S.F. No. 24493
Supreme Court of California
Dec. 29, 1983.
294 | 295 | 296 | 297 | 298 | 299 | 300 | 301 | 302 | 303 | 304 | 305 | 306 | 307 | 308 | 309 | 310 | 311
Peter Thomas Galiano for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Diane Ross, Raymond L. Hansen, Kirsten L. Zerger and Ramon E. Romero as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Richard V. Godino, Sandra Woliver, Celia Ruiz, Breon, Galgani, Godino & O‘Donnell, Douglas J. Maloney, County Counsel, and Ruth W. Rosen, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
BIRD, C. J.-
I.
Appellant, Janet Martin, taught school in the Kentfield School District (District) from 1973 to 1979. During that time she was assigned to teach a broad range of subjects, including physical science, to elementary school classes in grades two through five. She attained tenured status in 1976. (See
Late in the spring of 1979, a position opened up for a physical science teacher in the “middle school” (seventh and eighth grades). School officials determined that no continuing employees were available to fill the position. At that time, the District did not advertise the science opening to teachers on the reemployment list. The position was left open and the District decided to offer a third year of literature instead.
In September of 1979, a few days after the new academic year had begun, the literature instructor resigned. In place of the literature course, the District decided to reestablish the third year of middle school science. Having received no applications from continuing employees for the open science
On September 12, 1979, the District‘s school board met to determine whether Martin or Eisan should be awarded the job. Since Martin was the more senior applicant, the board examined her qualifications first. The board found that she possessed the appropriate teaching credential for the job. However, it also found that she “did not have sufficient academic preparation in physical science to support the physical science program as required in the Kentfield School District, Middle School” and that she did “not have any experience teaching Middle School programs and students.” On the basis of these findings, the board concluded that Martin was “not competent” to occupy the position offered. Having been found to meet all the announced criteria, Eisan, with less seniority than Martin, was chosen to fill the position.
Martin sought relief from the District‘s decision by petitioning for a writ of mandamus in the Marin County Superior Court.4 Relying on
The District argued that
Although the court found that the District “had not [previously] imposed the requirement of prior middle school experience upon continuing employees as a qualification to teach at the middle school,” the judge refused to order the District to rehire Martin. The court concluded that it was within the District‘s discretion to determine the criteria for the teaching position and that the District had not abused its discretion in choosing Eisan over Martin.
This appeal followed.
II.
The sole issue presented is whether the District abused its discretion by applying employment requirements to Martin which are not authorized by
The principles which guide this court‘s determination are not in dispute. There exists, among employers in this country, a broad spectrum of policies with respect to the weight to be given seniority in the making of personnel decisions. The Legislature has clearly stated which tenured teachers on layoff status should be appointed to vacant positions.
In
Such determinations, it has been held, involve “discretionary decisions” which are within the “special competence” of the school districts.
However, the District‘s discretion is subject to an important limitation. Under
The first disputed question is Martin‘s contention that prior middle school teaching experience constituted a “requirement” for the job within the meaning of
The District asserts that the “criteria” set forth in its letter announcing the middle school position were not employment “requirements” within the meaning of
Indeed, the argument that the “criteria” set forth in the District‘s job announcement were merely to be used in assessing competence of the applicants and not as “requirements” for the job simply misses the point of the statute.
The District is clearly correct in reasoning that it has the discretion to choose the most senior competent persons from the reemployment list to fill open teaching positions. Its discretion, however, is limited by the requirement set forth in
With this limitation in mind, the question remains whether the District abused its discretion in choosing Eisan over Martin for the physical science position. The answer turns on a factual inquiry: whether the requirement of prior middle school experience was applied evenhandedly to continuing and laid-off employees, or whether it was applied in a discriminatory manner. Unfortunately, the record as to that inquiry is unclear, and the findings incomplete. In particular, the record is incomplete as to the manner in which applicants were recruited for the open teaching job.
The record reveals that a physical science position “opened up” in the spring of 1979, that school officials determined that no continuing employees were available for the job, and that the position was not filled at that time. The record also indicates that in September of 1979, the school administration invited laid-off teachers to apply for an open physical science position. A letter was sent which listed “prior middle school experience” as one of the hiring criteria to be applied.
The record does not reveal, however, whether the position offered to laid-off employees in September was the same position offered to continuing employees the previous spring. In other words, it is unclear whether the September job announcement was part of a continuing recruitment process which began with the offer of the same job to continuing employees the
Since the resolution of this factual question is essential to a determination of whether the District complied with
If the trial court determines that the District failed to comply with
Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.
RICHARDSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur with the majority‘s conclusion that the Kentfield School District‘s (District) compliance with
In view of the fact that no continuing teacher applied for the physical science teaching position after it was advertised to laid-off teachers with the criteria at issue in September 1979, appellant‘s assertion of discriminatory treatment depends upon her claim that this position was the same one left unfilled the previous spring. If it was the same position, her argument that different criteria were applied to continuing and laid-off teachers would have some validity. (Even in such a case, however, discrimination would not necessarily have been established; for it is at least arguable that the District properly could have decided to upgrade the requirements for all new appli-
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority‘s remand for further factual determination because it is unnecessary in view of the record before us. Contrary to appellant‘s suggestion, the District has not sought unlimited discretion in the development and application of employment criteria.
The development of criteria for teacher competence is clearly within the District‘s statutory authority. There was no finding here that the criteria which the District applied to appellant‘s qualifications would not have been applied to any continuing employees who might have sought the new teaching position and there is no basis in the record for any such finding.
In a day when a national educational commission reports that “the educational foundations of our society are . . . being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and a people” (“A Nation At Risk,” a Rep. by the National Com. on Excellence in Education, N. Y. Times (Apr. 26, 1983) p. 13, cols. 1-4), the District‘s earnest and good faith pursuit of excellence in those who teach its children should be acknowledged and encouraged rather than frustrated.
Appellant was a permanent employee of the District, teaching grades two through five in one of its elementary schools. At the end of the 1978-1979 school year, the employment of appellant and several other permanent teachers was terminated as a result of declining student enrollment and a reduction in particular programs, pursuant to
In September 1979, the District established a third-year physical science course for grades seven and eight in its middle school. Unable to find a competent person among its existing staff to teach the new course, the District published an announcement of the teaching vacancy, listing several criteria of qualifications, and sent copies of the announcement to those teachers, including appellant, who were entitled to preferential reemployment rights pursuant to
The criteria established by the District for employment in the new position were: (a) appropriate credential; (b) academic preparation; (c) experience in teaching physical science; (d) experience with middle school programs
Appellant and one Eisan were the only applicants. Eisan supplied the requested information; appellant did not. Nonetheless, the District‘s superintendent interviewed both Eisan and appellant, reviewed their qualifications and recommended to the District‘s board of trustees that Eisan be hired.
On September 12, 1979, the board met for the purpose of selecting a teacher for the new position. Both appellant and Eisan appeared. Because the superintendent‘s recommendation appeared to be “passing over” a more senior former employee, appellant was offered, and she accepted, the opportunity for an immediate hearing on her qualifications. The board described this hearing as one “to determine competency of [appellant] for the position . . . .”
The evidence developed at the hearing established that appellant had a standard elementary school teaching credential. Her academic preparation included a bachelor of science degree, with a major in conservation of natural resources. She maintained a B average in undergraduate and graduate studies and received a master‘s degree in science education, which required about 57 and 1½ graduate units. She was first employed by the District on October 1, 1973, teaching grades two through five in its elementary school until she was terminated in 1979. She had never taught physical science as a separate subject, although science was included as part of her elementary school teaching program.
After the hearing the board deliberated and made specific factual findings that appellant had the appropriate teaching credential for the middle school level, but did not have sufficient academic preparation in physical science to support that school‘s physical science program, criterion (b). Nor did she have any experience teaching middle school programs and students, criterion (d). (By necessary implication, those findings also confirmed that appellant could not have had recent experience teaching middle school students, criterion (f). In addition, although the board did not make a specific finding on the matter, it appears to be undisputed that appellant had neither recent nor any experience teaching physical science as a separate subject, criteria (c) and (e).) The board expressly concluded that appellant “is not competent to teach the Middle School physical science curriculum as required by” the District.
In denying appellant‘s petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court found that the board had full discretion to establish the criteria of competency hereinabove set forth, and that it faithfully abided by those criteria in finding appellant “incompetent.” Concluding that the board did not abuse its discretion, the trial court refused to interfere with the board‘s decision. In my view, that judgment was sound.
Mandamus will lie to correct an abuse of discretion, but not the manner of exercise of discretion. (King v. Berkeley Unified School Dist. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1022-1023 [152 Cal.Rptr. 782]; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, § 65, pp. 3843-3844, § 75, pp. 3851-3852, § 77, pp. 3853-3854.) Further, it is established that in this appeal from the decision of the trial court which found no abuse of discretion by the District in declining to hire appellant, we must uphold that determination as to the basis of the administrative action if supported by substantial evidence. (Adcock v. Board of Education (1973) 10 Cal.3d 60, 66 [109 Cal.Rptr. 676, 513 P.2d 900].)
The applicable selection guidelines are clear. In pertinent part,
In essence, the majority concludes that the District may have violated this section when it found appellant incompetent to teach middle school physical science insofar as that finding was based upon appellant‘s lack of recent or other experience with middle school programs and students-factors which had not been “imposed upon other employees who continued in service” (
Initially, I suggest that the majority errs in failing to distinguish between criteria which may be relevant to a prospective teacher‘s competence to teach a specific course and the minimal requirements for employment as a teacher generally. There is a cognizable difference between the two. If there was not, the Legislature‘s express mandate for reemployment of the most senior “certificated and competent” teacher would be meaningless. (See
Further, as I read the District‘s “criteria” to which the majority objects, neither “experience” nor “recent experience with middle school students and programs” was an absolute prerequisite to reemployment. Rather, each was a factor to be considered with others in the board‘s formulation of its overall judgment of competence to teach the new science course. An examination of the criteria themselves supports this interpretation. If, for example, the criterion of “recent experience teaching Middle School students” (italics added) was an absolute prerequisite or “requirement” for appointment to the new position, then any additional “requirement” of mere “experience with Middle School programs and students” would be wholly superfluous or redundant. Similarly, a “requirement” that the applicant have “recent experience teaching physical science” (italics added) would make meaningless any additional “requirement” that such applicant merely have “experience in teaching physical science.” In fact, however, each of the criteria established by the District can be seen as intended to provide independently relevant information of qualifications to assist the District in assessing an applicant‘s overall competency within the meaning of the statute. Indeed, the District here made clear that, notwithstanding appellant‘s
Even accepting, arguendo, the majority‘s characterization of the District‘s “criteria” of competence as “requirements” within the meaning of
Appellant‘s claim that the District was engaged in a “continuing recruitment process” from late spring of 1979 to September 1979 to fill a “vacant science position” has no basis in the record. Therefore, her conclusion that imposition of the “criteria” at issue here in September 1979 represents discrimination because the same position was offered to continuing employees in the spring without such criteria is without foundation.
It is obvious that here, as in most cases, conflicting testimony was offered on the issues. It is not our task, however, to reweigh the evidence in order to determine the facts of the case for the purposes of our review. Rather, it is the trial court‘s findings, insofar as they are supported by substantial evidence, which determine the facts, whether we like them or not.
Here the trial court quite simply did not find that the position denied to petitioner was the “same position” which was vacated by a science teacher in the spring of 1979. What the trial court found was “On or about September 4, 1979, respondent [District] determined to reinstate the physical science component of its three year science program in its Middle School.” (Italics added.) The court found further that “On September 5, 1979, respondent announced the position opening of the 7th and 8th grade Physical Science Teacher with the [criteria which are at issue in this case].” The court also found that the criteria of prior middle school experience had not been imposed upon “continuing employees as a qualification to teach at the middle school previously” or “in the past.” (Italics added.) Finally, it found “That respondent district in imposing the requirement of experience teaching physical science at the middle school did not depart from the cri-
No one contends that any of these findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the letter of September 5, 1979, announcing the opening to teachers like petitioner and Eisan who were entitled to preferential rehiring rights, itself provides substantial evidence of the crucial finding that the physical science course was newly reinstated on September 4, 1979. That letter stated, in relevant part: “Last night the Board of Trustees [of District] accepted the resignation [of another teacher] and decided to reestablish the third year of Science instead of a third year of Literature.” (Italics added.)
It would seem absolutely clear that the trial court‘s finding that a decision was made “on or about September 4, 1979,” to reinstate a physical science course means that the course was not in place or in existence prior to that date. Equally obviously, a course reinstated in September 1979, could not have been offered to continuing employees earlier, in the spring of 1979, under different criteria. Indeed, there is neither finding nor evidence to establish the nature of the science teaching position which was vacated in the spring of 1979 and “left open” in the late spring of that year because-as the trial court did find-the District “was unable to find a qualified (competent) person” to fill it from its “regular staff.” Without such finding or evidence, assertions that it was the “same course” are baseless. Whatever that earlier course entailed, however, it is clear that the District did not institute in the spring of 1979 a “continuing recruitment process” which culminated in the hiring of Eisan in September of 1979. As the majority acknowledges, attempts to fill the earlier vacancy simply were abandoned: “The position was left open and the District decided to offer a third year of literature instead.” (Ante, p. 297, italics added.) Only in September 1979 was the decision made to offer the 7th and 8th grade physical science course.
In short, to interpret the trial court‘s findings as being ambiguous on the question of whether the District imposed different requirements on continuing and laid-off employees in this case obviously distorts the meaning of the findings. No continuing employee applied for the position which was reinstated in September 1979. Further, how any trier of fact could conclude from the undisputed evidence that the District would not have applied the same criteria to any continuing teacher who might have sought the position is a mystery. Thus, remanding this case to the trial court to afford it an opportunity to make just such a finding is unwarranted.
It is important to note that
Equally important, the prohibition of discrimination against laid-off employees (by imposing requirements upon their reemployment which are not imposed upon continuing teachers) is not the sole command of the statute. There is also the express statutory condition upon preferential rehiring, namely, that a former employee must be “competent to render” the service sought by the district. (
In construing the identically worded predecessor to
The facts in King, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 1016, were strikingly similar to those here. In that case, a laid-off teacher was reemployed to teach seventh and eighth grade mathematics. Three other laid-off employees-each credentialed to teach the position, each with some experience teaching mathematics, and each senior to the successful applicant-also had applied for the job. Because the academic background of each of the three was limited, however, the school district, exercising its permissible discretion, conclud-
In my view, King pointed the direction we should follow here. In approving the hiring of a teacher with less seniority and the nonhiring of more senior laid-off teachers who had some training and experience in the (mathematics) specialty involved in the position to be filled, King clearly concluded that the school district had discretion to determine whether the respective qualifications of the applicants demonstrated “competence” to occupy the vacant position. Further, by its affirmance of the trial court‘s denial of mandate sought by the three unsuccessful senior applicants to secure their reemployment, the King court held that the school district acted well within its discretion in its evaluation. (89 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023.)
A comparable exercise of discretion was undertaken here by the District in determining competence. If, as in King, insufficient academic preparation is an adequate basis for concluding that an applicant for a newly created position is incompetent to teach it, there is no reason why insufficient relevant teaching experience may not also be considered in determining a job applicant‘s competence. In any event, here the District expressly considered both factors, insufficient academic preparation and teaching experience, and these exercises of judgment were well within the local district‘s power. And, as indicated, appellant failed to meet other criteria as well.
In a similar context, the United States Supreme Court recently sounded the proper note: “[C]ourts lack the ‘specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.’ San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S., [1] 42 [(1973)].” (Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 208 [73 L.Ed.2d 690, 713, 102 S.Ct. 3034].) Thus, in rejecting a challenge to the manner in which one state chose to fulfill the requirements of a federal statute in order to qualify for federal funding of a state educational program for handicapped children, the court declared: “[O]nce a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.” (Ibid.)
We previously have affirmed the broad discretion and responsibility of school officials to administer schools in California. In Adcock, supra, 10 Cal.3d 60, 67, for example, we observed that ordinarily a school superintendent‘s exercise of discretion to transfer teachers between schools when it was in the best interests of the school district would not be reviewed or interfered with by the trial court in the absence of claimed violation of the teachers’ constitutional rights. (See Thompson v. Modesto City High School Dist. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 620, 623 [139 Cal.Rptr. 603, 566 P.2d 237].) This
It is apparent from the trial court‘s findings here that what the District did was to propose its new criteria for employment on September 5, 1979, the day after it decided to “reinstate the physical science component of its three year science program” by offering a 7th and 8th grade physical science course, and that such change in criteria was “applied equally from the date of the change to all potential applicants . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.)
Finding no abuse of that discretion conferred upon the District by
Mosk, J., and Kaus, J., concurred.