Nos. 13,073-(166) | Minn. | Aug 8, 1902
Lead Opinion
After the last remand of this action (81 Minn. 112" court="Minn." date_filed="1900-08-03" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/martin-v-walter-courtney-7971535?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7971535">81 Minn. 112, 83 N. W. 503), a change of venue was granted from Crow Wing to Sherburne county, where the cause was again tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict for defendant. A “case” containing the evidence was duly settled, a motion for a new trial was made and denied. From this order plaintiff appeals.
The claim of Mrs. Martin, as administratrix, for the alleged negligence of defendant in the surgical treatment of her husband, has been twice before this court. The first review was upon the merits, when a new trial was granted, for the reason that the preponderance of evidence was so strongly in favor of defendant that a retrial before a new jury was required. 75 Minn. 255" court="Minn." date_filed="1899-01-12" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/martin-v-walter-courtney-7970791?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7970791">75 Minn. 255, 77 N. W. 813. On the last review a new trial was ordered for misconduct of plaintiff’s attorney at the trial.
Upon the record now before us the only question to be considered is whether the whole evidence required a submission of the issues of fact to the jury; if so, the direction in defendant’s favor was error, and should be reversed. Concededly it should be a clear case to authorize interference by the court with the functions of the jury to determine the result of the evidence. In recognizing this responsibility, the trial court held on the motion for a new trial that its direction for defendant should be sustained upon the ground that it would have been required to set aside any verdict that might have been rendered in plaintiff’s favor. This is a fair test of judicial duty in such a case. It has also been held that the court should direct a verdict where the evidence has no reasonable tendency to support it. That such corrective power must
Plaintiff’s intestate was injured in a railroad accident at Brule, in Wisconsin, on May 24, 1895. His right foot was run over and the toes crushed by a railway car. An immediate amputation of these members was made by a local surgeon at West Superior. The next day he was removed to the Brainerd hospital, of which defendant was the superintendent, aided by an assistant and trained nurses. He remained at the hospital under defendant’s care until July 16, when he returned to his home in Brainerd, but visited the hospital at frequent intervals for further treatment until September 16, when he again returned to the hospital, where a further operation was performed by the amputation of an additional portion of less than an inch of the foot. The patient continued at the hospital without pronounced improvement until October 19, when a decided change in his condition for- the worse took place. He rapidly declined, and died on the afternoon of October 28, 1895.
The legal obligation of the physician to his patient, where his
The unfortunate termination of Mr. Martin’s illness is without doubt attributable to septicaemia, or blood poisoning, the germs of which had existed in his system for some length of time before they were discovered. Whether discoverable by the exercise of ordinary and -reasonable care by his medical attendants must be regarded as the crucial test by which, under the evidence, the order
The description of the treatment which intestate received at the hospital is very complete. It was given by the defendant, his assistant, and attendant nurses, with charts indicating his temperature from day to day, which shows that no malignant or dangerous indications appeared until three or four days before the death of the patient; also that from the time when intestate came to the hospital until very near the end his wound was thoroughly cleansed and properly dressed at suitable times with reference to the sanitary and antiseptic requirements now recognized by the highest standards of the medical profession; and that, while the progress of recovery was slow, it was apparently continuous, — the second amputation being required not from any suspicion of blood poisoning, but to secure a better stump as the ultimate result of the treatment.
While it is not necessary to give in detail the clinical history of intestate’s disease, yet, in view of the distinctive charge of defendant’s negligence in failing to discover the existence of septi-caemia in his patient, it is sufficient to say that it was emphatically insisted by the defendant himself, his assistant, and the nurses, that no evidence thereof was discoverable, and that there was no pus or poisonous exhalation from the wound, which would be the essential danger signal in a case of.blood poisoning. In these respects the defendant did more than to rely on the presumption in his favor, and it is not apparent that there was an attempt to suppress any evidence of the course of intestate’s treatment while under his charge; but, since the facts were not submitted to the jury, it becomes necessary to sublimate from the plaintiff’s own proofs the specific grievance of which she complains. This rests upon her testimony that within four or five days after her husband was brought to the hospital purulent discharges of a poisonous
During the progress of the treatment there was a continued effort made by the defendant and his assistants to secure the ultimate healing of the wound. That this course was proper without some distinctive ground of suspicion of blood poisoning is evident, but it must be also conceded in favor of plaintiff’s theory that, if poisonous matter came from the wound, it was evidence of septi-caemia, and that proper drainage should have been established to-carry the poison out of the system; hence the very pith of plaintiff’s claim is and must be that in closing up the wound at an early stage of the treatment, and by keeping it closed afterwards, the flow of the poison germs was retarded, which caused* death. So that the issue at the trial was whether the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the existence of septicaemia from the effusion of poisonous pus from the wound, and by closing it up, although to secure the more rapid healing of the stump, he was guilty of malpractice.
The statement of plaintiff that the exhalations from the wound were pus must not, however, be unqualifiedly accepted. Dr. W. H. Stone, an expdrt having the proper qualifications, was the witness presented to sustain plaintiff’s theory in this respect,, and, basing his opinion upon her testimony and other evidence to the effect that pus continued to exude from the wound from the beginning until the end, stated that the closing up of the wound was improper; but in connection with his statements in this respect he stated also that upon the conceded facts such a discharge of pus would be unusual. He further stated that there is a healthy discharge from all wounds of a watery matter or serum that may be easily mistaken by the nonprofessional observer for the poisonous discharge indicative of septicaemia. He also stated that the discharge characterized by plaintiff as pus would be accompanied by
Leaving out of consideration any other evidence in this case than that of Mrs. Martin and her own expert, we cannot say that the testimony reasonably tended to support the view that the emissions from the wound were poisonous, or appeared to be of a sufficiently dangerous nature to have required defendant to stop his efforts to heal the wound, and devote his attention solely to a better drainage for fear of blood poisoning. Neither can we hold that the jury had a right to say that a different course should have been adopted upon a supposition that plaintiff’s characterizations of the wound discharges were accurate where a nonprofessional judgment would be wholly insufficient for that purpose. In such cases a nonprofessional observer is not to be permitted to diagnose disease, nor define its symptoms, as the basis of judgment. Counsel recognized this elementary rule in the production of Dr. Stone, but the wisdom of the rule we have stated is obvious. The professional assistance of the physician is sought upon the supposition that he has superior knowledge, derived from his art, over a nonprofessional person; otherwise why call him? To this the patient submits himself. Hence the knowledge of the physician must also necessarily be distinguished from the knowledge or judgment of the ordinary layman, and constitute the standard by which any course of medical treatment is to be measured and determined. It is true that during the later stages of the disease Mrs. Martin claims there was exterior inflammation of the skin of the leg below the knee, but upon her distinct characterization of pus exhalations the opinion of her own .expert that defendant’s treatment was improper must depend, and this was at least but
Where the submission of important facts necessary to sustain a verdict rests on conjecture or suspicion alone, it should not be said in any enlightened tribunal that it could reasonably sustain a verdict. “Mere possibilities can never establish the probability of a fact requisite to be proved in order to make * * * a party liable in any action whatever. To decide otherwise would be to say that verdicts may rest on mere possibility, speculation, and conjecture.” Minneapolis S. & D. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 83 Minn. 370" court="Minn." date_filed="1901-06-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/minneapolis-sash--door-co-v-great-northern-railway-co-7971869?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7971869">83 Minn. 370, 376, 86 N. W. 451; Swenson v. Erlandson; 86 Minn. 263, 90 N. W. 534. Hence we conclude that the conclusion of the trial court that it would have been its duty to have set aside any verdict for the plaintiff based upon this record as a matter of law, and not in the exercise of its discretion, was correct.
On the former trial plaintiff presented her claim for recovery upon the ground that -the second amputation, of September 16, should have been made higher up, instead of at the place it was made, and also that proper dressing and bandages were not applied to the wound. Her contention is now radically different. On the former trial, as appears from the evidence, she was not able to state, although she assumed to give a description of the wound from time to time, that any pus exuded therefrom, nor was she able to describe the character of the discharges therefrom, but stated that she did not know what they were. While the testimony for Dr. Courtney from experts who testified in his behalf— among them several of the best practitioners in the state — is such as to have convincing weight in exonerating him from any misconduct, and is of great persuasive force in our judgment; yet our respect for the province of the jury in such cases would have led us to the conclusion that we should order another trial but for the statements of Dr. Stone, which, as a whole, are entirely in accord with all. the other testimony upon the subject to the effect
Order of the trial court affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I dissent. From a careful reading of the record, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the case should have been submitted to the jury.
(dissenting).
I dissent. In my opinion the evidence was, as we held when the case was last before us, sufficient to take the case to the jury, and the order appealed from should be reversed.