Martin v. BlackmonMartin v. Blackmon
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- Before:
- Holt
Lead Opinion
The principal issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in setting aside its declaration of a mistrial and reinstating the jury verdicts.
On November 24, 1981, a jury rendered verdicts of $222,698.81 in favor of appellee Delma Gold and $18,755.76 in favor of appellees Kenneth and David Blackmon against the appellants Clyde Martin and Arkansas Power and Light Company. The appellants’ attorney requested that the trial court poll the jury. The court then asked each of the eleven jurors, who had signed the verdicts, whether they were his or her own verdicts and “not the result of compromise.” Ten jurors spontaneously affirmed the verdicts as their own. One
Well, what I’m saying is that after you all have had every opportunity to discuss it that you are not to of course give up your own individual ideas after you have had an opportunity to discuss it between yourselves and to debate it then if this is a pure compromise such as if you all wrote down a figure and divided it by eleven it’s compromise.
After this explanation another juror stated that the verdicts were a compromise. The trial court declared a mistrial and excused the jury. As the jury dispersed, appellants’ counsel also left while counsel for the appellees were attempting to object and explain that the verdict, although a compromise, was valid or permissible inasmuch as there was no showing that the jury agreed to be bound in advance.
Within the next week, without notice to appellants’ counsel and without approval of the court, the attorneys for the appellees obtained affidavits, transcribed by the official court reporter, from each of the eleven jurors stating that the jury had, without previous agreement to be bound by the results, taken the average of the percentage of liability each would assign to the appellants and used that as a basis for discussion. The average was 76% fault attributable to the appellants. The jury then concluded that this average was too high and reduced the amount of fault attributed to the appellants to 60%. The verdicts represent 60% of the amount requested by the appellees.
After obtaining the affidavits, the appellees moved the trial court to set aside the mistrial order and reinstate the jury verdicts. At a hearing on the motion, over the objection of appellants’ counsel, the affidavits were read to the court and entered into evidence. The trial court candidly acknowledged that he had erred in declaring the mistrial since the verdict was not “a lot verdict” and reinstated the verdicts. A few
. . . [A]fter considering a transcript of the proceedings conducted by this Court of November 24,1981 at the conclusion of the trial of the cause herein, the responses of the Jurors to the Court’s questioning, and arguments of counsel, . . .
The court specifically finds that the polling of the jury tended to confuse the jury, and that the Court while attempting to identify if a verdict had been reached by lot, inquired if the jurors had ‘compromised’ in reaching their verdict....
After considering the Arkansas cases on the subject, and reviewing the transcription of the jurors’ statements taken by the official court reporter at the time the verdict was rendered to the Court, the Court is of the opinion that there is no evidence that the verdict was reached by lot or in such a manner as would render the verdict impermissible. (Italics supplied.)
The court further found:
. .. [T]his court need not rely upon those affidavits or statements in reaching its decision herein. The record according to the statements of the jurors before being dismissed is clear of any evidence of misconduct or of the jury having reached its verdict by lot. (Italics supplied.)
Appeal is taken from that order denying the motion to reinstate the mistrial.
The appellants argue that the appellees should have been required to clear up any confusion at the verdict proceedings by requesting that the jury be polled further.
The appellants also argue that the trial court erred in accepting into the record the eleven juror affidavits, and, therefore, it erred by granting the motion to reinstate the jury verdict and by denying the motion to reinstate the mistrial. Appellees respond that although an affidavit may not be received to impeach a verdict, it may be received into evidence to support a verdict. Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403 (1854); and Stanton v. State, 13 Ark. 317 (1853). Here, however, we must agree that this evidence is inadmissible pursuant to
... [I]t is improper for a lawyer to interview jurors after a trial in an effort to obtain such inadmissible affidavits to impeach their own verdict.
Nevertheless, we cannot reverse unless the error was prejudicial. Brown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977); Rule 103 (a), Uniform Rules of Evidence; A.R.Civ.P. Rule 61. Here the trial court would have been obligated to set aside the mistrial and reinstate the verdicts even in the absence of the affidavits, because there was no ground upon which a mistrial could be declared, without an abuse of discretion, at the verdict proceedings. A verdict may not be set aside arbitrarily and without reasonable cause. Big Rock Stone & Material Co. v. Hoffman, 233 Ark. 342, 344 S.W.2d 585 (1961). See also Bridges v. Hemmer, 256 Ark. 312, 506 S.W.2d 835 (1974); and Crowder v. Flippo, 263 Ark. 433, 565 S.W.2d 138 (1978). It is apparent that the trial court, at the time of the verdict proceedings, was confused as to the distinction between a verdict by lot and a quotient verdict, which we recently explained in Scheptmann v. Thorn, 272 Ark. 70, 612 S.W.2d 291 (1981):
Where the j urors each submit a figure and agree in advance that the verdict will be one twelfth of the total, the verdict is by lot and cannot be upheld. If, however, there is no agreement in advance to be bound by the procedure, but the jurors do adopt the result, it is a quotient verdict and is valid. National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 252 Ark. 106, 477 S.W.2d 488 (1982).
The party challenging a jury verdict as a verdict by lot has the burden of proving to the trial court that it was a verdict by lot and not a quotient verdict. National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 254 Ark. 139, 491 S.W.2d 811 (1973). Here, nothing that any juror said when polled by the trial court on the day of the trial indicated that the jury had rendered a verdict by lot. Nothing any juror said indicated misconduct of any kind. Based solely on the statements of the jurors when polled at trial, we have no hesitation in saying that the evidence to support the order of mistrial was insufficient. Since the trial court erred in ordering a mistrial, it follows that the court necessarily was correct in setting aside the mistrial.
The appellants’ final argument is that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial, because the jury was not required to deliberate further.
Affirmed.
Hickman and Hays, JJ., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. In Sanson v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1980), we said:
We take this opportunity to state unequivocally, for the guidance of the Bar, that in our opinion it is improper for a lawyer to interview jurors after a trial in an effortto obtain such inadmissible affidavits to impeach their own verdict.
We should delete the word “unequivocally” because the majority is not enforcing our policy and rule. A rule not enforced is no rule at all. The trial court admitted over the objections of appellant the statements of the jurors taken contrary to the Sanson decision. They were improperly taken and improperly admitted as evidence. We will never know whether they influenced the judge in his decision.
The only party innocent of a mistake is the appellant. The trial court’s error can only be corrected by a new trial.
Hays, J., joins in this dissent.