Thе extent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s role in faculty tenure and promotion procedures at State colleges and universities is questionеd by this appeal. The facts of the immediate controversy follow.
I
During the academic years from July 1969 to May 1973, appellant Martin Josеph Kilcoyne was a non-tenured member of the faculty of East Carolina University (ECU), a member institution of the greater University of North Carolina. As stipulаted by the parties, his employment contract with ECU incorporated the following provision of the Faculty Manual: “The Department Chairman will inform the non-tenured faculty member of his progress toward tenure both by personal conference and written resume.” These University guidelines required a tenure decision on professors of Kilcoyne’s rank following three probationary years of teaching at ECU.
Late in eaсh of his first two academic years at ECU, Professor Kilcoyne received a letter from his department chairman. 1 Both letters followed a common format. They began with an explanation that the letter was required by the University regulation just quoted. Next the chairman thanked Kilcoyne for his contributions to the University. The third paragraph of each letter stressed the need for him to publish his scholarly works. Both letters concludеd with a request for a personal conference with Kilcoyne in the department chairman’s office. Such a conference was held each year.
On September 20, 1971, the beginning of his third year, Kilcoyne was notified that he would be rehired for a fourth academic year. Bеfore this third and final probationary year was completed, however, he was informed that he would not be granted tenure nor given emplоyment beyond the fourth year. These communications from ECU prompted Kilcoyne’s Section 1983 2 and pendent State claims, the subject of this litigation.
II
Kilcoyne’s complaint, filed April 4, 1973 in the United Statеs District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against the defendants, alleges that ECU had granted him
“de facto
tenure” by hiring him for an additional year beyond the three-year probationary period for non-tenured faculty, and thus had violated his rights by discharging him without a hearing. The Court granted summary judgment against him on this point,
Kilcoyne v. Morgan,
On remand, Kilcoyne now maintains that the procedures followed by ECU did not conform precisely to those in the Faculty Manual, and that this asserted deviation constitutes an actionable denial of due prоcess by the State. The District Judge referred the cause to a Magistrate to determine “whether the conduct of the defendants amountеd to a denial of procedural due process.”
*942 The Magistrate’s Memorandum and Recommendation, filed January 10, 1980, concluded that Kilcoyne could not maintain a claim predicated on a denial of procedural due process. The District Court adopted thе Magistrate’s report in whole and, on January 29, 1980, again granted summary judgment against Kilcoyne. Subsequently, his pendent State claims against ECU for breach of contract also were referred to the Magistrate with similar results. On October 31, 1980, the District Court adopted the Magistrate’s report and dismissed the pendent claims as well. Kilcoyne appeals these two rulings; we affirm.
Ill
Invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guаrantees required Kilcoyne to show that the State had deprived him of a protected liberty or property
3
interest.
Board of Regents v. Roth,
Far from disclosing a violation of his constitutional rights, Kilcoyne’s complaint reveals that ECU provided procedural safeguards beyond the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because he lacked a right to further employment at ECU, his denial of tenure and further employment without
any
procedural safеguards would have been permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Board of Regents v. Roth,
Had ECU
gratuitously
afforded tenure aspirants procedural safeguards not constitutionally mаndated, deviations from those procedures would not support a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983.
See, e. g., Clark v. Whiting,
For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, Kilcoyne’s contractual claim for additional procedural safeguards does not distinguish his case from those where the procedures were provided gratuitously. The contract may provide a basis for recovery under a breach of promise theory, but that issue is not elevated to a constitutional question solely because the State is a pаrty to the contract. As we have admonished repeatedly “[ejvery disagreement between a public employee with his employer over . . . the terms of his contract does not reach constitutional proportions.”
Sigmon v. Poe,
IV
Kilcoyne’s pendent State law claims pressеd a cause of action for breach of contract. The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims on the grounds that they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of North Carolina abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in that State effеctive March 2, 1976.
Smith v. State,
In
MacDonald v. University of North Carolina,
The judgments below are
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. These letters were dated April 21, 1970 and May 22, 1971.
. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or оther person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
. Kilcoyne raises only colorable claims of deprivation of property interests.