92 Minn. 110 | Minn. | 1904
This appeal is from an order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint in an action brought to set off judgments owned by plaintiff against a subsequent judgment entered in favor of an administrator.
From the complaint it appears that the Martin County Bank held' several valid judgments rendered in justice court against one D. W. Coulthard previous to the death of the latter in December, 1894, transcripts of which were filed in the district court of the proper county according to law. During Coulthard’s lifetime an action in claim and
We cannot hold that it was a substantial objection to the demand that the bank’s judgments be set off that they were not rendered in favor of the present plaintiff, for the latter succeeded to all the rights of the Martin County Bank, and held the judgments in direct privity of interest thereunder. The power of a court to order that one judgment be set off against another on proper application when the adverse judgments are between the same parties, where equity and justice will be promoted, is too well established to admit of doubt. By such course both judgments will be extinguished if they are equal in amount, or, if they are unequal, by satisfying the smaller in full and the
In Lundberg v. Davidson, 68 Minn. 329, 71 N. W. 395, 72 N. W. 71, we held that the set-off was 'not demandable as an absolute right, but to be ordered in the exercise of the court’s discretion. This does not mean that the authority to allow or deny the right is arbitrary, or the power to adjudge the set-off dependent upon the mere inclination of the court. The discretion to be exercised in such case is a sound legal discretion addressed to the conscience and judgment of the court, where the relationship of the reciprocal judgment creditors is such that upon equitable grounds the relief sought should be granted; and where an action is brought for that purpose, and the complaint sets forth sufficient facts to show equitable grounds which justify the relief asked, affirmative defensive matter of a legal character or addressed to the discretion of the court should be pleaded, and the cause determined after hearing upon the merits therein disclosed.
We are inclined to the opinion from the argument here that the learned trial court, in sustaining the demurrer, denied the right to set off the bank’s judgments against that of the administrator upon the view that the obligations of the former had not been previously presented for allowance to the probate court as claims against intestate’s estate, which it is now insisted was an essential prerequisite to authorize .the relief which this action was brought to secure. This presents the only serious question for our determination on this appeal. The right of a defendant in an action brought by an administrator for the recov
It is undoubtedly true that no affirmative judgment above the set-off could be granted in favor of the plaintiff without having had the judgments allowed, but this is not what is sought, but to offset claims that have become fixed and indisputable, and, because the law presumes that to be done which ought to be done, declare paid that which has been equitably paid. It seems clearly apparent, upon the affirmative showing in the complaint, that the judgment pleaded by plaintiff should be set off, and unless there are reasons of a legal or equitable character, or
The order appealed from is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.