5 Conn. App. 5 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1985
This case presents the question of whether an orthopedic surgeon is qualified to testify as an expert as to the standard of care required in connection with the performance of foot surgery by a licensed podiatrist certified in the field of surgery.
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of surgery performed by the defendant Jeffrey Yale, a licensed podiatrist in Connecticut, on the plaintiffs right and left feet. Yale is an agent and employee of the defendant Yale Podiatry Group, P.C. His examination of the plaintiff disclosed a hallux limitus of the right foot (restricted, painful range of big toe motion) and a tailor’s bunion of the left foot. To alleviate the plaintiff’s condition, Yale operated on the plaintiff implanting an artificial joint in the plaintiff’s right, big toe and removing a portion of the plaintiff’s left small toe.
At trial, the plaintiff called Urelich Weil, an orthopedic surgeon, to testify to the applicable standard of care for such surgery. The defendants objected to Weil’s testifying, claiming that he was not qualified to testify as to the applicable standard of care. The trial court sustained the defendants’ objection and the plaintiff excepted. Weil was the plaintiff’s only expert witness and therefore the plaintiff rested since without his testimony the plaintiff could not prevail.
The standard of care to which physicians and surgeons are held is “that which physicians and surgeons in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like cases.” Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 169, 27 A. 116 (1893). When the court formulated that test, the “same general neighborhood” was interpreted as a territorial limitation restricted to the confines of the community in which the doctor practiced. In Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932), the “general neighborhood” was considered the state of Connecticut. It has now been broadened to include the entire nation. Van Steensburg v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospitals, 194 Conn. 500, 506-507 n.8, 481 A.2d 750 (1984). These cases reveal a trend towards the liberalization of the rules involving the qualifications of medical experts.
Although the issue of this case does not involve the geographical limitation on medical expert testimony, but rather the “general line of practice” limitation on expert medical testimony offered in a medical malpractice action, the liberalization of the evidentiary rules regarding the former limitation are relevant in analyzing the latter limitation.
Our analysis of cases starts with Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975), where the
Our appellate courts have had occasion to address this issue since that case. In Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 646-47, 368 A.2d 172 (1976), the court held that where the evidence presented at trial showed that the treatment in question falls within the field of all medical specialties and the minimum standard of care was common to all specialties, the plaintiff’s medical experts were competent to testify as to the applicable standard of care, although not specialists in the same field as the defendants. In Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn. App. 579, 584-86, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984), the plaintiff offered two plastic surgeons as expert witnesses on the standard of care for performing a breast reduction operation, although the defendant performing the surgery was a general surgeon. That defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the applicable standard of care. The trial court denied that motion and was upheld on appeal. One of the plastic surgeons testified that the standard of care applicable for performing the surgery was the same for plastic surgeons and general surgeons. Id., 585. The common thread tying these decisions together is that where the evidence indicates that the specialties overlap and the
Connecticut has not previously considered whether an orthopedic surgeon can testify as an expert against a podiatrist in a malpractice action. Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed this issue, reaching varying decisional results. The Ohio Supreme Court, citing a Connecticut case, Katsetos v. Nolan, supra, held that the plaintiffs medical expert, a podiatrist, was competent to testify as to the alleged malpractice, applying and failing to remove a cast which was too tight, by the defendant orthopedic surgeon. Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Medical Center, 56 Ohio St. 2d 155, 383 N.E.2d 564 (1978). The record disclosed that the application and removal of casts is an area where these fields of medicine overlap. The court, therefore, concluded that the podiatrist was qualified to testify as an expert. Id., 162. The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed this issue, holding that where the evidence indicates the fields overlap and the methods of treatment are the same for the schools involved, an orthopedic surgeon can testify as an expert as to the standard of care which must be exercised by a podiatrist. Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495, 288 S.E.2d 739 (1982). The California Court of Appeals has addressed the analogous issue of whether a podiatrist can testify as to the applicable standard of care of an orthopedic surgeon performing foot surgery, holding that he can. Chadock v. Cohn, 96 Cal. App. 3d 205, 157 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1979). The record revealed a familiarity with the surgery and contained testimony that the fields overlapped. Id., 209-14.
There is, however, a line of authority excluding such testimony. The South Carolina Court of Appeals has held that an orthopedic surgeon was not competent to testify as to the applicable standard of care in a mal
The decisions allowing and excluding expert testimony in this area generally focus on the expert’s familiarity with the school of medicine and the procedures involved. To resolve this issue in the context of this case requires an examination of the testimony proffered to qualify Weil as an expert, in order to determine whether he possessed a sufficient familiarity with the school of medicine and the procedures involved.
In the absence of the jury, Weil was extensively examined regarding his qualifications to testify as an expert. He testified that he has performed hundreds of operations on the feet, that he was familiar with the surgical procedure performed on the plaintiff’s feet,
The defendant podiatrist testified that, in terms of foot surgery, orthopedic surgeons and podiatric surgeons generally performed the same procedures. He admitted that a certain medical text on surgery on the feet was authoritative. Weil expressed a familiarity with that text insofar as it pertains to the plaintiffs preoperative condition and the surgical and conservative nonsurgical techniques for the treatment of the plaintiffs condition. Although Weil had never performed or assisted in the surgical procedures involved in the treatment of the plaintiffs malady, this was so because he questioned the use of such procedures. The extensive offer of proof discloses that the plaintiffs expert had the requisite familiarity with the particular school of medicine and the procedure involved to
There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff waived his right to claim error on the issue of whether the plaintiffs expert was qualified to testify since
A reported decision of the New York trial court excluded a general surgeon from testifying as to the standard of care of podiatrists. Darby v. Cohen, 101 Misc. 2d 516, 421 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1979).