Marshall v. SAIF Corp.Marshall v. SAIF Corp.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Gillette
In this workers’ compensation case, the issue is whether claimant, a sole proprietor, submitted sufficient evidence to corroborate her claim of compensability for an occupational disease, thereby permitting recovery under
The facts of the case that are pertinent to the issue before the court are undisputed. Claimant has been a hairdresser for 35 years. For approximately the past 20 years, she has been the sole proprietor of her own salon. She elected workers’ compensation coverage for herself with SAIF Corporation (SAIF) under
In 1991, claimant began to notice pain in her right hand and arm. The symptoms gradually worsened and, by January 1992, the pain had radiated up through her wrist and elbow into her shoulder. In February 1992, claimant consulted a physician, Dr. Rabie, who diagnosed tendinitis and capsulitis in her right index finger, thumb, elbow, and shoulder. Based on claimant’s account of her condition, Rabie concluded that the problem was the result of her repetitious hand and arm movements at work, and instructed her to limit her work to four hours per day.
*52 In April 1992, claimant submitted a workers’ compensation claim for tendinitis in her right thumb, finger, elbow, and shoulder. SAIF denied the claim on the ground that claimant’s work as a hairdresser was not the major contributing cause of the development or worsening of her tendinitis. Claimant requested a hearing and, before a Hearings Division referee, presented her own testimony as to compens-ability, along with Rabie’s report diagnosing tendinitis and concluding, based on information that claimant had provided to him, that claimant’s condition resulted from her work activities.
After the hearing, SAIF submitted a trial memorandum to the referee in which it contended that, in addition to its other reasons for denying claimant’s claim, the claim should be denied because claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof as a sole proprietor under
In response, claimant argued, among other things, that
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SAIF sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals. That court reversed the Board on the issue of the proper interpretation of
On remand, claimant asserted that her consistent medical histories, provided to her own doctor and to the physicians who examined her on behalf of SAIF, as well as her consistent statement to SAIF’s investigator, constituted sufficient corroborative evidence to satisfy the requirements of
In its order on remand, the Board held that the corroborative evidence required by the statute “must be supplementary to and of a different character from claimant’s evidence.” On the facts of the present case, the Board concluded that neither the physicians’ reports nor claimant’s statement to the investigator constituted “corroborative evidence in addition to the evidence of the claimant,” inasmuch as they were not supplementary to or different in character from her own testimony. According to the Board, the medical reports corroborated the existence of claimant’s medical condition, but they did not corroborate the cause of that condition. Consequently, it reinstated and upheld SAIF’s denial of claimant’s claim. 4
Claimant again sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals, this time assigning error to the Board’s conclusion that Rabie’s medical report did not constitute corroborative evidence of compensability and, alternatively, to the Board’s refusal to remand the case to the referee to allow claimant to present additional corroborative evidence. The *54 Court of Appeals reversed the Board on the first issue and, therefore, did not reach the second.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals began by analyzing the wording of
The Court of Appeals assumed, for the sake of discussion, that the phrase “evidence of the claimant” in
“[n]ot only are the medical reports ‘in addition to’ claimant’s statements, they do, in fact, corroborate compensability. They show that the claimant described to her doctor the same employment conditions that she had reported on her *55 claim and to which she testified. The doctor’s opinion attributes claimant’s injury and need for treatment to the employment conditions claimant described. The reports accordingly corroborate both the ‘arising out of and ‘in the course of components of proof of compensability,ORS 656.005(7) , and satisfy the requirement ofORS 656.128(3) , because they make more certain the compensability of the claim.”
Ibid.
On review, we need not address the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning regarding the sufficiency of the medical reports, because, for the following reasons, we conclude that sufficient corroborative evidence is present in this case to support the claim.
At the outset, we note that claimant’s tendinitis is compensable, if at all, as an “occupational disease” under
Claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the occupational disease is compensable.
“[n]o claim shall be allowed or paid under this section [permitting sole proprietors to elect workers’ compensation coverage], except upon corroborative evidence in addition to the evidence of the claimant.”
*56 The statute requires the claimant to produce corroborative evidence in addition to the “evidence of the claimant. ” (Emphasis added.) However, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the statute does not define the phrases “corroborative evidence” or “evidence of the claimant,” nor does it specify what, exactly, must be corroborated. As did the Court of Appeals, we attempt to discern the intent of the legislature using the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or at 610-12. At the first level of our analysis, we look at the text and context of the statutory section itself. Id. at 610-11.
It is clear that the legislature could not have intended the phrase “evidence of the claimant” to mean all the evidence a claimant presents at a workers’ compensation hearing, for that would lead to the absurd result that no claimant could ever meet the burden because any evidence offered as corroboration would, itself, be “evidence of the claimant.” At the same time, the statute does not require merely that a claimant’s
testimony
be corroborated by other evidence. The text, therefore, suggests that something more is required and appears to reflect a heightened legislative concern over a claimant’s credibility. It is evident from the wording in
Turning to “corroborative evidence,” we agree with the Court of Appeals’ definition of that phrase, as “evidence, different from the evidence of the claimant, that tends to make more certain the compensability of the claim.”
Marshall II,
146 Or App at 53. We have defined corroboration or corroborative evidence similarly in other contexts in our decisions over the years. For example, in
Farmers Insurance Exch. v. Colton,
264 Or 210, 217, 504 P2d 1041 (1972),
quoting 2
E. Conrad, Modem Trial Evidence § 1155 (1956), we held that “corroboration” is “ ‘something which leads an
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impartial and reasonable mind to believe that material testimony is true, testimony of some substantial fact or circumstance independent of a statement of a witness.’ ” Nothing in the statutory context of
The remaining question, then, is what, exactly, a sole proprietor must corroborate. As the Court of Appeals held in
Marshall I,
the wording of the statute requires the claimant to corroborate
compensability.
To be compensable, an injury or occupational disease must arise out of and in the course of employment.
To corroborate
compensability,
then, a sole proprietor must provide not only corroborative evidence of the
existence
of the injury or disease, but also corroborative evidence that the injury or occupational disease is
work-related.
The evidence is “corroborative” if it supplements, strengthens, and confirms the testimony of the claimant and tends to verify her version of the facts. Nothing in
At the hearing before the Board, claimant provided corroborative evidence of the existence of her tendinitis in the form of Rabie’s medical report. It is true that even the doctor’s medical conclusions are based, in part, on claimant’s complaints of pain in her hand, arm, and shoulder. Yet, the doctor’s own examination, expertise, and diagnosis are necessary to confirm that the disease of tendinitis exists. That additional “evidence” provides sufficient corroboration of claimant’s claim in that regard.
Finally, we consider whether the doctor’s report corroborated claimant’s assertion that the tendinitis is work-related. We hold that it did, under the peculiar facts presented here. There are a few kinds of employment that are so familiar to the ordinary person that no further proof of specific physical activities by a claimant on the job is required. We believe that the work of a hairdresser fits within such a class. Most persons have observed hairdressing first hand and, even for those who have not, they almost surely are aware that the work requires rapid and repetitious hand and arm movements. The doctor should be deemed to have been aware of that fact independent of claimant’s history. Thus, in this case, the necessary corroboration was present.
SAIF argues that claimant separately must corroborate the fact that her work was the major contributing cause of her disease. The effect of that argument in the present case would be to require claimant to submit corroborative evidence of a negative,
viz.,
of the fact that she did not carry on activities off the job that involved rapid and repetitious hand and arm movements of the kind that could have caused her tendinitis. We hold, however, that claimant satisfied that requirement of
It follows from the foregoing that, although we disagree with portions of the analysis of the Court of Appeals in this case, we do agree with its conclusion.
*59 The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the Workers’ Compensation Board is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Board for farther proceedings.
Notes
“No claim shall be allowed or paid under this section, except upon corroborative evidence in addition to the evidence of the claimant.”
SAIF also had raised the general issue of the applicability of
Claimant also asked the Board to remand the case to the referee for the presentation of additional corroborative evidence, should the Board find her corroboration argument unpersuasive.
The Board refused to remand the case to the referee to allow claimant to offer additional evidence.
Although not discussed in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, the reference to the “ ‘arising out of or ‘in the course of prong” is a reference to the workers’ compensation statute that defines a compensable injury or occupational disease as one “arising out of and in the course of employment.”