*1
In order to
counsel,
show that he received ineffective assistance of
point
defendant must therefore
revealing
to facts
that his counsel’s
performance was so deficient that it fell
objective
below the
standard
of reasonableness and that
a
that,
there is
probability
reasonable
but
unprofessional errors,
counsel’s
the result of the proceeding would
have been
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
80 L. Ed.
Accordingly, for the above, reasons set forth defendant’s convic- tion is affirmed.
Affirmed. COUSINS, JJ.,
RAKOWSKIand concur. MARSHALL, GERALD W. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. METROPOLITAN WATER FUND, RECLAMATION DISTRICT RETIREMENT Defendant-Appellant. (2nd Division) First District No. 1 — 97—3095 Opinion July 14, filed *2 RAKOWSKI, J., specially concurring. Gaughan, Kane, Frank Doy Harrington, Ltd., I. & and Andrew A.
Farenga, Chicago, appellant. both of Rothschild, Goldstine, Donald Skrodzki, Russian, S. Hoff, Nemec & Ltd., Summit, Gross, Brook, and Mark C. appellee. of Oak JUSTICE opinion COUSINS delivered the of the court: *3 Plaintiff sustained injuries heart-related while in the of course his duties for (District). the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Based on the Industrial finding Commission’s that plaintiffs none of injuries permanent resulted in disability plaintiffs total allegedly and filing late application benefits, of his for defendant denied plaintiff duty disability pension benefits. The circuit court on administrative review set benefits, aside defendant’s denial of ruling plaintiffs that hospitalization five-week the statutory tolled filing deadline for for also, benefits; that laches barred denying defendant from plaintiff benefits where defendant unnecessarily waited more than 13 years af- ter plaintiff filed his application for benefits making before its deci- (1) sion. On appeal, argues defendant that: plaintiff is collaterally estopped relitigating the issue of whether his current condition (2) of total is related to District; his work with the and laches improperly was considered a bar defendant’s denial of coverage based on of plaintiffs filing application late his for benefits.
BACKGROUND 2, September 1981, District,
On employ while under the of the plaintiff heard coming parking noise from the area his near work sta- at Chicago investigated tion River locks. Plaintiff the disturbance drowning man. After help to calling for save found a woman and managed to the woman plaintiff and attempts, several unsuccessful pains chest Michigan. experienced Plaintiff from Lake the man pull room, it where was hospital emergency was taken to a hours later and Plaintiff was suffering a heart attack. was plaintiff that determined spent approximately and care unit hospital’s to the intensive admitted that revealed examinations Follow-up hospital. in the weeks 2Va irreversible loss 30% approximately resulted-in attack heart plaintiffs of heart function. the District 28, 1981, resumed work with September plaintiff
On 11, February working until continued Plaintiff light-duty on a basis. receiving the results attack after 1982, angina he when suffered of work weeks approximately missed service test. Plaintiff a civil 1% attack, thereafter. he returned to work angina but as a result of the 1982, hospital- 30, at which time he was through April Plaintiff worked that determined clotting legs. physician in his Plaintiffs ized for blood weakened heart inability clotting by was caused anti-clotting forcefully enough. Although plaintiffs to circulate blood condition, subsequently determined his it was improved medication sitting clotting problem. standing plaintiff’s or exacerbated Plaintiff and he was April after did not return work June, May, during the months of in excess of five weeks hospitalized in a medical eventually deemed disabled July and 1982. Plaintiff was 18, July on opinion plaintiffs physician written District, plaintiff with the During employment the course injuries. of his three for each compensation filed claims workers’ resulting claims and the Following District’s denials of case, Industrial Commission concluded hearings arbitration in each 1982, work- September incident of was heart attack disability compensation total plaintiff temporary and awarded related appealed The District permanent partial compensation. Il review and the the circuit court on administrative this decision to Court, the award upheld both of which Appellate linois Reclamation District Metropolitan Industrial Commission. Water Comm’n, v. Industrial Chicago Greater February angina attack respect With dis temporary total granted the Industrial Commission disability. permanent ability compensation but no compensation, *4 upon blood compensation for básed Plaintiff’s third claim workers’ motion. legs plaintiffs on own clotting was dismissed claims, plaintiff filed compensation In to his addition workers’ defendant on benefits duty disability pension for with application as to make a determination August 23, 1982. Defendant chose not to plaintiffs application duty pension for disability a final until decision been respect had made the courts with to work- compensation ers’ claims. After the Appellate Illinois Court affirmed plaintiff’s award, initial compensation workers’ finally defendant conducted its hearing administrative respect with to claim duty disability benefits. hearing This occurred on January over 13 years plaintiff well after had application filed his such benefits. ultimately Defendant determined that plaintiff was not duty entitled to disability benefits, reasoning applica- untimely filed, tion had been that plaintiff had already received unre- lated compensation for his injuries, and that blood-clotting condition, by being work-related, virtue precluded him from receiving duty disability benefits. petitioned
Plaintiff subsequently the circuit court for administra- tive review, review defendant’s denial. On the circuit court set aside on grounds defendant’s decision the that the statute of limitations for filing duty the disability application was tolled during periods the plaintiff which was hospitalized, and that laches barred defendant refusing from pay duty plaintiff the benefits for which he had applied. appeals Defendant from that decision.
We reverse and remand with directions.
ANALYSIS
Defendant first plaintiff contends that is collaterally estopped relitigating from the issue whether his current condition of total causally from work to his employment related with position, District. In support points of its defendant to the fact that the Industrial Commission did not find permanently was totally 30, 1982, and April disabled after a any as result of of his ac- cidents at work.
Generally,
estoppel precludes
collateral
a party
relitigat
ing
adversely
issues resolved
to them in a prior civil proceeding with
(1988).
party.
Owens,
another
In
re
125 Ill. 2d
The Owens
court set forth the threshold requirements for collateral
as
estoppel
(1)
follows:
the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with
(2)
presented
bar;
one
the action at
there was a final judgment
(3)
on
prior
the merits in the
adjudication;
party
whom collateral estoppel
privity
a
or in
a
party
asserted was
with
party
prior
Owens,
adjudication.
addition,
to the
Applying that, the above rules to the judice, case sub we note
71
prior
in
issue
pivotal
the
may
though
seem as
initially, it
to that cur
identical
Commission is
the Industrial
adjudication before
is
disabled
defendant, namely, whether
by
rently presented
arising out
his
or accidents
of an accident
from work as a result
however, we
inspection,
Upon
District.
closer
employment with the
identical
to that
court
the issue before this
determine that
the Industrial Commission
The
before
previously adjudicated.
issues
the extent of
involved
litigation
in
consolidated
Act
Compensation
in
of the Workers’
injuries
the context
permanent
(West
(820
1994)),
petition
whereas
seq.
et
ILCS 305/1
of the Il
injuries in the context
his
duty disability
dealt with
1992)).
(West
(40
The
seq.
et
Code
ILCS
linois Pension
5/11—101
in
aptly treated
significant
and was
importance of this distinction
46,
Co.,
App.
103 Ill.
3d
Casting
Steel
Sterling
v.
the case Godare
(1981).
In court this and employed making compensation pen- in are workers’ standards The court stated: sion determinations.
“Procedurally, compensation hearing, medical in a workmen’s employ of claimant’s testimony as well as evidence of the nature by the ment, age, experience capabilities and are considered [citation]; by Commission[] arbitrator and reviewed whereas, the Industrial agreement is founded pension entitlement under the 51-52, Godare, App. on 103 Ill. 3d at exclusively opinions.” medical 624. 430 N.E.2d at Comm’n, App. 3d v. Industrial Chicago
See also
Park District
(1994) (workers’
835,
perma
compensation award
In statutory law, aforementioned and case our review of the record establishes that the evidence and presented issues before the Industrial in plaintiffs Commission prior litigation differed from those presented before the circuit in plaintiffs court duty action for Moreover, benefits. we are of opinion that, due progressive plaintiffs injuries, nature of the evidence presented latter necessarily action differed from that considered the Industrial Commission in Consequently, neither the new evidence *6 nature of plaintiffs injuries and extent underlying nor the issue of plaintiffs disability current total is by barred collateral estoppel the Thus, pension view, action. in our although the Industrial Commission plaintiffs concluded that injuries work-related permanently were not totally disabling, its determinations did not foreclose the circuit court in subsequent the pension litigation receiving from and consider- ing updated concerning plaintiffs evidence the permanency of injuries, injuries as such were progressive in nature.
Next, defendant contends plaintiffs that claim for duty disability by benefits is barred the 90-day filing requirement applicable at the time of work-related accidents. Defendant attempts to bolster its contention by arguing 90-day that the deadline constituted jurisdictional a equitable considerations, limitation and that such as laches, applied cannot be that limitation. statutory
The applicable subsection at the time injuries provided occurred as follows: [duty disability]
“The only benefit shall be if allowed the follow- ing requirements by employee: are met
(1) Application days [B]oard is made to the within from added.) (Emphasis date the accident.” 111.Rev. Stat. ch. IO8V2,par. 13—157.
However, provision 1, 1992, this on January provide was amended as follows:
“(b) [duty disability] The if only benefit shall be allowed the fol- lowing requirements employee: are met
(1) Application is made to the days Board within 90 added.) disability beginsi.]” the date (Emphasis 40 ILCS (West 309(b) 1992). 5/13—
Initially, recognize procedural we amendment as being above that, nature. Our decision is based on well-settled where the law legislature amends a statute no pending appeal and where vested reviewing by involved, disposed the suit must be rights are Education, Mien- v. Board the amended statute. Bates court under 17, 136 Ill. 2d District School No. Community dale Consolidated (1990). al the issue of Moreover, defendant raised 268-69 for the first time its 90-day time limit breach of the leged 309(b) amended. was benefits, well after section denial of pension 13— section 13— version of result, that the amended As a we conclude 309(b) to the instant case. applies Code the Pension disability begins” nonetheless, “date
Defendant, argues that the Defen injuries. his work-related plaintiff initially sustained when 23, 1982, at least 23 filing was plaintiffs August dant that asserts days of deadline, within 90 as it did not occur days beyond the stated 11, 1982, 2, 1981, February April or September either 1982, accident.
Plaintiff, however,
of his
was
argues that
the date
inability
he
of his
since was
aware
April
sometime after
view, the
agree.
We
In our
until later medical determinations.
work
309(b)
is that the “date
proper interpretation of section 13—
that an
it becomes clear to a reasonable claimant
begins” occurs when
An
or her duties.
instruc
injury precludes
performance
further
v.
County
Nursing Home
Industrial
tive case is Peoria
Belwood
Comm’n,
case,
Supreme
2d 524
In that
the Illinois
progressive injury
the date when a
occurs
the date
Court wrote that
Home,
County
injury
Nursing
manifests itself. Peoria
Belwood
“ ‘[mjanifests
explained
115 Ill. 2d
531. The court further
at
injury
of the
and the
itself means the date on which both the fact
employment
to the claimant’s
would
relationship
injury
causal
County
plainly apparent
person.”
have
to reasonable
Peoria
become
*7
Home,
that
Nursing
running of time in a statute period any of limitations for span of time during which a See, claimant benefits is disabled. e.g., Ciers v. O.L. Lines, Inc., Schmidt Barge 1046, 285 App. 1052, Ill. 3d 675 N.E.2d (1996) 210, 214 (equitable tolling may appropriate plaintiff, be if extraordinary some way, has prevented asserting been from rights).
In addition to holding that application for duty dis ability timely filed, benefits was the circuit court determined that the doctrine of laches barred defendant from denying plaintiff those Generally, benefits. laches an equitable doctrine precludes that recovery by a party whose delay unreasonable in bringing preju suit dices rights of the opponent. ex People Daley Stray horn, rel. v. 121 (1988). 470, Ill. 2d 482 The determination of whether applies laches depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and lies within the sound discretion of judge. the trial Hannigan Hoffmeister, v. 1065,
Ill. App. 3d A judge’s trial rul ing respect with to laches is reviewed under the “abuse discretion” standard of review. Hannigan, App. 240 Ill. 3d at 608 N.E.2d at parties
Both appeal arguments on make with respect to laches. Plaintiff argues delay years defendant’s over making its determination as plaintiffs duty application disabilities was unrea- sonable. Plaintiff highlights the fact that one of defendant’s represen- testimony tatives admitted in that defendant could have made its deci- sion much sooner. Plaintiff further prejudiced by contends he was delay such prevented that it him from possibly settling or later fil- ing any or all of his workers’ compensation claims pas- and that the sage long period such a has made it impossible for plaintiff to determine the exact date when became he aware that he was disabled working Defendant, however, the District. argues that the 90- 309(b) day filing deadline in jurisdictional section constitutes a 13— limitation on claim duty disability benefits, preclud- thus any ing equitable defense such as laches.
Although
already
we have
concluded that
filing for
duty disability
did not abridge
90-day deadline, we,
never
theless,
309(b)
examine defendant’s contention that section
13—
jurisdictional.
upon
Defendant relies
Eschbaugh
Comm’n,
v. Industrial
(1996),
75 s substan plaintiff to a precedent a the former is condition stating that s plaintiff affect a does not the latter remedy, while right to seek a tive Ill. Eschbaugh, 286 remedy. his or her only but rights substantive of limita a statute Accordingly, 964-65, N.E.2d at 440. App. 3d at 677 to and open that is waivable affirmative defense tions constitutes an 964-65, App. Ill. 3d at 677 Eschbaugh, 286 considerations. equitable statutory pro recognized that a particular, 440. In the court N.E.2d at days’ notice of an employer an 45 give to requiring vision a claimant limitation, provision a jurisdictional whereas a incident constituted compensa for workers’ filing application declaring period a time equitable to subject of limitations deemed a statute tion benefits was 965, at 440. 3d at App. 286 Ill. Eschbaugh, defenses. case, Eschbaugh the instant we in to the rationale Applying 309(b) a Pension Code is statute of the that section conclude 13— not create a substantive statutory provision does This limitations. can be chal rather, language of limitations that but, constitutes right not Consequently, plaintiff was equitable defenses. lenged with defendant, section 13— precluded asserting against laches and 309(b) jurisdictional proceedings. to the present bar does case,
Nevertheless, find error in the court’s particular in this we any laches, which, effect, precluded consideration application of review, the Upon defendant. administrative the evidence considered setting aside defendant’s following made the statement circuit court “[Sjince [F]und plaintiff: to duty denial of application, this years disqualify to Marshall’s waited over thirteen him.” repaying from not [F]und that latches bars the [szc] Court finds reasoning setting aside of the circuit court’s This was the extent Although of whether laches the determination defendant’s decision. court, the trial of the trial applies lies within the sound discretion App. 240 Ill. 3d at Hannigan, See court must not abuse its discretion. more, stating the court concluded N.E.2d at 403. Without 608 duty dis plaintiff the paying barred defendant from not that laches view, the court’s he In our circuit ability applied. benefits for which foreclosed from even rais ruling effectively that defendant was meant plaintiff totally disabled. ing permanently the issue of whether laches to the ultimate view, applying erred in In our the circuit court duty disability benefits. entitled issue of whether in administra petitioned to sit the circuit court was Importantly, laches, circuit Therefore, absent tive of the instant case. review case and court in such a appellate serve as an dutybound court was weight the evi “manifest review defendant’s decision under Fire & Park Board Village Biscan v. Melrose dence” standard. N.E.2d Commissioners, Police (1996) (sole duty upon of trial court administrative review is to review administrative record to agency’s determine whether decision is weight evidence), manifest citing Polk v. Board Trust *9 of Fund, ees the 525, 536, Police Pension Ill. 3d 253 of is, 1374 That the circuit purpose court’s was to review the evidence that was adduced before in making defendant its deter whether, mination and to decide upon law, based that evidence and the of duty disability defendant’s denial benefits to plaintiff was against the weight manifest of the evidence. See City Belvidere v. Illinois of (1998) (in Board, Labor State Relations 181 Ill. 2d 204 reviewing agency’s administrative findings, factual reviewing court does not weigh evidence or judgment substitute its for that of the administra agency); tive Robbins v. Board Trustees the Carbondale Police of of (1997) (on Fund, Pension 177 Ill. 2d 538 review, administrative court’s function is to determine agency’s whether findings and conclu against evidence); sions are weight manifest Abrahamson v. Il Department (1992) linois Regulation, Ill. of Professional (court’s purpose on administrative is to reweigh review not evidence facts). independent or make an determination of the The record in what, the instant case does not reveal any, if consideration the gave circuit court to the evidence that was considered defendant in its denial of application. dif- Put ferently, the circuit court made no determination as to whether defendant’s decision was weight the manifest of the evidence. Since the circuit court duty has not fulfilled its to serve as appel- late court to decision, review defendant’s we reverse and remand the instant case to the circuit court and direct the court to review the evi- dence, determine whether duty defendant’s denial manifestly erroneous, was and enter judgment accordingly.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
McNULTY,EJ., concurs. RAKOWSKI, concurring: JUSTICE specially I agree estoppel that the doctrine of collateral does not Mar- bar shall claiming causally that his current condition is related to I September agree also that incident. the amended version 309(b) I jurisdictional. agree section is not further that Peoria 13— County Nursing Bellwood Home is instructive as to when Marshall’s alleged disability occurred.
The of alleged however, date disability, question nonetheless a fact. Although majority hospitalization holds that intermittent will law, authority is cited no a matter of period as toll the limitations such, As none exists. respectfully I that submit proposition. such a that to make board to the retirement remanded this cause should be this given in the instructions with in accordance determination opinion. made, may analyze the circuit court
Once determination is under issues causal connection date and occurrence both standard. weight a manifest evidence I opinion, assume in the expressly not stated Finally, although apply of laches should the doctrine majority concluding that, agree. I case. With under the facts this *10 al., FETTSON, JAMES et Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATIE L. TYRONE Defendants-Appellants. (3rd Division) 1—96—2106
First No. District September Opinion filed