143 Me. 167 | Me. | 1948
The defendants Yvonne Mathieu and David Mathieu, her husband, prosecute the present appeal against a decision rendered against them, and another, on a Bill in Equity brought to enforce a lien claimed by the plaintiff on land and buildings belonging to the wife. The process names the tenant of one of the buildings, who operated a restaurant therein, as the third defendant, and alleges that the plaintiff furnished labor and materials in erecting, constructing, altering and repairing that building under a contract with all three defendants. The decision negatives such a contract. Its recitals that the third defendant, Cora Maheu Poilliot (named as Cora Maheu), is indebted to the plaintiff in a named sum and that the plaintiff has a lien on the land and buildings for a lesser one indicates factual findings that the plaintiff was employed to do all the work by Mrs. Poilliot alone and that lienable labor and materials for a part of it were furnished with the consent of the owner of the property. That is all the lien statute, cited infra, requires. An exception to an evidence ruling in the Trial Court, perfected in the Bill of Exceptions, was waived at oral argument.
A statement of the amount claimed as a lien was filed pursuant to the requirements of the statute, showing charges for labor and materials amounting to $1,172.34 and a balance due of $872.34. The award of $722.34 and costs of $25.00, a total of $747.34, eliminates items aggregating $132 applicable to labor and materials used in the construction of tables for the restaurant, and $18 which is said to have been duplicated in the statement. The larger amount is made up of $42 for materials and $90 for labor,
The lien statement was filed on July 11, 1946. The Bill in Equity is dated August 10, 1946, and was filed 6 days later. The statute requirements are that to preserve a lien the statement must be filed within 60 days after the claimant “ceases to labor or furnish materials” and, to enforce it in equity, the bill must be filed within 90 days “after the last of the labor is performed, or labor or materials” furnished.
Ample authority has established several pertinent principles. Only such labor and materials as are used in “erecting, altering, moving, or repairing” a building are protected by a lien. Lambard v. Pike, 33 Me. 141; Baker v. Fessenden, 71 Me. 292; Dole v. Bangor Auditorium Association et al., 94 Me. 532; 48 A. 115; Hanson v. News Publishing Co. et al., 97 Me. 99; 53 A. 990. The coverage stated is that of the present statute. R. S. 1944, Chap. 164, Sec. 34. Originally it was limited to “erecting or repairing.” Laws of 1820, Chap. CLXIX. “Altering” was added in 1837, P. L. 1837,
Prior to 1857 no lien was available to one furnishing either labor or materials for the construction or repair of buildings except under a contract with the proprietor of the land, as he was designated originally (Laws of 1820, Chap. CLXIX), or the owner, as subsequently identified in legislation. The law was liberalized in that year to provide a lien for one furnishing labor or materials for a building owned by one person and standing on the land of another, which would reach any interest the owner of the building might have in the land. P. L. 1857, Chap. 15. It was not until 1868 that land became subject to lien on the basis of its owner’s consent to the furnishing of materials for the erection, alteration or repair of a building located on it. P. L. 1868, Chap. 207. The reason for permitting such a result was well expressed by Mr. Justice Strout, more than 30 years later, in Hanson v. News Publishing Co. et al., supra:
“A lien is given upon the ground that the work has been a benefit to the realty, and has enhanced its value.”
Eliminating the labor and materials applied to the construction of the tables, and allowing for the $18 duplication in the lien statement, as the Justice below did, the decision relates to a total repair bill of $1,022.34, all except $6 of which was either paid out on or before April 15, 1946 or was applicable to materials used on or before that date. The $6 is divided between an item for trucking on April 20, 1946 and the labor charge of May 15, 1946 heretofore discussed. Whether the trucking involved the lumber furnished for the tables, the delivery of them after their construction, or the delivery of other materials, is not important. If it involved other materials it must have related to something delivered on or prior to April 15th. No materials were furnished thereafter.
Correcting the lien statement to eliminate the $18 duplication, it shows a total charge of $1,154.34 and a claimed balance of $854.34 for two jobs, one of which involved lien-able labor and materials while the other did not. The division between the two is entirely clear except for the two $3 items. The Trial Court decided that the trucking item of April 20th, listed as labor, and the labor item of May 15th belonged to the lienable rather than to the non-lienable
Appeal sustained.