372 F.3d 175 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,
____________ ROSENN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. Nos. 03-2801 & 03-3282 (Filed: June 15, 2004) ELINOR F. MARSHALL; Marvin J. Brauth, Esq. (Argued) HARRIET FENTON PARKS; Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, P.A. CAROLL D. KNOTT; 90 Woodbridge Center Drive LINDSAY DRYDEN, III; P.O. Box 10 RANDOLPH FENTON, JR.; Woodbridge, NJ 07095 GLENN THORNTON; Counsel For Appellants
SYNDIE THORNTON SMITH;
HEATHER THORNTON; Gerard G. Brew, Esq. (Argued) MATTHEW C. FENTON, III Robert A. M intz, Esq. THOMAS T. FENTON, Tammy L. Meyer, Esq. McCarter & English, LLP Appellants 100 Mulberry Street Newark, NJ 07102 v. Counsel For Appellees ____________
BRUCE LEA LAURIAULT;
MERCANTILE-SAFE DEPOSIT & OPINION OF THE COURT TRUST ____________ COMPANY; K. DONALD PROCTOR; ELIZABETH CHANDLER ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
LAURIAULT
PIERSON; SALLY VAUGHN This appeal presents an unusual LAURIAULT challenge to the action of the United States District Court in refusing to declare the ____________ State of New Jersey’s adult adoption statute unconstitutional for lack of a notice Appeal from the United States District provision. Other difficult questions posed Court relate to the District Court’s diversity For the District of New Jersey jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an adult D.C. No.: 02-cv-05945 adoption on state law grounds. District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Maria Fenton (“Maria”), now Thompson deceased, was one of ten beneficiaries of a that time, the principal is to be distributed trust created by her uncle, Foster T. among the individuals entitled to receive Fenton, in Maryland in 1966. Several the Trust income at the date of years before her death, Maria adopted her termination. four adult cousins through a proceeding in
The Trust specifically provides that New Jersey state court. The other “an adopted child and such adopted child’s beneficiaries sought declaratory relief in lawful blood descendants shall be the United States District Court for the considered in this instrument as lawful District of New Jersey to have the New blood descendants of the adopting parent Jersey adult adoption statute declared or parents.” The Trust does not include invalid and Maria’s adoption proceedings any specific provision pertaining to declared null and void. The District Court individuals adopted as adults. granted Maria’s motion to dismiss the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We Maria filed a Complaint in July affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 1991 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, for further proceedings. Chancery Division - Fam ily Part,
Hunterdon County, to legally adopt four
I.
adults. The adoptees were the children of Plaintiffs/Appellants are surviving Maria’s first cousin, who recently had beneficiaries of a revocable trust (the died. The Superior Court granted the “Trust”) created by Foster T. Fenton adoption pursuant to the New Jersey adult (“Fenton”) in the State of Maryland on adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 et seq . November 29, 1966. The Trust provides Appellants claim that neither they, nor the that after the death of Fenton’s wife, the trustees, received notice of the adoption balance of the Trust would inure to the proceeding. benefit of Fenton’s brothers and their
Prior to completing the adoption, wives. After the deaths of the brothers and Maria’s attorney, James W . Lance, wrote wives, the Trust provides for the annual in 1990 to the Trust’s corporate trustee, income to be paid to each of Fenton’s ten Mercantile-Safe De posit & Trust nieces and nephews during their remaining Company, informing the trustee that Maria lifetimes. Upon the death of any niece or intended to adopt her four cousins. The nephew, his or her designated one-tenth letter inquired whether, in the trustee’s share of income from the Trust is to be opinion, the adult adoption would enable paid to the deceased niece or nephew’s the adoptees to inherit Maria’s share of the “issue,” as the case may be. If there are no Trust. The trustee responded to the inquiry living issue, the share is to be paid, per offering an unqualified opinion that the stirpes , to the surviving nieces or nephews adoption would enable the adoptees to or their living issue. The Trust terminates inherit Maria’s share of the Trust, per twenty-one years after the death of the last stirpes . Upon completion of the adoption, of the ten named nieces and nephews. At Maria’s attorney delivered the amended law. See Davis v. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., birth certificates of the adoptees and the 697 F.2d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1983) (“in Order of Adoption to the corporate trustee. passing on a motion to dismiss on the
ground, inter alia , of lack of jurisdiction Maria died in 2002. Upon her over the subject matter, the allegations of death, three of her adopted children the complaint should be construed (collectively, “the Adoptees”) asserted an favorably to the pleader”). Thus, we read interest in the Trust as Maria’s “issue.” [1] the claim to allege, as the Appellants assert In response, the Appellants, who are all in their brief, that the adoptions were beneficiaries under the Trust, filed the invalid under the New Jersey law of complaint at bar in the U.S. District Court adoptions, and that the New Jersey for the District of New Jersey. The adoption decrees should not be given full complaint raised two claims for faith and credit under Maryland law, declaratory relief seeking, inter alia , a which governs the Trust. judgment that would (1) declare the 1991 New Jersey adoption decree invalid insofar The seco nd co unt alleges as it created rights or interests in the Trust alternatively that because the New Jersey for the adult Adoptees; (2) declare that the adult adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1, et adult Adoptees have no rights to or interest seq ., does not provide for notice to persons in the income or principal of the Trust; and or entities whose interests may be affected (3) direct the trustees not to pay any by the adoption, the statute is invalid under portion of the income or principal of the the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Trust to the adult Adoptees. States Constitution and the New Jersey
State Constitution. Although both counts in the complaint seek identical relief, they are In January of 2003, the District based on different legal theories. The first Court granted Appellants a temporary count alleges that Maria’s failure to restraining order, prohibiting the Adoptees provide notice of the adoption proceeding from filing an action in Maryland state to the Appellants “prejudiced” their court to claim their interest in the Trust. In interests in the Trust, thereby invalidating March of 2003, the District Court denied the adoption insofar as it would affect their the Appellants’ motion for a preliminary interests. The basis for the claim of injunction and vacated the temporary “prejudice” is not completely clear from restraining order. Once the restraining the language of the complaint, and we order was lifted, the Adoptees filed a claim interpret it as a challenge to the validity of in Maryland state court (“the Maryland the adoptions based on the applicable state case”) seeking to compel the trustees to
make distributions from the Trust to the Adoptees. [2] The Adoptees also filed an 1331, and as a diversity suit pursuant to 28 action in the Superior Court of New U.S.C. § 1332. This court maintains Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § Hunterdon County, (“the New Jersey 1291. As an appeal from the District case”) seeking a declaratory judgment Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under certifying that the New Jersey adoption Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), our review is de decree is valid for all purposes. [3] novo . Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien
& Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. On May 27, 2003, the District 1994). Upon a motion to dismiss, we Court granted the Adoptees’ motion to construe the complaint liberally, and dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. assume all factual allegations in the Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The appellants timely complaint to be true. Wilson v. Rackmill, appealed. [4] 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989). The II. dismissal will be upheld if we agree with the District Court that the Appellants can T h e A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m e d prove no set of facts that would entitle jurisdiction for their underlying suit as a them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. matter arising under the Constitution of the 41, 45-46 (1957). United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § The District Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear any of the Plaintiff’s claims based on state law, and [2] The Maryland case is captioned In considered only the challenge to the New the Matter of the Marital Trust Created Jersey adult adoption statute on Under the Revocable Deed of Trust
constitutional due process grounds. Executed by Foster T. Fenton as Settlor Regarding the challenge to the validity of and Hilary W. Gans and Mercantile-Safe the New Jersey state court adoption Deposit and Trust Companies as
decree, the District Court cited to District Trustees, Case No. 24-T-03-000074 (Cir. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, Ct. Baltimore Cty.). 460 U.S. 462 (1983) for the proposition that federal district courts do not have [3] The New Jersey case is captioned In jurisdiction to hear a challenge to state- the Matter of the Estate of Maria B.
court decisions, even if the challenge Fenton, deceased. The Adoptees did not raises a constitutional claim. As to the provide a case number citation to this claim for a declaratory judgment that the court. Adoptees have no interest in the Trust, the District Court held that it could not assume [4] In addition to M aria Fenton’s jurisdiction over that issue under the adopted children, Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company, K. Donald Proctor, Matthew C. Fenton and Trustees were also named as nominal appellees. probate exception to diversity jurisdiction. [5] New Jersey, and they are not challenging Finally, although the District Court did not an adverse judgment against them. Rather, address this issue, the Adoptees argued the Appellants mount a collateral attack on before the District Court and again in their the validity of the New Jersey adoption appellate brief that this Court should decree. Therefore, we hold that the abstain from deciding the Appellants’ District Court’s finding of no jurisdiction claims. We therefore turn to each of these over a claim of a non-party to state jurisdictional issues. litigation because of Rooker-Feldman to
be in error. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
A.
does not apply to this case, and the District In dismissing for lack of Court could, in theory, assert diversity jurisdiction the challenge to the validity of jurisdiction over this collateral attack to the New Jersey adoption decree, the the New Jersey adoption decree. District Court noted the general principle
B.
that federal district courts may not sit as appellate courts to review state court The District Court found that it did decisions. Although the District Court not have jurisdiction to declare that the cited only to District of Columbia Court of Adoptees have no right or interest in the Appeals v. Feldman, this principle is Trust due to the probate exception to commonly known as the Rooker-Feldman diversity jurisdiction. The District Court doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., did not conduct any analysis of this issue, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The District Court but simply cited to Princess Lida of Thurn correctly stated the general principle under and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 Rooker-Feldman, but failed to recognize (1939), to support its position. We an important factor in the doctrine’s conclude again that the District Court’s application. Under the Rooker-Feldman holding in this matter was incorrect. In doctrine, “a party losing in state court is Princess Lida, the Supreme Court was barred from seeking what in substance called upon to resolve a dispute between a would be appellate review of the state federal district court and the Pennsylvania judgment in a United States district court, Court of Common Pleas, where both based on the losing party's claim that the courts had claimed jurisdiction over a trust state judgment itself violates the loser's matter and had issued orders restraining federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 the parties from proceeding in the other U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (emphasis court. 305 U.S. at 461. The Supreme added). In this case, the Appellants were Court determined that the claims in that not a party to the adoption proceeding in case were not brought in personam to
determine the rights of any person in the trust. Id. at 466-467. Had the claims been [5] See infra Part II.B for a description brought under diversity jurisdiction in of the origin and scope of the probate personam , the Court’s analysis would have exception. been different. Id. Rather, the claims Generally speaking, the Judiciary were quasi in rem , as they related to the Act of 1789 conferred equity jurisdiction administration and restoration of the upon the federal courts, which did not corpus of a trust. Id. at 467. Therefore, include probate jurisdiction. Markham v. the Supreme Court held that the state court Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (noting maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the that the English Court of Chancery in 1789 corpus of the trust, and the federal district did not have jurisdiction over probate court could exercise no jurisdiction. Id. at matters). Thus, federal courts do not have 468. The differences between Princess jurisdiction to probate wills or administer Lida and the case at hand are stark. First, estates. Id. However, federal courts do there is no conflict between the federal and have jurisdiction to entertain suits raised jurisdiction. [6] state courts regarding by creditors, heirs and other claimants Second, the case at bar deals primarily against an estate as long as the federal with a determination of rights in the Trust court “does not interfere with the probate among the parties; there is no claim in rem proceedings or assume general jurisdiction requiring the federal court to maintain of the probate or control of the property in jurisdiction over the corpus of the trust. the custody of the state court.” Id. See
also Moore v. Graybeal, 843 F.2d 706, 709 A determination of whether the (3d Cir. 1988). In Markham, the Supreme probate exception to diversity jurisdiction Court upheld a district court judgment a p p l i es r e q u i re s a m u c h m o re declaring that a petitioner was “entitled to comprehensive analysis than that offered receive the net estate of [the decedent] in by the District Court. Several of our sister distribution” because the judgment did not circuit courts have discussed the limits of disturb the administration of the t h e p r o b a t e e x c e p t i o n , o f t e n decedent’s estate, but rather “decree[d] acknowledging its difficult contours. See, petitioner’s right in the property to be e.g., Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F.3d 1, 2 distributed after its administration.” 326 (1 st Cir. 2000) (noting that “the precise U.S. at 495. scope of the probate exception has not been clearly established”). However, the In the cases following Markham, Supreme Court and the several circuit the circuit courts have further refined the courts have sufficiently clarified the probate exception to diversity jurisdictions doctrine’s guiding principles to resolve the explaining generally that the jurisdictional issue presented in this case. question can be decided by determining
whether the action could be brought in a state court of general jurisdiction where the federal court sits. Foster v. Carlin, 200 [6] The Appellees stipulated at oral F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1952). However, argument that the Maryland state court where a matter does not ordinarily fall has stayed the proceedings in the case within the probate exception to diversity brought by the Adoptees pending jurisdiction, the exception may not be resolution of this appeal. expanded or federal jurisdiction denied court would presumptively consider the because state law would allow the matter same issues presently before this court, to be assigned to a probate court. See, including whether Maryland law requires e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank recognition of the New Jersey adoption & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43-44 (1909). decree and a grant of full faith and credit
for all purposes. Because these issues are Turning to the case at hand, we appropriate for the Maryland state court of conclude that the District Court erred in general jurisdiction, and not the Maryland determining that the probate exception to probate court, the federal court’s diversity diversity jurisdiction applies to this case. jurisdiction, consequently, is not disturbed Fenton established the Trust at issue in this by the probate exception. [8] case prior to his death, and there is no current or pending matter regarding the C. Trust to be administered in the state
The Adoptees argue that this Court probate court. To this Court’s knowledge, should abstain from deciding this case, no state pro bate court exercised based on several recognized abstention jurisdiction over the Trust prior to the doctrines. In order to weigh the appellants filing the present suit. appropriateness of abstention, it is helpful Therefore, the federal court is not asked to to summarize the parties’ positions interfere with any probate proceeding or regarding the state law issues before us. assume control over property in probate. Appellants concede that the Trust is Thus, the District Court possesses diversity governed by Maryland law, but argue that jurisdiction over this claim in personam to the New Jersey adoption decree is not determine the rights of the parties in the entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland Trust. because it is the result of an invalid To further reinforce the point, we judicial ruling. Appellants cite to a series note that the claim brought by the of New Jersey cases for the proposition Adoptees to establish their rights in the Trust was appropriately raised in Maryland
brought by the Adoptees in New Jersey Circuit Court, the state court of general does not affect the probate exception to jurisdiction. [7] In that action, the Maryland diversity jurisdiction analysis. that in New Jersey, adult adoptions entered McCoy, 436 A.2d 436 (M d. 1981). for the purpose of inheriting from a third
As noted above, once the District party or “stranger to the adoption” are not Court resolved its temporary restraining valid. [9] Had the Appellants been provided order, the Adoptees filed the Maryland notice of the adoption proceeding, they case seeking distribution of their interest in suggest that they would have informed the the Trust funds, and the New Jersey case New Jersey court of Maria’s “invalid” seeking declaratory relief to establish the purpose in the adoption (i.e. arranging for validity of the adoption. These pending her cousins to inherit from the third party state court claims form the basis for the Trust) and prevented the court from Adoptees’ request for abstention. approving the adoption. The Adoptees rely on two different The Adoptees argue that New lines of cases to support their request for Jersey law does not prohibit adult abstention. First, under Railroad Comm’n adoptions simply because they involve, of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 among other things, inheritance from a (1941) and its progeny, the Supreme Court third party passing through the adoptive acknowledged that the federal courts may parent. Adoptees assert that the adoption exercise their “wise discretion” to abstain is valid because they complied with every from a case if a parallel state suit may requirement of the New Jersey adult resolve the federal question. 312 U.S. at adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 et seq ., 501. Subsequent cases refined the and that Maryland law explicitly states that Pullman abstention doctrine, warning that adult adoptees will be considered “issue” abstention is only appropriate in entitled to the same rights as natural “exceptional circumstances.” Moses H. children in matters governing the Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., disposition of a trust. See Evans v. 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). The [9] See Matter of Duke, 305 N.J. Super. appropriateness of abstention should be 408, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. reached by balancing factors such as Div. 1995); Matter of the Action of M “inconvenience of the federal forum; the for the Adoption of P, an Adult, 193 N.J. desirability of avoiding piecemeal Super. 33, 471 A.2d 1220 (N.J. Super. litigation; and the order in which Ct. Law Div. 1983); Matter of Nicol’s jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent Estate, 152 N.J. Super. 303, 377 A.2d forums.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15 1201 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); (citation omitted). Yet, none of these Matter of Griswold’s Estate , 140 N.J. factors will be determinative, and the Super. 35, 354 A.2d 717 (Morris County balance is “heavily weighted in favor of Ct. 1976); In re Comly’s Estate, 90 N.J. the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 16 Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175 (Gloucester (citation omitted). County Ct. 1966). The Sup reme Co urt als o Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. acknowledged that “[g]enerally, as § 400, presenting only questions of local between state and federal courts, the rule is laws, the court is under “no compulsion to that ‘the pendency of an action in the state exercise [] jurisdiction” if a parallel state court is no bar to proceedings concerning court proceeding would address the the same matter in the Federal court matters in controversy between the parties. having jurisdiction . . . .’” Colorado River, In Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277 424 U.S. at 817 (citing McClellan v. (1995), the Court reaffirmed the district Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). In courts’ broad discretion for abstention fact, when a judgment sought is strictly in when entertaining claims for declaratory personam, both state and federal courts judgment. “Since its inception, the with concurrent jurisdiction may proceed Declaratory Judgment Act has been until judgment is obtained in one of them. understood to confer on federal courts Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 465-466. unique and substantial discretion in See also In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, deciding whether to declare the rights of 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that parallel litigants.” Id. at 286. Thus, courts are in personam actions may proceed in permitted to avoid gratuitous interference federal and state courts, with principles of with state court matters by abstaining from res judicata resolving the effect of a claim s for declaratory judgment, judgment in one court upon the other). specifically if the state court proceedings
would address “the same issues, not Under these circumstances, we do governed by federal law, between the same not believe that this case requires parties.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282 (citing application of Pullman abstention. First, Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). deferring the state law issues to the state courts would not likely resolve the federal Therefore, if the federal court constitutional question presented. Second, believes that the state law questions in we see no issues in these state law claims controversy between the parties are better that create the “exceptional circumstances” suited for resolution in state court, then the required for Pullman abstention. federal court may properly abstain from
deciding a declaratory judgment claim. Id. However, Adoptees also argue for Although the Adoptees informed this abstention under an alternate theory. Court of their pending claims in Maryland Despite the strong antipathy to abstention, and New Jersey, those complaints are not the Supreme Court acknowledged a in the record before us. Without reviewing specific situation that allows federal courts the complaints, we cannot verify whether greater deference in deciding whether those state claims will adequately address abstention is appropriate. In Brillhart v. all of the issues presented in this case. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, Thus, we will remand this issue for further 494-95 (1942), the Court held that when a consideration by the District Court and federal suit is brought under the Federal application of the Brillhart abstention doctrine should the District Court then failure to follow Rule 24(c), we will treat deem such action appropriate. the claim as a challenge to the statute as
applied, and turn to the merits of the
III.
dismissal. The second count in the Appellants’ Appellants’ preface their ability to complaint alleges that the New Jersey collaterally attack the adoption decree on adult adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1, et the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § seq ., is invalid under the Fourteenth 31(2) (1982). That section states that: Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New Jersey State Constitution because it “does not provide for notice to persons
[a] judgment in an action whose purpose is or entities interested in or whose interests to determine or change a person’s status is may be affected by the adoption.” conclusive with respect to that status upon Because this claim, on its face, appears to all other persons, with the following be a facial challenge to the New Jersey qualifications: adult adoption statute, this Court noted that Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c) requires that the District Court notify the state attorney
(a) If a person has, under applicable law, general of the claim, providing the state an an interest in such status such that he is opportunity to intervene to defend the entitled to contest its existence, the statute. Although Rule 24(c) places the judgment is not conclusive upon him responsibility on the court to provide unless he was afforded an opportunity to notice to the state, it also warns that the be a party to the actions. party challenging the statute “should” call the matter to the attention of the court. In this case, the record does not indicate any
Comment (f) to the Restatement § acknowledgment from the District Court 31(2) further explains that: or the Appellants of its Rule 24(c) duty. We requested that the parties address the [r]ules governing proceedings to consequences of the failure to comply with adjudicate status often designate those who Rule 24(c). The Appellants explained that must be made parties to, or given notice their claim was not actually a facial of, the proceedings. . . . In some instances, challenge to the statute, but rather a a legal interest in the status sufficient to challenge to the statute as applied in these confer that authority has been found to circumstances. Because this is an appeal exist as a matter of Constitutional law. of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we will Beyond this, applicable statutory and accept the Appellants’ customizing of their decisional law determines the persons who claim, despite the otherwise clear language have such an interest. in the complaint. Therefore, we will not take any action with respect to a potential
Although the New Jersey courts if it is convinced that the plaintiff can have not explored this topic, the District prove no set of facts warranting relief. Court correctly found that the New Jersey Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 adult adoption statute on its face only (1957). On the other hand, the District requires that consent, and therefore notice, Court’s second ground for dismissal, of an adult adoption proceeding be given finding that the Appellants’ due process to the spouse of the adopting parent. rights would be satisfied by their ability to N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1. There is no statutory defend their righ ts in the Trust requirement for notice to third parties. proceedings, strikes closer to the target. Therefore, the Appellants must show that We turn now to a more complete analysis their protected interest in the adoption of this issue. proceeding is derived from either the
At the outset, we note that due federal or state constitutions. process is a flexible doctrine, requiring The District Court dismissed the procedures as the situation demands and Appellants’ due process claim on two dependent upon the circumstances. grounds. First, the Court explained that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 none of the case law cited by the (1972); see Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d Appellants supported their claim that, as a 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996). Any challenge to party whose monetary interest in the Trust a state law, or the application of the law, could be tangentially affected by the on due process grounds begins with two adoption, they were entitled to notice of inquiries: (1) “whether the State has the adoption proceeding. Second, the deprived the claimant of a protected Court stated that the disposition of the property interest,” and (2) “whether the Trust itself would provide the Appellants State’s procedures comport with due with an opportunity to defend their process.” Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, interests, thereby satisfying due process. Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001). Appellants
argue that they have a legitimate property A constitutional analysis begins interest in Maria’s one tenth share of the with a presumption that a statute or its Trust because the Trust specifically states application is constitutional, and the that if Maria died without issue, her share challenger bears the burden of proving that would be divided among them as the a statute is unconstitutional. See I.N.S. v. remaining beneficiaries. However, Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). assuming arguendo the Appellants’ However, we are not persuaded that a assertion of a property interest in M aria’s party’s failure to cite sufficient supporting one tenth share of the Trust, [10] we do not case law is an adequate ground for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); it is possible that a party could raise a scenario [10] As will be discussed below, the not yet recognized in prior case law. A Appellants had no property interest in court should only grant a motion to dismiss Maria Fenton’s share of the Trust at the believe that the State’s action in granting her second cousin adoptees. What, if any, the adoptions actually worked to deprive effect the adoption had on the interests in the claimants of a property interest. the Trust of the other beneficiaries was a
matter for the trustees and the Maryland To support their argument, the courts. Appellants cite to a line of Supreme Court cases acknowledging that natural fathers “The fundamental requirement of have a due process right to notice of due process is the opportunity to be heard adoption proceedings if those proceedings ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful would extinguish their parental rights. See manner.’" Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. (1965) (recognizing a natural father’s Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The liberty interest in a parental relationship Appellants’ claim of a property interest in and requiring notice of an adoption to Maria’s one-tenth share of the Trust will satisfy the father’s due process rights); be determined by the trustees, based on Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 their interpretation of the requirements (1983) (holding that a state may satisfy due specified in the Trust itself, or by a court process through a putative father’s deciding the issue under Maryland law. registry, which places the father’s right to The New Jersey court, by granting the notice within his control). Appellants adoptions, exercised no jurisdiction or would have this Court interpret these cases authority over any property interest in the to establish a rule that parties whose Trust. Therefore, the “meaningful time” economic interest may be affected by an for the Appellants to be heard will occur adoption are entitled to either notice of the when either the District Court on remand proceeding or an alternative mechanism to elects to address the state law claim under assert their right to notice. Yet, these diversity jurisdiction, or abstains, leaving cases are distinguished from the scenario the issue to the Maryland state court. before us because in both Armstrong and
The Supreme Court’s recent Lehr, the adoption proceeding itself opinion in Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, extinguished the natural fathers’ liberty Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001) further supports interest in their parental status. In this our conclusion that the Appellants did not case, the New Jersey adoption proceeding have a due process right to notice in this did not purport to or actually determine the case. In Lujan, a California agency, acting Appellants’ interest in the Trust. Rather, under state law, withheld payments to a the adoption proceeding simply created a construction contractor because the agency parental relationship between Maria and alleged that the contractor had violated state minimum wage laws. 532 U.S. at 191. The contractor complained that the
time of the adoptions, but only an interest withholding violated its due process rights in a potential claim if certain conditions because the state did not provide notice or were met at the time of Maria’s death. a hearing before withholding the than the federal constitution, it has never payments. The Court explained that the announced such a position that would state’s actions did not deprive the encompass the due process rights to notice contractor of any property over which it of the adoption requested by the could exercise present ownership Appellants in this case. See, e.g., State v. dominion; the contractors’ interest was Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) limited to a future claim for payment under (announcing state constitutional rights in a contract with the state. Id. at 196. the context of search and seizure); Therefore, the Court held that “if Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of California makes ordinary judicial process Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) available to respondent for resolving its (announcing state constitutional rights in contractual dispute, that process is due the context of zoning). Therefore, we process.” Id. at 197. believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would reach the same conclusion under the Applying the Lujan holding to the New Jersey Constitution as we have case at bar, it is clear that the Appellants’ reached under the federal constitutional potential claim to Maria’s interest in the analysis. Accordingly, the District Court’s Trust at the time of the adoption was not dismissal of the due process claim will be based on present ownership dominion. affirmed. [11] The potential claim to Maria’s share of the Trust remained to be determined by the trustees or the Maryland courts. W e hold, therefore, that the Appellants, as third [11] The Adoptees raise two alternate parties, had no due process right to notice arguments to support their position. of the New Jersey adoption proceedings. First, they assert that when M aria’s The Appellants’ ability to pursue their attorney informed the trustees in 1990 of claim in the appropriate state court at the her intention to adopt her cousins and time of the Trust disposition provides all sought an opinion on whether the the process that is due them under the adoption would entitle her adopted Fourteenth Amendment of the United children to inherit from the Trust, she States Constitution. provided constructive notice to the beneficiaries satisfying any due process
The New Jersey Supreme Court has requirements. Second, the Adoptees noted that Article 1, paragraph 1 of the argue that laches bars this suit, given that New Jersey Constitution encompasses the the Appellants learned of the adoption in same due process rights guaranteed under 1991 but waited to challenge the the Federal Constitution. Montville Tp. v. adoption until after Maria’s death. Block 69, Lot 10, 376 A.2d 909, 917 (N.J. Because we hold that the Appellants did 1977). Although the New Jersey Supreme
not have a due process right to notice of Court has interpreted the state constitution the adoption proceeding, we need not in a few areas to provide greater rights reach these issues.
IV.
Because we hold that the District Court erred in its finding of no jurisdiction to hear the Appellants’ claims based on state law grounds, we will vacate the dismissal of those claims. However, because the Appellants seek declaratory judgment on state law claims which seem to address the same state law issues currently pending in state court, abstention on these claims may be appropriate under Brillhart. This case will be remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate its orders to dismiss, review the state law claims, and determine whether in the exercise of its discretion, it will abstain. In the event that the District Court does not abstain, it should decide the germane state law claims. Finally, the District Court’s order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Appellants’ due process claim is hereby affirmed. Each side to bear its own costs.
NOTES
[1] Maria’s adopted daughter Virginia Lewis Lauriault predeceased Ms. Fenton.
[7] Under the Maryland constitution, the
[8] It is worth noting that even if the courts and legislature have vested Maryland case is postured in rem , the probate jurisdiction in the orphan’s court. federal court will not be stripped of See Radcliff v. Vance, 757 A.2d 812, jurisdiction because the state court claim 816 (Md. 2000). Because the Trust is was filed after the federal in personam governed by Maryland law, and only the claim. See Reichman v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Maryland courts could assert any Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972). potential probate jurisdiction, the case
