Marshall v. Franklin Cty. TreasurerMarshall v. Franklin Cty. Treasurer
Rendered on August 18, 2022
On brief: Stephanie Marshall, pro se. Argued: Stephanie Marshall.
On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and William J. Stehle, for appellee. Argued: William J. Stehle.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
SADLER, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Stephanie Marshall, appeals pro se from a decision of the Franklin County Municipal Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Franklin County Treasurer (“Treasurer“), on Marshall‘s small claims complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} This case involves the Treasurer‘s issuance of notices related to the property located at 101 Meek Avenue, Columbus, Ohio (“the Property“). Accordingly, we find it useful to briefly review the recent transfer history of the Property based on the record before us. On March 10, 2017, ACM Vision V, LLC, issued a quitclaim deed conveying the Property
While he has no actual recollection of this particular situation he is familiar with the standard process for handling the DTE Form 100, Real Property Conveyance Fee Statement of Value and Receipt. The process requires that said form be accompanied by an executed deed conveying the real property from the Grantor/Seller to the Grantee/Buyer. After processing the deed, it would be stamped “Transferred” and returned to the person filing it. In his opinion, the Franklin County Auditor‘s Office would not accept a DTE Form without review and examination of the deed transferring the property from the Seller to the Buyer because the information on the DTE Form is collected from the deed.
(Steven Kosbab Aff. at ¶ 2.) Notably, Marshall does not deny that there was a deed conveying the Property to her; rather, she claims she elected not to mail the necessary documents and fees to the Franklin County Recorder‘s Office to have the transaction recorded. Marshall asserts she believed there would be no transfer of the Property unless the conveyance was recorded.
{¶ 3} In September 2021, the Treasurer sent notices to Marshall indicating the Property had been selected for a tax-lien certificate sale because there were delinquent real property taxes owed. After receiving the notices, Marshall filed a complaint in the Franklin County Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, asserting the following claim against the Treasurer:
The Franklin County Treasurer‘s office is trying to get me to pay the taxes on someone else‘s property. So for the hassle, my time, and the duress placed upon me to go to court I am suing
for $1,000.00 and to have my name taken off as a responsible party.
(Oct. 18, 2021 Compl.) Marshall‘s complaint was accompanied by copies of the tax-lien certificate sale notices issued by the Treasurer.
{¶ 4} On November 29, 2021, the Treasurer moved for summary judgment, asserting Marshall owned the Property and claiming immunity from tort liability under
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 5} Marshall assigns the following as trial court error:
The assignment of error would fall onto the courts as I was unaware that a response was needed from me when I received the NOTICE OF COURT APPEARANCE. Ex. A
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 6} “Appellate review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo.” You v. Northeast Ohio Med. Univ., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-733, 2020-Ohio-4661, ¶ 12. In this case, Marshall did not file objections to the magistrate‘s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Treasurer, and the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision. “An appellant‘s failure to object to a magistrate‘s decision waives all but plain error review on appeal.” Rhea v. Rhea, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-609, 2017-Ohio-4141, ¶ 10.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} In her sole assignment of error, Marshall claims the trial court erred by failing to notify her that a response to the Treasurer‘s motion for summary judgment was necessary. At oral argument, Marshall asserted she believed the motion for summary judgment would be addressed at the trial that was scheduled for January 27, 2022. Thus, it appears Marshall argues in effect that the trial court erred by ruling on the summary
{¶ 8} Under
{¶ 9} We previously have held that a trial court does not err by ruling on a motion for summary judgment after the time for a response has passed. See Bernard v. Wodarcyk, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-628, 2019-Ohio-4144, ¶ 11 (“The trial court ruled on the motion after the time expired for appellant‘s response and thus, did not err by ruling on the motion for summary judgment.“); Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Payne, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-185, 2017-Ohio-513, ¶ 12-14.1 In this case, Marshall failed to file a response to the motion for summary judgment within the time provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The magistrate issued a decision granting the motion for summary judgment on January 4, 2022, more than 30 days after the motion was filed, and the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision on January 10, 2022. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by ruling on the motion for summary judgment before the scheduled trial date. See McClendon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Sheriff Office, 8th Dist. No. 110863, 2022-Ohio-1589, ¶ 17 (holding trial court did not infringe appellant‘s due process rights because it gave him 30 days to respond to a motion for summary judgment and appellant did not seek additional time to respond).
{¶ 10} By rule, Marshall had 28 days to respond to the Treasurer‘s motion for summary judgment. When she failed to file a response within that time or seek an extension of time to respond, the trial court was not required to notify her that it intended to rule on the motion for summary judgment. We note that Marshall was pro se at trial,
{¶ 11} Under the circumstances in this case, the trial court did not err by granting the motion for summary judgment before the scheduled trial date without notifying Marshall that a decision would be issued. Accordingly, we overrule Marshall‘s sole assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 12} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Marshall‘s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J., and KLATT, J., concur.