Marshall v. DelPonteMarshall v. DelPonte
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- Before:
- Heiman
The defendant, the commissioner of motor vehicles for the state of Connecticut, appeals from the trial court’s judgment sustaining the plaintiff Lawrence Marshall’s appeal from the defendant’s order suspending Marshall’s driver’s license for ninety days pursuant to
The following facts are pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. On November 21, 1990, at about 12:51 a.m., Officer Kimberly Quesinberry of the West Haven police department stopped the plaintiff’s Dodge Polara after observing it being driven through a red light at the corner of Captain Thomas Boulevard and Savin Avenue in West Haven. Upon reaching the plaintiff, Quesinberry smelled alcohol on his breath and observed that his eyes looked glassy and his speech was slurred. Quesinberry then administered field sobriety tests to *348the plaintiff, which he failed. On the basis of her observations, Quesinberry arrested the plaintiff for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or both, in violation of
The plaintiff was transported to police headquarters where, after receiving the statutorily required warnings; see
On November 30, 1990, the defendant notified the plaintiff that his driver’s license was to be suspended for ninety days pursuant to
Carey issued his decision on December 26, 1990, finding that (1) the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for violating Public Acts 1989, No. 89-314 (now
The plaintiff appealed his suspension to the Superior Court, claiming, inter alia, that the defendant’s decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record and *350that the record failed to disclose any basis for Carey’s finding that the intoximeter test results indicated a BAC equal to or greater than 0.1 percent at the time of the alleged offense. The court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal on two grounds. First, it ruled that the defendant failed to produce expert testimony regarding the plaintiffs BAC at the time of the alleged offense as required by our decision in State v. Geisler, 22 Conn. App. 142, 576 A.2d 1283, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819, 576 A.2d 547 (1990), vacated on other grounds, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 663, 112 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1991). Second, it found that the record was devoid of any evidence regarding the plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the alleged offense. The court found, therefore, that Carey’s determination that the plaintiff’s BAC was equal to or greater than 0.1 percent at the time of the offense was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record and that his suspension of the plaintiff’s license constituted an abuse of discretion and prejudiced his substantial rights. It then sustained the plaintiff’s appeal and ordered the defendant to return the plaintiff’s original driver’s license to him.
We first address the trial court’s determination that our decision in State v. Geisler, supra, controls this case. Geisler involved a criminal prosecution for driving under ‘the influence of liquor in violation of
This case, unlike State v. Geisler, supra, involves an administrative license revocation proceeding under
The trial court did not, however, base its finding that the plaintiffs appeal should be affirmed solely on its interpretation of State v. Geisler, supra. It also found that the defendant’s decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record because there was no evidence, expert or otherwise, indicating the plaintiffs BAG at the time of the offense. We agree.
*352In determining whether an administrative decision is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record”;
The record of the suspension proceeding discloses no evidence supporting Carey’s finding that the plaintiff’s BAC was equal to or greater than 0.1 percent at the time of the offense. Although the record contains the results of two intoximeter tests administered after the alleged offense, it contains no extrapolation of those results back to the time of the offense.
Similarly, the record does not indicate that Carey either relied on his own expertise in determining the plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the alleged offense or attempted to take judicial notice of the plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the alleged offense. See
The record discloses no evidence on which Carey reasonably could have found that the plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the alleged offense was equal to or greater than 0.1 percent. Further, Carey failed to apprise the parties of his intent to rely on either his own expertise or judicial notice to establish the plaintiff’s BAC at the time of the alleged offense. As a result, the evidence presented at the suspension hearing was insufficient to justify suspending the plaintiff’s driver’s license under
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The plaintiff also was arrested for failure to obey a control signal, in violation of