Thе plaintiffs, Marshall Stewart, Jr. and Isiah Williams, brought this action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that the United States Postal Service *376 (“USPS”) discriminated against them based upon their status as African-Americans. The alleged discrimination occurred in the hiring process for the position of Manager of Processing and Distribution Facility at the USPS facility in Lafayette, Indiana. Stewart and Williams were employees at the Lafayette facility at the time, and they submitted written applications for the position along with six other USPS employees. The pool of applicants was composed of two white females, three white males, and three African-American males including Stewart and Williams.
Pursuant to USPS policy, the written applications were reviewed by a three member review committee and evaluated under the “STAR” method, which refers to “Situation on Task,” “Action” and “Result.” The job vacancy announcement identified the knowledge, skills and аbilities (“KSAs”) needed to perform the position, and applicants were instructed that their written applications must demonstrate how they possess each KSA by describing a situation on task in which they took action and providing the rеsults of that action, or STAR. The committee then reviewed the applications to determine which candidates were best qualified for the position by analyzing those STAR examples. After reviewing the applications individually, the members of the committee convened a teleconference to discuss their evaluations and make recommendations. The committee recommended four of the applicants for the position, and thosе persons proceeded to the next stage of the process which involved personal interviews. Stewart and Williams were not among those recommended, although another African-American male was in the recommended group. The three . member selection committee conducted interviews of the four finalists, and offered the position to Larry Melton, a white male. Stewart and Williams contend that they were discriminated against based upon their race. The district court granted summary judgment to the USPS, holding that Stewart and Williams had failed to demonstrate that the reasons given by the USPS for its decision were pretextual.
I.
A plaintiff may prove race discrimination under Title VII through direct evidence, or indirectly through the burden-shifting mechanism of
McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
II.
Stewart and Williams argue that the district court erred in considering on summary judgment an affidavit prepared by Walter Hess, the chairperson of the review committee, which detailed the reasons for the cоmmittee’s decision not to recommend Stewart and Williams. They also argue *377 that those reasons were pretextual, and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the USPS attached an affidavit frоm Hess. That affidavit stated, in relevant part, that all three reviewers rated Williams as one of the weakest candidates, and that the consensus on Williams was that his written application responses to the KSAs showed an adversarial quality that would be detrimental in the position. Hess further attested that he initially rated Stewart as one of his top four candidates, but that the other two disagreed. Those reviewers convinced Hess that his rating was too high becausе in his application Stewart did not document “Actions” that he had taken himself, as is required, but instead had “ ‘too many we’s — not anything he did himself.’ ”
Stewart and Williams maintain that the affidavit represents inadmissible hearsay, and that it should not have been сonsidered by the district court. They also assert that the Hess affidavit is improper to the extent that it goes beyond presenting Hess’ own views and sets forth the actions and conclusions of the committee as a whole.
The plaintiffs’ hеarsay argument rests largely on a misunderstanding of the concept of hearsay. They argue that the affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay because it included statements and thoughts by other committee members and because it sеt forth the reasons for the review committee’s actions, not just Hess’ own views. There is only one actual statement by the other reviewers in the affidavit, which is the comment that Stewart’s application had too many “we’s.” That comment at the teleconference is hearsay only if offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.,
Furthermore, Stewart and Williams are simply wrong in asserting that Hess may not testify as to what happened at the teleconference. Hess was a participant in the teleconference, and thus has personal knowledge of what was decided and why. If the plaintiffs’ argument was carried to its logical extreme, each committee member could only testify as to his or her personal opinion, but no one could testify as to what the group as a whole decided. There is no legal support for that position, and in faсt the plaintiffs have not attempted to provide any. Hess could properly testify as to the reasons why the committee decided not to recommend Stewart and Williams for the position. Therefore, the district court did not err in considering the Hess affidavit when granting summary judgment.
Stewart and Williams make the frivolous argument that if those reasons are considered, the court also was required to consider as a reason for the decision another part of Hess’ affidavit, in which Hess indicated that a committee member discussed Williams’ EEO complaint. The affidavit makes clear, however, that after the decision not to recommend Williams was made, one member indicated that Williams previously hаd filed an EEO complaint, and that comment motivated Hess to retain his notes. The affidavit thus *378 negates any claim that the EEO discussion affected the decision, since the decision preceded it. The plaintiffs offer nothing to the cоntrary. In fact, the plaintiffs never even deposed any member of the review committee, despite having more than a year to do so.
Stewart and Williams also contend that the USPS did not follow the STAR method and that therefore the decision was pretextual. For instance, they argue that the STAR method requires two steps, Phase I and Phase II, and that there was no evidence that Phase I was attempted much less completed. That may be evidence thаt the USPS did a poor job of implementing the STAR method, but it is not evidence that the proffered reasons were pretextual. The focus of a pretext inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason was honest, not whether it was aсcurate, wise, or well-considered.
Jackson,
Finally, Stewart argues that the court should have found an issue of fact created by comparing the application of a selected candidate, Connie Flick, with Stewart’s applicatiоn. Stewart argues that his application used 65% “I’s” and 35% “we’s”, whereas a recommended applicant, Connie Flick, used 66% “I’s” and 34% 1 “we’s.” He therefore asserts that the difference is minimal, and thus the decision based on the absence of personal experience and abundance of “we’s” was pretextual. This argument is deficient for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that counting the “I’s” and “we’s” leaves no sense of the critical issue for a cоmmittee of where and how the language is used. In addition, even if we were to ignore that fundamental defect and consider the numbers, Stewart’s own example demonstrates that Connie Flick had substantially more examples of pеrsonal (“I”) rather than group (“we”) action. Stewart declares that Flick uses “we” 24 times or 34% of the time, whereas he used it 6 times or 35% of the time. That merely demonstrates that Flick provided many more examples of both personal аnd group action than Stewart. Of course, Stewart did not mention the number of “I’s” in each application, but his own figures indicate approximately 46 for Flick and 11 for Stewart. Far from demonstrating pretext, that actually provides evidence supporting the committee’s decision, and certainly does not provide evidence of pretext.
*379 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the district court is Affirmed.
Notes
. Stewart’s brief actually states 44%, but that would add up to 110%. Regardless of whether it was 34% or 44%, the analysis and disposition would be the same.