206 Pa. 558 | Pa. | 1903
Opinion by
.The first reason urged why this judgment should be reversed is, that “ the direct cause of the accident, the specific negligence of the defendant that is alleged to have caused it,” was not shown on the trial below. In pressing this reason, the learned counsel for the appellant insist that the case of plaintiff, as presented, is simply one of a supposed theory as to the cause of the accident, and is not supported by established facts.
It is, of course, true that, as between employer and employee, the mere happening of an accident raises no presumption that it was due to the negligence of the employer, and no theory as to how it might have happened, not supported by facts from which the jury can fairly find that the specific act of negligence charged is sustained, will justify the submission of the question to them. While the employer owes his employee the duty of furnishing such machinery and appliances as, in the ordinary usage of the business engaged in, are safe and suitable, and of keeping them in such condition, a verdict and judgment cannot be entered against him at the suit of an injured servant on a guess that he was negligent, or on a mere theory of specific negligence, without proof to sustain it. Specific negligence must be shown by competent testimony before the question of liability can go to a jury, who, in no case or controversy, are to be. guessers, but, in all, sworn triers of facts, upon evidence submitted to them. This we have repeatedly said in cases like the present, among the latest being Higgins v. Fanning & Co., 195 Pa. 599; Spees v. Boggs, 198 Pa. 112; Alexander v. Penna. Water Co., 201 Pa. 252; Price v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 202 Pa. 176; and the judgment here cannot be sustained if it is on a finding of a mere theory, unsupported by proof that the railroad company was negligent.
The specific act of negligence charged against the appellant is, that it knowingly supplied a locomotive with an old, worn, defective, unsafe and dangerous boiler, which exploded and caused the death of appellee’s husband. On the day of the trial — February 19, 1903 — two expert witnesses, called by the plaintiff, had examined the exploded portions. Complaint now seems to be made by the appellant of the examination
The testimony of these two witnesses is not merely as to a theory of what might have caused the explosion, but is a recital of facts, which, if believed by the jury, sustain the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant was negligent in placing its