MARSH USA LLC, Plaintiff, -against- MICHAEL PARRISH, GISELLE LUGONES, ROBERT LYNN, and JULIE LAYTON, Defendants.
1:25-cv-06208-GBD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
September 18, 2025
GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION
25 Civ. 6208 (GBD)
GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge:
Before this Court is Plaintiff Marsh USA LLC‘s (“Marsh“) Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery. (The “Application,” ECF No. 14.) Marsh‘s Application seeks injunctive relief to, inter alia, bar Defendants Michael Parrish, Giselle Lugones, Robert Lynn and Julie Layton (collectively, “Defendants“) from soliciting Marsh‘s employees and clients, and using or disclosing Marsh‘s confidential information. (Id.)1 On August 7, 2025, this Court set a briefing schedule for the Application and issued an Order for Defendants to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. (ECF No. 62.)
Defendants submitted a Memorandum of Law and other supporting papers in opposition to Marsh‘s Application on August 21, 2025. (ECF Nos. 80-82.) Marsh submitted a Memorandum of Law and rebuttal declarations in further support of its Application on August 28, 2025. (ECF. Nos. 107-111.) This Court held a hearing regarding Marsh‘s Application on September 4, 2025.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018) (per curiam) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Additionally, where the proposed injunction “will alter rather than maintain the status quo the movant must show clear or substantial likelihood of success.” Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
II. PLAINTIFF‘S APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
First, regarding likelihood of success on the merits, at issue is Marsh‘s claim that the Defendants breached contractual obligations set forth in the restrictive covenant agreements Defendants each entered to obtain employment with Marsh. These include obligations (i) not to solicit certain Marsh employees; (ii) not to solicit certain Marsh clients; and (iii) not to misuse Marsh‘s confidential information, as defined in the respective agreements. (See ECF Nos. 20-2 & 20-3 (Parrish); ECF Nos. 20-8 & 20-9 (Lugones); ECF Nos. 20-15 & 20-16 (Lynn); ECF Nos. 20-20 & 20-21 (Layton), hereafter collectively the “Employment Agreements.“)
Marsh has also shown it is likely to succeed on its claim that Defendants breached their Confidentiality Agreements by accessing Marsh‘s confidential client and employee information in relation to their anticipated move from Marsh to Howden. Confidential information is defined to include both “personnel information” and “client information“. (Mufson Decl. Exs. 3, 9, 17, 23, ECF No. 20.) Defendants’ Confidentiality Agreements prohibit them from directly or indirectly using, disseminating, or disclosing Marsh‘s confidential information except as required to carry out their duties as Marsh employees. (Id.)
Defendants also argue that Marsh lacks a protectable interest, making the various agreements “entirely unenforceable.” (Defs.’ Mem. 15-16, ECF No. 82.) Multiple courts have held, however, that employers have a legitimate interest in protecting their workforce from targeted solicitation. See, e.g., Marsh USA Inc. v. Karasaki, No. 08 Civ. 4195, 2008 WL 4778239, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Natsource LLC v. Paribello, 151 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Similar efforts by other former Marsh employees have been deemed to likely violate similar contractual provisions. See Marsh & McLennan Agency, LLC v. Alliant Ins. Servs., Inc., No. 1:24-cv-9914, 2025 WL 304500, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Marsh USA Inc. v. Karasaki, No. 08 Civ. 4195, 2008 WL 4778239, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Marsh has presented direct and circumstantial evidence of over 90 coordinated employee resignations (see Schnabolk Decl. ¶ 6), conduct that implicates Marsh‘s protectable interests.
Marsh has also demonstrated the likelihood that it would suffer irreparable harm, absent injunctive relief, from damage to its client relationships and use and/or disclosure of its confidential information. Besides the more than 90 Marsh employees who immediately followed Defendants to Howden (id.), at least eight clients of Marsh also accompanied Defendants. (McClellen Decl. ¶ 10.) Defendants refute plaintiff‘s claims of irreparable harm, noting that Marsh‘s Application is based largely on alleged actions completed in the past and before the date of Defendants’ resignations. (ECF No. 82 at 11.) This characterization ignores the full record. Defendant Layton has begun her employment with Howden (Hr‘g Tr. 7:14, Sept. 4, 2025), whereas Defendants Parrish, Lynn, and Lugones have submitted resignations to Marsh and are currently still Marsh employees in their notice periods. They do not dispute that they intend to start employment at Howden on September 22, 2025, and intend to provide the same or similar insurance broking services as they did at Marsh. (ECF No. 120-1 Ex. A.) Since Marsh submitted its Application, an additional nine clients have left for Howden, bringing the total number of clients that have departed to seventeen. (Second Schnabolk Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 111.) Ten of these clients were tied to Defendant Lugones (id.), who detailed plans to “transition” certain Marsh clients to Howden in her declaration. (Lugones Decl. ¶¶ 23, 26-32.)
Marsh has further demonstrated that it will continue suffering irreparable harm due to the risk of Defendants’ use and disclosure of its confidential information. There is evidence that Defendants possess knowledge of Marsh‘s confidential business strategies and information,
Lastly, the balance of equities and public interest favor a limited preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that the balance of equities—the harm to plaintiff from denial of the injunction as against the harm to defendant from granting it—tips in the plaintiff‘s favor. See e.g. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep‘t of Fin. Serv., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014). On balance, Marsh has demonstrated that it will likely suffer further irreparable harm, absent injunctive relief, through the loss of client relationships, employees, and disclosure of its confidential information. Further, there is “undoubtedly a public interest in enforcing valid contracts including such restrictive covenants as they may contain.” HRB Res. LLC v. Schon, No. 6:19-cv-0339, 2019 WL 4015256, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2019). Public interest weighs in favor of enforcing valid and binding contracts like the Employment Agreements between Marsh and the Defendants. Defendants argue that the relief Marsh seeks would harm the public interest and “stifle competition.” (ECF No. 82 at 1, 30.) But, as Plaintiff specifies in its Revised Proposed Order, it moves this Court to enter a “status quo preliminary injunction.” (ECF No. 120-1 Ex. A.) Such an injunction would be narrowly tailored to mirror the defendants’ existing obligations2 (see R. Lynn Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, Layton Mem. 11, Lugones Decl. ¶
III. CONCLUSION
Having considered the parties’ submissions and arguments, this Court hereby grants in part Marsh‘s Application for a preliminary injunction. In particular, this Court grants Marsh‘s Application for a preliminary injunction enjoining each defendant from, directly or through others, (1) communicating with current Marsh employees regarding employment with Howden, or any form of solicitation thereof, (2) communicating with existing Marsh clients regarding provision of services or products by Howden, or any form of solicitation thereof, and (3) any use or disclosure of Marsh‘s confidential information. This Court denies further injunctive relief sought by Marsh with regard to prohibiting Defendant Parrish, Defendant Lugones and Defendant Lynn from engaging in competitive activities.
Dated: SEP 18 2025
New York, New York
GEORGE B. DANIELS
United States District Judge
